Majority
Headnote
1. Trusts (§ 349[1] )—Constructive Trusts—Grounds—Fraud.Action to impress a trust upon certain cotton in the possession of the defendants, upon the theory that it was purchased with funds obtained from the plaintiffs by fraud, and that defendants obtained possession of the cotton with notice of the fraud, and without paying value therefor. The defendants demurred to the complaint, upon the ground, among others, that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained, with leave to serve an amended complaint ( 132 N. Y. Supp. 505 ), and on appeal the order sustaining the demurrer was affirmed ( 149 App. Div. 942 , 133 N. Y. Supp. 1127 ). The plaintiffs thereafter served an amended complaint, to which the defendants again demurred, on substantially the same ground as before. After the demurrer had been interposed, the plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings, and from an order sustaining the demurrer, and an order dismissing complaint, unless further amended within 20 days, the plaintiffs appeal.
The amended complaint alleges, in substance, that between the 5th and 20th of April, 1910, the firm of Steele, Miller & Co., merchants doing business in the state of Mississippi, drew five foreign drafts,, payable to its own order, aggregating upwards of $68,000; that attached to these drafts were eight forged bills of lading, each one purporting to cover 100 bales of cotton, deliverable to its own order at a foreign port named; that it indorsed the drafts and bills of lading,, and forwarded the same to one Van Gerpen, its New York agent,, with direction to sell the same; that the plaintiffs, bankers doing business in the city of New York, relying upon the forged bills of lading, purchased the drafts from Van Gerpen, and after deducting exchange, etc., paid him therefor $68,676.25; that cotton called for by the bills of lading was never shipped, nor was any part of the drafts paid,, though• duly presented for payment; that to facilitate the remittance to Steele, Miller & Co. of the money paid by plaintiffs to Van Gerpen,. Steele, Miller & Co. drew certain “currency” drafts upon Van Gerpen, and deposited them in banks in Mississippi, which, in turn, forwarded them to their correspondents in New York, where the same were paid by Van Gerpen with the money received from the plaintiffs; and that the balance in'excess of the “currency” drafts was transmitted by Van Gerpen in other unspecified ways.
There is no allegation in the complaint that the “currency” drafts-
[1] One who has been deprived of his property by fraud may, in case he can identify it or trace the proceeds derived from its sale, impress a trust upon it or the proceeds, whether in the hands of the wrongdoer or any person who takes title through him, unless it be in good faith and for value (Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N. Y. 261 , 91 N. E. 582 , 29 L. R. A. [N. S.] 119, 139 Am. St. Rep. 817 , 19 Ann. Cas. 747; Welch v. Polley, 177 N. Y. 117 , 69 N. E. 279 ; Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133 , 25 Am. Rep. 152 ); and this even though, at the time the trust is sought to be impressed, the wrongdoer, or the person to whom the title has been transferred, is insolvent and unable to pay his other creditors (Matter of Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 256 , 11 N. E. 504 ; Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De G., M. & G. 387). This is upon the theory that the property, or the proceeds, belongs to the person defrauded, and the one who defrauded him, or the transferee, holds it as trustee for his benefit. Lightfoot v. Davis, supra.
[2] But in every case the property upon which it is sought to impress the trust must be shown to be either the property of which the cestui que trust was defrauded, or proceeds derived therefrom. There must be a direct and unbroken connection between the two. This was pointed out in Perris v. Van Vechten, 73 N. Y. 113 , the court saying:
“To follow money into lands and impress the latter with a trust, the money must have been clearly traced and distinctly proved to have been invested in the lands.”
And in Matter of Cavin v. Gleason, supra:
“But it is the general rule, as well in a court of equity as in a court of law, that in order to follow trust funds and subject them to the operation of the trust they must be identified.”
See, also, Matter of Hicks, 170 N Y. 195 , 63 N. E. 276 , Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 369 , 34 N. E. 205 , 20 L. R. A. 566 , 34 Am. St. Rep. 463 , and Cole v. Cole, 54 App. Div. 37 , 66 N. Y. Supp. 314 .
[3] It does not appear from the allegations of the amended com
I am of the opinion that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, and for that reason the orders appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
Cases cited
- Lightfoot v. Davis 198 N. Y. 261 p. 1103
- Welch v. Polley 177 N. Y. 117 p. 1103
- Newton v. Porter 69 N. Y. 133 p. 1103
- Cavin v. Gleason 105 N. Y. 256 p. 1103
- Ferris v. Vechten 73 N. Y. 113 p. 1103
- In re the Accounting of Hicks 170 N Y. 195 p. 1103
- Holmes v. Gilman 138 N. Y. 369 p. 1103
- Cole v. Cole 54 App. Div. 37 at 66 p. 1103
- Kirkham v. Bank of America 165 N. Y. 132 p. 1104
- Metropolitan National Bank of New York v. Loyd 90 N. Y. 530 p. 1104
- Cragie v. Hadley 99 N. Y. 131 p. 1104