Delevan v. New York, N. H. & H. R.

This action is brought by the plaintiffs, who are stockholders of the defendant the Rutland Railroad Company, owning 1,349 shares of the common or preferred stock in that company. It is not alleged that either of the plaintiffs own any stock in either the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company or the New York Central Railroad Company, and plaintiffs do not claim in this action to enforce any right or to recover for any damages sustained by the Rutland,$jRailroad Company, of which they are stockholders. They seek to málntain this action as owners of a small minority of the stock of the Rutland Company, and their right to maintain the action must depend upon the right that a minority stockholder has to enforce his individual right against the defendants.

The Rutland Company is a corporation organized under the laws of the states of Vermont and New York, and owns and operates a railroad from Ogdensburgh, in the state of New York, to Alburgh, in the state of Vermont, and thence to Rutland and Bellows Falls, in the state of Vermont, and of certain branches extending to the towns of Chatham and White Creek, in the state of New York. It is also the owner of the capital stock of another railroad corporation, and has certain trackage agreements with certain Canadian railroad companies, and agreements with steamship lines on the St. Lawrence river and on the Great Lakes. The Rutland Railroad also connects with a railroad known as the Boston & Main Railroad Company, operating a railroad in New England. The New York Central Railroad is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York, and operates an extensive system of railroads through New York state, and, by reason of its control of the stock of other railroad companies, a system of railroads extending through many of the states of the Union, and constitutes one of the main lines between the Western states and the Atlantic seaboard. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York and of the New England states, and controls the Boston & Maine Railroad. The New York Central Railroad Company was the owner of 47,041 shares of the preferred stock of the Rutland Company and 19,940 shares of the common stock of that company, constituting a majority of the stock issued, and by virtue of that ownership controls the election of the directors of the Rutland Company.

The complaint alleges" that on or about February 11, 1911, the New York Central and the New Haven Companies, contriving and intending unlawfully to restrain the trade and commerce within and among the several states and between the said states and foreign countries carried 'on by them and by the Rutland Railroad Company, respectively,

“By transferring said forty-seven thousand and forty-one (47,041) shares of the- stock of the Rutland Company held by the New York Central Company to the New Haven Company, to the end that the New Haven Company should control the -Rutland Company, and should illegally vote all of said stock for the election of directors of the Rutland Company, and should exclude the minority stockholders from a just and legal voice in the election of directors of the Rutland Company, and by entering into a partnership agreement whereby the New York Central Company and the New Haven Company should equally share and divide the losses .and profits arising from the operation of the Boston & Albany Railroad.”

In pursuance of said unlawful combination and' conspiracy, the New York Central Company and the New Haven Company wrongfully and unlawfully entered into a contract, dated February 16, 1911, wherein and whereby it was agreed: That all competition between the Boston & Albany division of the New York Central system and the Fitch-burg division of the New Haven system should be suppressed, and that the New York Central Company and the New Haven Company would each endeavor to develop and increase the business of the Boston '& Albany Railroad. A copy of this agreement in annexed to the complaint. That—

“in further pursuance of said unlawful combination and conspiracy, the New York Central Company has already wrongfully and unlawfully transferred t<v the control of the New Haven Company 23,035% shares,, constituting one-half of the controlling interest in the stock of the railroad company held by the New York Central Company, as aforesaid, at and for the price of about $105 per share.”

On July 1, 1911, the New York Central Company and the New Haven Company entered upon the performance of this contract. That in and about November, 1911, in further pursuance of the said unlawful combination and conspiracy, the New York Central Company and1 the New Haven Company further agreed that the remaining 23,035% shares of the stock of the Rutland Company held by the New York-Central Company should be transferred to the New Haven Company-at and for the price of about $105 per share, and on November 20,. 1911, the executive committee of the board of directors of the New York Central Company adopted a resolution whereby the president, of the New York Central Company was authorized to sell to the New England Navigation Company, a company controlled • by the New Haven Company, 23,520% shares of preferred stock of the Rutland’ Company and certain demand notes of the Rutland Company held by."

The complaint then alleges that in consequence of these acts a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states and with foreign nations formerly carried on by the railroad companies independently has been formed and is in operation, and the defendants are attempting to monopolize such interstate, and foreign trade and commerce “to the great and irreparable damage of the people of the states of New York, Massachusetts, and Vermont and the United States, in derogation of their rights, in violation of the laws of the states of New York, Massachusetts, and Vermont, and the act of Congress adopted July 2, 1890,” commonly known as the Sherman Act (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3200]), “to the great and irreparable damage and injury of all the minority stockholders of the Rutland Company.” It is then alleged that the New Haven Company now threatens to, and unless restrained by this court will, pursuant to said unlawful combination and conspiracy, take over from the New York Central Company and pay for at the above-mentioned price of about $105 per share the remaining one-balf of the controlling stock of the Rut-land Company, and the New York Central Company threatens to and will, unless restrained by this court, transfer said stock to the New. Haven Company, and the .New Haven Company threatens to, and unless restrained by this court will, vote all the stock of the Rut-land Company acquired by it in pursuance of said unlawful combination and conspiracy at all meetings of the Rutland Company to be hereafter held in favor of directors wholly dictated and controlled by the New Haven Company, and will deprive.the minority stockholders of the Rutland Company of a just and legal voice in the election of directors of the Company, and will maintain and perpetuate an illegal control and domination of all the business and affairs of the Rutland Company. '

It is then alleged that there are about 800 minority' stockholders of the Rutland Company, who are citizens and residents of a large number of states, and the plaintiffs bring this suit on their own behalf and on behalf of all other stockholders of the Rutland Company similarly situated, who may come in and contribute to the expense of the suit and join in the prosecution thereof. And the judgment demanded is that the defendant the Rutland Company be perpetually enjoined from registering on the books of the Rutland Company any transfer of the stock of the Rutland Company from the New York. Central Company to the New Haven Company, and from in any manner recognizing or accepting either the New York Central Company or the New Haven Company as the holder or owner of any shares

Upon this complaint the Special Term granted a temporary injunction restraining the New York Central Railroad Company, its stockholders, directors, officers, agents, and attorneys, and each of them, from in any manner transferring or delivering to the defendant the New Haven Railroad Company, or its representatives, any of the capital stock of the defendant Rutland Railroad Company now owned by the said New York Central Company, and enjoining the New Haven Railroad Company, its stockholders, directors, officers, agents, and attorneys, from acquiring or receiving from the defendant the New York Central Company any of the stock of the defendant Rutland Company, and enjoining the'Rutland Company from registering on its books any transfer of its stock from the New York Central Railroad Company to the New Haven Railroad Company; and from the order granting that injunction the defendants appeal.

While there is a general allegation in the complaint as. to the irreparable injury that this transfer will cause to the minority stockholders of the Rutland Company, no fact is alleged which would justify an inference of such damage. Refore the agreements alleged in the complaint, and which are complained of, were made, the New York Central Company owned a majority of the stock of the Rutland Railroad Company, after such transfer is completed, the New Haven Company will own a majority of the stock of the Rutland Company, and it is not suggested upon what principle the minority stockholders of the Rutland Company will suffer by this transfer of control. It is alleged that the New. Haven Company and the corporation which it controls compete with the Rutland Company, but that is strenuously denied by the defendants, they claiming that the Rutland Company is a connection or extension of the New Haven road rather than a competing road; and it certainly is not clearly established that as the roads exist at present there can be any substantial competition between them. The mere fact that passengers could by a devious and extended

But in the view that I have of the controlling principles that must determine the questions submitted to us it is not necessary to determine this question. What is apparent is that the New York Central Railroad and the systems which it controls are much greater competitors of the Rutland Railroad than the New Haven Railroad can ever become, and certainly, if it would be illegal for the New Haven Railroad to acquire a majority of the stock of the Rutland Railroad, it would be equally illegal for the New York Central Railroad to hold a majority of that stock; and its continuous ownership of that stock, which involves the control of the Rutland Railroad, is a more serious violation of the laws of the United States than the control of the Rut-land Railroad by the New Haven Company would be. Accepting the allegations of the complaint, the New York Central Company, being the owner of a majority of the stock of the Rutland Railroad and controlling its operation and management through the ownership of such stock, has been violating the federal law for years and subjecting itself to the penalties imposed by that act. It now seeks to relieve itself from this unlawful position by transferring its stock to another railroad, and the effect of the injunction granted below is to restrain the New York Central Railroad from ceasing to violate the federal law in transferring its stock to another corporation, because it is alleged that the other corporation will also violate the law if it acquires the stock. Just how this could possibly affect the rights of the minority stockholders is difficult to understand. The object of this attack upon the right of the New York Central Railroad to sell its stock is, however, quite frankly stated in the brief of the learned counsel who appeared for the respondent, as, indeed, it fairly appears from the allegations of the complaint.

It appears from the record, and is repeated in the brief, that the position of the Rutland minority stockholders’ committee before the Public Service Commission, when this question as to allowing this transfer of stock was before it, was that in any event the control should not be allowed to pass, unless adequate provision was made for the protection of the minority stockholders, and that this could not be accomplished, except by requiring the purchasing company to pay for such minority stock as may be offered the same price as it had agreed to pay for the majority stock, namely, about $105 per share. And complaint is made that the Public Service Commission, in passing upon the application of the New York Central Railroad to acquire the stock of the Ontario & Western Railroad Company, decided that such leave should not be granted, except by imposing as a condition of

One of the plaintiffs’ contentions, as stated by the learned counsel for the respondents, is that:

“Without regard to the anti-trust law, and even if the transaction were otherwise lawful, one corporation will not be permitted to acquire the bare control of a competitor, with all the opportunities and temptations for oppression and discrimination presented by such a situation, without at least being required to offer to th.e minority holders the opportunity to sell their holdings on the terms on which the majority is being acquired. The ordinary dictates of common fairness require that-such a condition be imposed before the minority interest can be subjected to such changed control.”

And a point in the respondent’s brief is devoted to an attack upon the Public Service Commission for granting this application without requiring the New Haven Railroad to purchase at the same price the stock held by the minority stockholders.

It must be quite apparent from this record that the injury that these plaintiffs complain of was caused by the refusal of the New Haven Railroad to purchase their stock at the same price as the stock was purchased from the New York Central Railroad, and that the object •of the minority stockholders’ objection before the Public Service Commission and this litigation is to force the New Haven Railroad to purchase their stock at the price at which they have purchased the majority stock from the New York Central Railroad. It is certainly a doubtful proposition whether a court of equity will allow its process to be used to accomplish such a purpose; but certainly a court of •equity will not by its injunction prevent a corporation from transferring a control which it is alleged is in violation of the federal statutes, because the purchaser of the control will probably violate the same law that the seller of the stock is charged with having violated. If the allegation as to the effect of the control of the New York Central Company over the business of the Rutland Company is sustained, certainly the interests of the Rutland Company and its minority stockholders would be greatly conserved if its stock was transferred to another company, which would not have the same motive for making the alleged discriminations against the Rutland Company.

There is one legal question, presented at the outset of this investigation, which, however, renders further discussion of these questions unnecessary, and that is as to the right of the plaintiffs as minority .stockholders to maintain this action or obtain any of the relief they ask. As before stated, the plaintiffs are owners of a minority of the stock of the Rutland Railroad. They do not ask in this case to enforce the rights of the Rutland Company, but simply their rights as (owners of a minority of the stock. The facts upon which a minority stockholder can base a cause of action against a majority stockholder have been a question which has been greatly discussed, and which in

“The plaintiff has been damnified; but the damages sustained by him flow from the wrong committed against the corporation, and are, in pontemplation of law, remote, indirect, and consequential. Where, as here, the common law prevails, such damages are not recoverable, except in the right of the corporation. * *, * Even though the depreciation in the value of the stock be capable of ascertainment as a basis of damages at law, the wrongs complained of are wrongs against the corporation, and it has a cause of action for the restoration of the property or for the damages sustained. It is presumed that a diligent enforcement of these remedies will result in the restoration of the corporate property or its equivalent, and will afford adequate indemnity to the stockholders. A recovery in such case by the stockholders in their own right would not be a bar to a recovery of the same damages by the corporation. A double recovery has not been permitted in these actions up to the present time,'either-at law or in equity."

And this case was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 176 N. Y. 119 , 68 N. E. 142 , where the court said:

“True, the plaintiff has suffered a depreciation in the value of his stock as a result of the wrong, and in this respect the injury was personal to the holders of the stock. But every stockholder has suffered from the same wrong, and if the plaintiff can maintain an action for the recovery of the damages sustained by him, every stockholder must be accorded the same right. The injury, however, resulting from the wrong, was, as we have seen, to the corporation. The depreciation in the value of the plaintiff’s stock, and that of the other stockholders, was in consequence of the waste and destruction of the property and franchise of the corporation. There are wrongs which, if committed against a stockholder, entitle him to a right of action against the person committing the wrong for the damages sustained, as, for instance, where a person had been induced to purchase stock in a corporation and pay a higher price than the stock was fairly and reasonably worth, or where the owner of stock had been induced to part with it for a less sum than its true value, by reason of false and fraudulent representations of others with reference to its value. Bui these wrongs are distinguishable from those against the corporation. They result in injury, to the stockholder upon whom the wrong is practiced, but do not injure the other stockholders or the corporation itself. The injuries, however, in this case, are not of that character. The defendants had obtained control of the affairs of the corporation through the board of directors elected by them. These directors undertook to manage the property of the corporation in good faith, according to their

best judgment and skill, in the interests of all of the stockholders. Having assumed the management, they were bound to use their best endeavors to prevent default in the payment of interest and the consequent sacrifice of the corporate property. Under the allegations of the complaint, the directors of' this corporation not only failed to discharge their duties to the stockholders, but they actively participated in the depletion of the company’s treasury and in a sacrifice of the company’s property, thus depriving the stockholders and the creditors of that which belonged to them.”

The court then cites from Judge Vann’s opinion in the case of Flynn v. Brooklyn City R R. Co., 158 N. Y. 493 , 53 N. E. 520 :

“Where a majority of the directors, or stockholders, or both, acting in bad faith, carry into effect a scheme which, even if lawful upon its face, is intended to circumvent the minority stockholders and defraud them out of their legal rights, the courts may interfere and remedy the wrong. Action on the part of directors or stockholders, pursuant to a fraudulent scheme designed to injure the other stockholders, will sustain an action by the corporation, or, if it refuses to act, by a stockholder in its stead for the benefit of all the injured stockholders.”

That was an action to recover the damages sustained by the corporation in consequence of an illegal act of the majority, after such acts had been committed and the corporation and its stockholders injured thereby; while in this case the'majority stockholders are to be restrained from disposing of their stock, because such a result might happen by virtue of the control of the New Haven Railroad Company over the corporation. Certainly if, after the wrong has been committed, a minority stockholder cannot sue to recover damages caused to his stock by such wrongful and illegal acts, such minority stockholder cannot have a cause of action in equity to restrain the acquisition of a majority of the stock by an individual or corporation because it is possible that similar results would follow the acquisition of a majority of the stock.

The question as to the right of the corporation itself to maintain this action was presented to the United States Circuit Court in the case of Hunnewell v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. Co., 196 Fed. 543 , and in that case Judge Noyes, in refusing an application for an injunction, said:

“The conclusion reached from the examination thus far is that the complainant in this suit is not entitled to an injunction restraining the sale of' said shares. If, however, this conclusion were not reached and this suit was treated as one by the stockholder in his own interest, it would still be impossible for us to grant an injunction upon the ground of want of application to the Public Service Commission, because it now appears that such application has been made.”

But these cases only follow the principle established in a line of cases of which McHenry v. Jewett, 90 N. Y. 58 , is the leading case,, in which Chief Judge Andrews said:

“It is not sufficient, to authorize the remedy by injunction, that a violation of a naked legal right of property is threatened. There must be some special ground of jurisdiction, and, where an injunction is the final relief sought, facts which entitle the plaintiff to this remedy must be averred in the complaint and established on the hearing. The complaint in this case is bare of any facts authorizing final relief by injunction. It is true that it is alleged that the defendant, by the use of the shares, has been enabled to a great ex

tent to control the management of the combination in the interest of the New York, Lake Erie & Great Western Railway Company, with little or no regard to the best interests of the company issuing the shares. But there are no facts supporting this allegation, nor is it averred that the interests of the latter company have been prejudiced, or that the value of the shares has been impaired by the acts of the defendant. So, also, it is alleged that it is greatly against the plaintiff’s interest as a shareholder to permit the defendant to vote upon the shares,, and that the plaintiff will suffer great and irreparable injury, if the defendant is permitted to do so. But no facts justifying these conclusions are stated, and the' mere allegation of' serious or irreparable injury, apprehended or threatened, not supported by facts or circumstances tending to justify it, is clearly insufficient.”

See, also, Gamble v. Queens County Trust Co., 123 N. Y. 91 , 25 N. E. 201 , 9 L. R. A. 527 ; Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262 , 108 N. Y. Supp. 978 , affirmed 192 N. Y. 535 , 84 N. E. 1111 ; Flynn v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 158 N. Y. 493 , 53 N. E. 520 .

And that principle has been uniformly followed in this court and In the Court of Appeals. It is clear that neither in the complaint in this action nor in the evidence submitted! to the Special Term was there allegation or proof that this transfer to the New Haven Company has caused or could cause any injury to the plaintiffs or other minority stockholders, except so far as such a transfer would injure the corporation and thus indirectly depreciate the value of the plaintiffs’ stock. In fact, Mr. Justice EAUGHEIN’S opinion conclusively establishes that in this case the plaintiffs have sustained and can sustain no damage by reason of the transfer of the Rutland stock to the New Haven Company, so far as it has been completed, or by the contemplated transfer of the remainder of the stock owned by the New York Central Company, unless, indeed), the plaintiffs have been damaged by the refusal of the Public Service Commission to compel the New Haven Company to purchase the plaintiffs’ stock for the same price that the defendant New Haven Company paid the New York Central Company, a damage which I think will be conceded cannot be the basis of an injunction to restrain the New York Central Company from selling, or the New Haven Company from-buying, the stock at a price which the parties may agree to. There is no allegation that the plaintiffs’ stock has decreased in value by reason of thiso sale of the New York Central’s holdings, and! an allegation as to the method by which the New York Central Company has decreased the value of the plaintiffs’ stock by virtue of its management of the Rutland Company would! tend to show that it was a distinct advantage to the plaintiffs, as stockholders of the Rutland Company, to have the management changed, so that such discrimination against the Rut-land Company should not be' continued. Applying, therefore, the principle that has been established and uniformly applied in this state for many years, it would seem clear that plaintiffs neither alleged in the complaint nor submitted proof by affidavit which would justify the court in restraining the owner of the stock of the railroad from selling it to whom it pleased! and at any price the purchaser would agree to pay.

. We have, however, the allegation upon which the plaintiffs seem 4o lay great stress, and upon which, as I understand Mr. Justice

It is unnecessary that we should attempt to determine whether or not these contracts are a violation of this statute, or that the sale of this stock by the New York Central Company would be a part of or the carrying out of an illegal contract; for it appears to me clear that a violation of this statute by the New York Central Company or the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company gives to the plaintiffs as stockholders of the Rutland Railroad Company no right of action to enforce this statute. We may assume, without deciding, that the Rutland Railroad Company, whose stock is being transferred in pursuance of an agreement which is illegal and void under this statute, would have a right to enjoin a transfer of control which would be necessary to carry into effect the void agreement, although it is difficult to understand how the Rutland Company could be affected injuriously or otherwise because two of its stockholders have entered into an agreement which the law of the land has declared to be illegal and which makes those taking part in it guilty of a crime. It is not alleged that the Rutland Company is a party in any way to the contract. Two of its stockholders have entered into what is claimed to be an illegal contract, and if they have violated! the law the parties to the contract are those who must bear the penalty. There is nothing in the law, and nothing is suggested, to show that the Rutland Railroad Company would be subject to any penalty because of the making of this contract by two of its stockholders. Its right to exercise its franchise could not possibly be affected, the corporate existence could not be threatened, and no injury could possibly be inflicted upon it.

But, even assuming that the Rutland Railroad Company would have a cause of action, each of its stockholders certainly would not have. No act of the New York Central Company and! the New Haven Company could possibly impose any liability upon the minority stockholders protesting against the action of the majority stockholders in selling its stock. These plaintiffs occupied no other relation to this transfer of stock by the New York Central Company to the New Haven

The order appealed from must therefore be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion denied, with $10 costs.

SCOTT, J., concurs.

I concur in the result reached, upon the ground that the plaintiffs cannot maintain this action, nor obtain the relief which they seek, not having alleged any damages sustained by them, as distinguished from those sustained by the corporation.

(dissenting). The plaintiffs own 1,349 shares of the capital stock of the Rutland Railroad Company, for brevity hereinafter referred to as the “Rutland Company,” a corporation organized under the laws of New York and Vermont; and they bring this action in behalf of themselves and all other stockholders of the Rutland Company similarly situated, and they claim to represent directly 6,151 shares and indirectly 15,000 additional shares of the capital stock. The outstanding capital stock of the Rutland Company is 90,000 shares. The New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, which will be referred to as the “Central Company,” in 1905 acquired stock control of the Rutland Company by the purchase of 47,041. shares of the capital stock; and in February, 1911, it transferred one-half of this stock to the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, which will be referred to as the “New Haven Company,” and thereupon three- of the directors of the Rutland Company, theretofore elected to represent the Central Company, resigned, and three directors of the New Haven Company, one of whom was its president, were elected to succeed them. The Central Company, since it obtained

“Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of commerce among the several states, * * *” is illegal.

And section 2 of which provides that:

“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine •or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several states * * * is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

It is alleged that the laws of Vermont prohibit any stockholder from voting on more than 10 per cent, of the capital stock of the company, and, in the event that the transfer is not enjoined, an injunction against the New Haven Company and the Rutland Company is prayed for, limiting the voting power of the New Haven Company accordingly. It would not be proper to express an opinion on the merits with respect to the controverted facts at this time; but. the decision of the appeal requires that the material facts alleged and supported by affidavits, even though controverted, be stated, for on the sufficiency thereof to present a prima facie case depends the right of the plaintiffs to have the injunction continued.

The plaintiffs allege that the Rutland Company owns and operates a ra-lroad extending from Ogdensburg, N. Y., to Alburgh, Rutland, and Fellows Falls, Vt., with branches extending to Chatham and White Creek, N. Y.; that it owns all the capital stock of the.Rutland & Noyan Railway Company, which owns and operates a short line from Alburgh to Noyan Junction, near the Canadian line, and thereby controls that company; that it has trackage agreements with the Quebec, Montreal & Southern Railway' Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, under which it runs and has the right to run its own trains over said lines between Noyan Junction, Iberville Junction, and Montreal; that it owns all the capital stock of the Rutland Transit Company, which is a duly authorized common carrier of passengers and freight by steamboats, and owns and operates a line of steamboats plying between Ogdensburg and Chicago and intermediate points, and thereby controls the business of that line; that at Bellows Falls it connects with a line of railroad controlled and operated by the Boston

The plaintiffs further allege that prior to the 16th day of February, 1911, the Central and New Haven Companies, contriving and intending unlawfully to restrain trade and commerce within and among

The prayer for relief, so far as material to the decision, is that the Rutland Company, its directors, officers, and agents, be enjoined from registering on its books any transfer of said stock pursuant to said agreement, and from permitting either company to vote thereon, and from permitting any stockholder of the Rutland Company to vote

The affidavits and evidence presented by the respondents tend to sustain all of the material allegations of the complaint, and tend to show that the Rutland Company, with its rights to operate its trains over other lines as aforesaid, and the New Haven Company are actually and potentially competitors for interstate trade and commerce from New England and Atlantic coast points to the Great Lakes and ports thereon and other points, as well as for such trade and commerce between most of the New England states and Canada. The moving papers further show that the market value of the stock of the Rutland Company is only $40 per share, and that President Mellen, of the New Haven Company, considers that for the purpose' of enabling his company to control the Rutland Company a bare controlling interest in the stock is worth $105 per share, and that he regards it as the right of one corporation, thus having stock control of another, to dispose of such stock control as may seem best for its own interests, and that he testified before the Public Service Commission that the purchase of this stock “was born of a desire to help the B. & M.” (meaning the Boston and Maine, which is controlled by the New Haven Company) particularly, and the New Haven Company “somewhat, but less.” It further appears that officers of the New Haven Company admitted before the Public Service Commission that the Rutland and New Haven Companies compete and are parallel to some extent. Mr. Mellen and other officers of the New Haven Company also testified that the interests of the New Haven Company in operating'the Rutland Company with respect to developing the business of the Rutland Company are not in conflict, and that while it would be possible for the New Haven Company, through this stock control, to divert business from the Rutland Company to a large extent, such is not its intention.

But the respondents have a right to expect that, in determining whether the temporary injunction0 should be vacated, the court will take the most favorable view to them of the affidavits and testimony and admissions of the officers of the appellants. It may be observed that it is at least doubtful whether the New Haven Company would pay nearly three times the market value of this stock for the purpose of controlling the Rutland Company, unless it is to obtain some advantage thereby at the expense of the Rutland Company. The respondents also present evidence tending to show that the New Haven Company is rapidly obtaining a monopoly of the New England interstate and international trade and commerce.

The learned counsel for the appellants contends that this case falls

This action is neither brought to recover damages sustained by the corporation nor for an accounting by any of the officers of the corporation or by others. The plaintiffs sue to enjoin the consummation of threatened illegal acts by which the control of the corporation will be turned over to a rival competing line, which will be permitted, through its ownership of a majority of the stock, to elect and control the board of directors, and dictate the policy and manage the affairs of the corporation of which the plaintiffs are minority stockholders ; and it is charged that such acts are not for the best interests of the Rutland Company, and are designed to give the New Havem Company an advantage over it, and that such will be their effect, and this charge is fairly substantiated. The plaintiffs allege that they will be damaged in their rights as stockholders, upon the ground that the Rutland Company will be subjected to penalties for violations of the Sherman Act, and that its earnings will be depreciated by a diversion of its business to the New Haven Company and otherwise. The only acts which the Rutland Company threatens to do, which it is alleged are a violation of the plaintiffs’ rights or of law, are the recognition of the transfer and the acceptance of the surrender of the stock, and the issuance of new stock to the New Haven Company, and the recognition of the right of the New Haven Company to vote on the stock. It is ndt apparent how those acts would subject the Rutland Company to penalties under the Sherman Act, even though the transfer of the stock by the Central Company to the New Haven Company be a violation thereof; but, however that may be, the plaintiffs would not be affected by the damages which it is alleged will ensue, excepting as-stockholders, and the same as all other stockholders, and therefore, with respect to those matters, the cause of action would be vested

In Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U. S. 423 , 28 Sup. Ct. 572 , 52 L. Ed. 865 , upon which counsel for the respondents relies as authorizing an action by a stockholder in his own right for affirmative relief other than an injunction, the form in which the action was brought was not considered in the opinions delivered in the Supreme Court of the United States or in the report of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (Anderson v. Shawnee Compress Co., 17 Okl. 231 , 87 Pac. 315 , 15 L. R. A. [N. S.] 846), and the action was sustained after the consummation of the act in violation of the Sherman Act and a lease illegally executed was annulled. In this jurisdiction, unless the fact that the execution of the lease was in violation of the express provisions of the statute distinguishes it from other cases, that action could only have been maintained by the stockholder in the right of the corporation. Flynn v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., supra. That decision is, however, authority for the action based solely on a violation of the Federal statute; for, if equity would afford relief on that ground alone after the violation, surely a court of equity can stay the act which would constitute the violation.

Section 7 of the Sherman Act is as follows:

“Any person who shall be injured tn this business or property by any other person or corporation by reáson of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act may sue therefor in any Circuit Court of the United States in the District in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages sustained and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”

This action cannot be maintained by the minority stockholders in their own right, upon the theory that this statute would give them the right to treble damages, and that the remedy at law would be inadequate owing to the impossibility of proving the actual damages. The right of action for damages, if any, would be in the corporation, and not in the individual stockholders. It cannot be maintained that the right of action for these damages is given to the stockholders. It would be impossible to determine each stockholder’s proportionate interest, and it would be an unreasonable construction to hold that every stockholder could recover treble damages, based "on the entire damages sustained by the corporation. It is, however, I think, the settled rule that if the threatened act sought to be enjoined be 'within the power of the corporation, so that pending the action by the stockholder it could be legally consummated or ratified, or if the acts have been consummated, and have thereby given rise to a cause of action in favor of the corporation for equitable relief, as, for in

In Tomkinson- v. Southeastern Railway Co., supra, which was an action by a stockholder in his own right to enjoin an illegal disbursement of corporate funds, the court, on granting the injunction, among other things, said:

“I have no .doubt that it is the duty of the court to grant an injunction in this case. The question, as the Attorney General said, is whether the act proposed to be done is within the powers of the railway company, or outside its powers. If it is outside its powers, it is now perfectly settled that any one shareholder may come to this court and say, ‘This company is going to do an act which is beyond its powers; stop itand the court thereupon has no discretion in the matter.”

If equity will, at the suit of a stockholder or member of a corporation in his own right and without showing special damages, enjoin threatened acts of the corporation which are ultra vires or otherwise illegal, I see no reason on principle why it has not jurisdiction and should not exercise jurisdiction to enjoin an illegal transfer of a majority of the stock. If an injunction would lie in such circumstances to enjoin the issue by the corporation of a controlling interest in the stock in violation of law, I think it will also lie to enjoin the illegal transfer by a stockholder of a controlling interest in the stock. The effect upon a minority stockholder of a transfer of a controlling interest in the outstanding stock in violation of law is precisely the same as if the stock had never been issued, and the corporation was threatening to consummate a contract to issue and sell a controlling interest in the stock in violation of law, in the sense

The majority stockholder in the circumstances disclosed by this case, a controlling interest having been accumulated by it for the purposes of control, occupies “substantially the same relation of trust towards the minority as the board of directors would occupy toward the stockholders it represents” (see Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. N. Y. & N. R. Co., supra), and owes a duty to the minority stockholders to manage the corporation within its charter powers and within all other laws applicable thereto, and in good faith and for the best interests of the corporation, and it is within the jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin and redress violations of this duty; but the honest exercise of the discretion and judgment vested in the majority stockholders cannot be reviewed by the court. Gamble v. Q. Co. W. Co., supra; Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. N. Y. & N. R. Co., supra; Flynn v. City Rd. Co., supra; Wright v. Oroville M. Co., 40 Cal. 20 ; Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., supra; Meyer v. Staten Island Ry. Co., 7 N. Y. St. Rep. 245 .

It is not necessary to consider the federal authorities under which counsel for the appellants contends that a suit in equity to enforce the provisions of the Sherman Act by injunction can only be maintained by the Attorney General pursuant to the provisions of the act; for in the case at bar Avell-recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction appear, and the minority stockholders have the same right, in my opinion, to apply to a court of equity to enjoin acts on the part of the majority stockholder and of others, including the corporation of which they are stockholders, in violation of a federal statute, as if the acts were in excess of the powers conferred upon the corporation by its charter, or in excess of the authority of stockholders as limited by the charter or other .laws of the state; for when the Congress of the United States legislated on this subject, which was clearly within its jurisdiction, it declared rules of law and of public policy which superseded all laws and rules of public policy of every state and territory inconsistent therewith, and the statute became as binding in this and every other state as if it had been enacted by the state Legislature, and it is as much the duty of the state courts to protect stockholders of a corporation against a violation thereof

The authorities lastly herein cited are, I think, precedents for this action; but, if they are not, I think that a precedent therefor should be made, for it will tend to safeguard the interests of the minority stockholders by preventing those in control through ownership of the majority of the stock from violating the duty which they owe to the minority to conduct the affairs of the corporation and preserve it as a- separate entity for the fulfillment of the purposes of its creation, instead of turning it over to a rival in violation of law and virtually terminating its independent existence. There is no danger in such a precedent. The only judgment demanded is an injunction to prevent the consummation of the transfer of the stock control in violation of the duty of the majority owner to the minority owners, and in Violation of the federal statute. The defendants will neither be subjected to a double recovery nor to a multiplicity of actions. No recovery is sought excepting a decree of the court restraining the violation of this trust duty and of the statute and canceling the transfer of stock which has been made; and this as a representative action in behalf of all stockholders who are not selling their stock at the excessive valuation offered by the New Haven Company for sufficient only to give it control of the Rutland Company. Of course, no. action could be brought by the majority, holder who is selling, and it is a party defendant, and the final decree will determine all questions with respect to liability by virtue of the contract, or contemplatedi-contract, as between it and the vendee, who is also before the court. No other minority stockholder can maintain a separate action in his own right for the relief demanded by plaintiffs, and if such an. action should be brought, under well-settled rules of equity practice, it would be consolidated with this or stayed.. I regard it as exceedingly doubtful whether the Rutland Company could maintain an action for like relief ; but, however that may be, it has been made a party defendant, and the other defendants will not be prejudiced, for the Rutland Company will be bound by the decree, and could not, if it would, maintain another action for like relief.

Section 150 of the Railroad Law (chapter 49, Consol. Laws; chapter 481, Laws 1910) forbids the merging or consolidation of parallel and competing lines of railroad, other than street surface railroads, and • contracts, including leases, for the use of one road by the other, “unless the Public Service Commission shall consent thereto”; and section 54 of the Public Service Commission Law (chapter 48, Consol. Laws; chapter 480, Laws 1910) forbids the purchase or acquisition by any railroad corporation, domestic or foreign, of “any part of the capital stock of any domestic railroad corporation,” including street surface railroads and other common carriers, “oganized or existing under or by the laws of this state, unless authorized so to do” by the Public Service Commission. The consent and authorization by the Public Service Commission pursuant to these provisions of law was obtained. The learned counsel for the appellants contends, therefore,

That argument seems plausible, but it is fallacious. It leaves out of consideration the fact that the Congress of the United States has exercised its constitutional authority to declare by statutory enactment a public policy on the same subject for the whole country, which, by virtue of the express provisions of the federal Constitution, became the “supreme law of the land,” and is as much the public policy of this state as any statute enacted at Albany. The federal statute super 7 seded all state statutes inconsistent therewith, and rendered nugatory any subsequent state legislation in conflict therewith. Second Employers’ Liability Cases, supra. It is based on the further erroneous theory that the Public Service Commission of the state of New York, in approving this transfer of stock, authoritatively determined that the transfer would not be prejudicial to the public interests, or in restraint of trade, or constitute a violation of the Sherman Act, and that such determination, if not controlling, should be accepted by this court. The opinions of the Public Service Commissioners, acting within their jurisdiction, are entitled to great weight, and doubtless their determinations on facts, acting likewise within their jurisdiction, if not annulled on certiorari, are controlling; but the Commission was exercising functions under the state law, and it could make no adjudication which would protect any of the parties against a prosecution or action for a violation of the Sherman Act, or which would, constitute a bar fo an action for damages or a suit in equity based on a violation thereof, or on a breach of the duty owing by the majority stockholders to the minority stockholders. If the transfer would constitute a violation of the Sherman Act or of such duty the Public Service Commission should not have approved it; but that body was not given jurisdiction to authoritatively decide those questions. It was authorized merely to determine authoritatively whether or not the transfer would be consistent with public interest, and, if so, to consent in behalf of the people of this state. That consent or approval was at most merely permissive, and notwithstanding it a court of equity may inquire into the motive of the Central Company in selling and the purpose and object of the New Haven Company in thus acquiring control of the Rutland Company, and the effect thereof, even though no statute were violated thereby; and if the transfer involves a breach of duty on the part of the vendor, it being in the circumstances of a quasi trustee for the minority stockholder, I think that it is entirely competent for a court of equity to enjoin it. See Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. N. Y. & N. R., supra, 150 N. Y. 434 , 44 N. E. 1043 , 34 L. R. A. 76 , 55 Am. St. Rep. 689 ; Young v. R. & K. G. L. Co. et al., 129 N. Y. 57 , 29 N. E. 83 ; Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., supra.

Moreover, I am of opinion that it is by no means clear that the Legislature contemplated that the Public Service Commission would attempt to ápprove of the purchase of a mere controlling interest in the stock of one corporation by a rival competing line, thus leaving

The Court of Appeals in Young v. Rondout & Kingston Gaslight Co., 129 N. Y. 57 -60, 29 N. E. 83 , 84, on considering whether an injunction, which was essential to a recovery by the plaintiffs, should be vacated, said:

■ “To dissolve an injunction, with the inevitable result of defeating plaintiff’s remedy without a trial, we must be entirely satisfied that the case is one in which by settled adjudication the plaintiff, upon the facts stated, is not entitled to final relief. We cannot say that of this plaintiff’s complaint in advance of a trial. * * * These are grave and serious questions. Oh this motion we do not decide them.”

It may be said that on the review of the order the Court of Appeals was confined to legal questions, and that this court may review the exercise of discretion by the court at Special- Term; but still, if the plaintiffs present a prima facie case for injunctive relief, where, as here, it is probable that their right to final judgment will depend upon whether the status quo is maintained, I am of opinion that the injunction order should be sustained. See Mannington v. Hocking Valley R. R. Co. (C. C.) 183 Fed. 133 , 146, 147, 149, 159; Bigelow v. Calumet & Heckla Mining Co. (C. C.) 155 Fed. 869 .

On the hearing on the application to vacate the injunction order, which was originally granted ex parte, the plaintiffs offered to have the cause submitted for decision on the merits on affidavits presented on the motion, as depositions, or to try the issues immediately, and they subsequently formally renewed this offer in writing. That was some evidence that the action has not been brought in bad faith and

The appellants further contend that in the main the Rutland and New Haven Companies are connecting companies, and form a through line, and are parallel and competing only to a very small extent, and that therefore there is and will be no violation of the Sherman Act, which was construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., supra, as embracing only “acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade, or which either because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts” injuriously restrain trade. Those questions should be left for decision when the facts are fully developed by common-law proof showing definitely the extent to which the lines are competing and parallel, and the extent to which trade and commerce will be restrained and a monopoly created, and clearly laying bare the purpose of the majority stockholder of the Rutland Company in thus turning over the control and management of that company to the New Haven Company and of the latter company in acquiring it. The plaintiffs allege, and present evidence tending to show, that the New Haven Company and lines which it controls are competing and parallel, lines with the Rutland line to an extent sufficient under the decisions of the federal courts construing the Sherman Act to establish presumptively that the proposed transfer constitutes a contract or combination in restraint of interstate and foreign trade and commerce, and is designed to monopolize such trade and commerce, and that it is therefore illegal and void. See Louisville & Nashville v. Kentucky, supra; Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197 , 24 Sup. Ct. 436 , 48 L. Ed. 679 ; Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 1 , 31 Sup. Ct. 502 , 55 L. Ed. 619 , 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 834 ; U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., supra; Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 197 U. S. 244 , 25 Sup. Ct. 493 , 49 L.

MILLER, J. I am of the opinion that a minority stockholder of a corporation may maintain an action to enjoin the transfer of the control of the corporation to a competing corporation in violation of law, and that the plaintiffs have made a sufficient case on that head to justify the Special Term in preserving the status quo until the determination of the action.

I therefore vote to affirm the order.