Majority
Headnote
1. BIunicipal Corporations (§ 796[2] )—Injuries on Streets—Negligence.The decedent, Joseph White, was a member of the fire department of the city of New York, and assigned to duty as driver of engine No. 16, which was housed bn East Twenty-Fifth street, between Second and Third avenues, in the borough of Manhattan, and in response to an alarm of fire from the vicinity of Eighteenth street and First avenue at 3:20 p. m. on the 28th day of March, 1910, he was driving a team of three horses attached to the engine east on Twenty-Fifth street to First avenue and southerly on First avenue, and at a point about 40 feet north of Twenty-Third street he was thrown from the engine and was run over and killed. This action was brought to recover the damages sustained by his sisters.
The defendant railroad company owned and operated a double street railway track in First avenue, and at the time of the accident the space between the outer rails of the tracks was paved with granite blocks, and that part of the pavement concededly was in good condition. The street had formerly been paved with bluestone, and thereafter asphalt pavement had been laid over the stone between the outer rails of the railway tracks and the curb on either side of the street. On the 8th day of September, 1909, the city had duly let a contract to the defendants Rafferty Bros., to repave the street with granite block pavement
Some of the evidence tends to show that there was a depression nearly nine feet in length along the westerly side of the westerly rail where the asphalt had been worn off down to the bluestone pavement, in which there was also a slight depression, and that the wheel of a vehicle going southerly coming into it would rise again gradually onto a strip of asphalt, and then pass into another similar, but shorter and more shallow, depression. The decedent had driven through this block to a fire after the asphalt pavement had been so removed and shortly before the accident, and several times within a few months prior to the accident. It may fairly be presumed that he knew the condition of the street. He might have driven down Second avenue, and that route would have been the same length. As he drove down First avenue, another vehicle was traveling southerly on the southbound track ahead of him, and it did not afford him room to pass without turning out of his course. He turned first to the left onto the north-bound track, and then after passing the vehicle, to the right
[1] The action was brought against the city, the street railroad company, and the contractors. The complaint was dismissed as to the contractors, and a verdict was rendered against the other two defendants. The evidence was sufficient to charge both appellants with notice of the condition of the pavement. The city was proceeding with due diligence to have the street repaved. It was under no obligation to repair the pavement outside the railway tracks, where it was about to lay a new pavement. The real question in the case, so far as the city is concerned, is whether it was negligent in not cutting off travel from this part of the street altogether. Part of the street, however, was perfectly safe, and therefore negligence cannot be predicated against its leaving the street easterly of the westerly street railroad track open for travel. It would not be reasonable to require the city to erect a barrier along the westerly side of the railroad track to prevent driving off the track to the west as did the decedent. The conditions there were as obvious to a driver under ordinary circumstances and in broad daylight as if notices had been post ed. I deem it doubtful whether the evidence was sufficient to present a question of fact with respect to the city’s negligence; but, if so, I think the verdict is against the weight of the evidence on that point.
[2] I would not attribute negligence to the decedent in driving in •the manner or at the speed shown by the evidence; but I think that in so doing he assumed the risk of being jolted off the engine. It may well be that he relied on a safety strap which was designed to prevent drivers being thrown from their seats. Ordinarily the safety strap remained hooked at one end, and the driver, on faking his seat, passed it around his waist and hooked it at the other end. The record does not show whether this strap was thus secured. It merely
Concurrence
[3] The street railroad company offered in evidence the contract made August 30, 1897, by the city with the Warren-Scharf Asphalt Paving Company for paving this street, between the curbs and the outer rails of the street railway tracks, with asphalt, together with the specifications and bond to keep and maintain the pavement in proper repair for a period of 15 years, which had not expired, and offered to prove that the city had rendered a bill to it for its proportionate share of the expense, and that the city had made another contract for the performance of work which the asphalt contractor failed to perform. This evidence was excluded, on the ground that it had not been pleaded. Counsel for plaintiff, after interposing this objection, withdrew it, and consented that the answer might be amended without terms, and offered to discontinue the action as against the railroad; but the court, on objection taken by other defendants, allowed neither the amendment nor discontinuance. The learned counsel for the railroad company contends, upon the authority of Roemer v. Striker, 142 N. Y. 134 , 36 N. E. 808 , that under 'its denial of negligence, and of duty to keep the pavement in repair, this evidence was admissible; but it is contended on behalf of plaintiff, on the authority of Donohue v. Syracuse & East Side Ry. Co., 11 App. Div. 525 , 42 N. Y. Supp. 808 , that it was necessary for the railroad company to plead that the city had, in effect, by the contract lawfully assumed the railroad company’s duty under the statute (section 98, Railroad Law [Laws 1890, c. 565], and chapter 475, Laws of 1895), and that the railroad, having been lawfully precluded from keeping this part of the street in repair, and having become liable to the city for reimbursement, if it had not in fact already paid the bill, could not -be held liable therefor.
I am of opinion that the court erred in denying the motion to amend the answer and in excluding the evidence, which might have constituted a complete defense. See Binninger v. City of New York & Brooklyn Heights Ry. Co., 177 N. Y. 199 , 69 N. E. 390 .
It follows, that the judgment and order should be reversed on bath appeals, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellants to abide the event.
INGRAHAM, P. J„ and McLAUGHLIN, J., concur.
We concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice LAUGHLIN as to the defendant railroad company; but dissent, and vote to affirm the judgment against the city.
Cases cited
- Roemer v. Striker 142 N. Y. 134 p. 798
- Binninger v. City of New York 177 N. Y. 199 p. 798