Majority
Headnote
1. Municipal Corporations (§ 218[2] )—Civil Service—Discharge—Conduct Detrimental to Service—Prior Rules or Orders.The petitioner shows that in the month of April, 1900, he duly passed an open competitive examination held by the Municipal Civil Service Commission of the City of New York for the position of senior clerk with said Commission and was duly appointed to that position on the 1st day of May, 1901; and that he served in that capacity until the 6th day of November, 1912, when he was dismissed after certain charges had been made and served upon him and he had been afforded an opportunity to explain them.
Petitioner further shows that he first served about a month as a clerk in the computing room, where computations of the ratings of those who enter civil service examinations are made after the papers have been marked by the examiners; that he thereafter served as a clerk in the Labor Bureau of the Commission until September, 1909, and thereafter as a clerk in the Information Bureau until October 9, 1911, when he was put in charge of the computing room and remained in charge of that room until his dismissal; that there were several employes of the Commission performing services in the computing room over whom and whose work he had supervision and charge; that his duties were to receive from the examiners for the Commission all examination papers on which they had passed judgment and on which they had marked the ratings they had given to the candidates, and the sealed envelopes containing the identification cards of the candidates,
“I hereby prefer charges against Albert D. McGuire of conduct unbecoming an employé of this Commission and subversive of discipline and efficiency.
“From the 19th day of October to the 29th, inclusive, the papers in the
examination for promotion to assistant foreman, fire department, were in the custody of the clerk in the computing room, and during that time certain monitors were employed in calculating the percentages and preparing the schedule sheets. I charge that at different times during this period Mr. McGuire improperly interfered with the work of the monitors so engaged, endeavoring to obtain information with reference to some particular candidates; that he went to several of these monitors with a slip of paper in his hand seeking and getting information from the schedule sheets with reference to the standing of some of the candidates in that examination, and that he made memoranda on this slip of paper as a result of the information so derived and that his acts were irregular and improper.”
That he appeared before the Commission, pursuant to notice from the chairman accompanied by a copy of the charges and affording him, at a time and place specified, an opportunity to make an explanation, and explained in substance his duties and the rumors which came to him and his investigation thereof as already stated, and gave to-the Commission the names of persons who had informed him concerning rumors with respect to the standings of certain candidates, and would have given the names of the candidates but for the fact that he had been instructed by the president of the Commission that advance ratings were only to be given to him, and that the president of the Commission in questioning the petitioner “abruptly turned to other matters at the point when the question naturally led up to a disclosing of these names,” and that he feared to give the information at that- time lest it would be a disobedience of the order of the chairman of the Commission; that after making his explanation he was notified in writing by the president of the Commission that the Commission found his explanation to be unsatisfactory and had ordered that he be ■ dismissed forthwith.
It was further shown in support of the petition, by the affidavit of one Conway, who had been assistant chief examiner, that with respect to nearly every examination for promotion in the police and fire departments rumors reached the office of the Commission to the effect that certain candidates had received certain ratings as a result of alleged unlawful conduct on the part of some unnamed employe of the Commission; that these rumors were generally unfounded, but that on ■one occasion an examination for police captain was set aside as a result of investigations in behalf of the Commission with respect to such rumors; that like rumors were afloat with respect to the examination in question for promotion in the fire department, and that during the ■compiling of the ratings of said examination they were brought to the attention of the president of the Commission with the result that certain firemen were dismissed from the service and others were fined; that it had been the practice during the tenure of office of various commissioners for employés of the Commission in the position which relator held at the time of his removal “to make some investigation of such rumors for the purpose of verifying them before presenting them to the Commission; that no rule or regulation or order prohibiting such investigation had ever been issued to his knowledge by any Commission against the practice.”
In behalf of the Commission, it was shown in opposition to the motion that, before the ratings of the candidates at such examination
When the petitioner came before the Commission to offer an explanation, he attempted to explain his failure to inform the commissioners-with respect to the rumors which came to .him concerning the ratings of some of the candidates who took the examination, on the ground that in so far as his investigation went he found that the true ratings-did not correspond with the rumors concerning them. He admitted that one of the monitors in the computing room remonstrated with him for looking at the rating sheets, and that he made answer that she was probably putting a wrong, construction on what he was doing, and. that he had looked at rating sheets in the hands of monitors at least half a dozen times, and that he tpok a sheet,of paper and wrote down the ratings. On being asked by one of the commissioners why he wrote them down, his only answer was,, “I did not see why I should not write.it down,” and, when pressed further for his object, he said that it was so that he might look it. over afterwards and “discover how he got the impression that he got his rating”; and, asked if his purpose was not to go out;and say that the rumor was right or wrong, he answered “I did not tell anybody outside. No one was interested to-
[1] The fact that the Commission had not made a rule or issued an order forbidding the petitioner from examining the rating sheets in the hands of the monitors for the purpose of taking memoranda thereof with respfect to the names and ratings ,of candidates and leaving the room and premises with such memoranda in his pockets did not preclude, the Commission from removing him for such conduct if they deemed it to be detrimental to the public service. People ex rel. Hart v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 82 N. Y. 358 .
[2] The authority,of the commissioners to make appointments is found in section 123 of the Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, c. 466), which provides, among other things, that they have authority to
The theory upon which the writ was granted and upon which it is sought to sustain the order is that the charges were frivolous, and Matter of Griffin v. Thompson, 202 N. Y. 104 , 95 N. E. 7 , which reversed the decision made 'by this department by a divided court ( 140 App. Div. 904 , 125 N. Y. Supp. 1123 ) is cited in support of that contention. In that case and in numerous other decisions (see People ex rel. Baum v. Butler, 120 App. Div. 807 , 105 N. Y. Supp. 606 ; People ex rel. Brown v. O’Brien, 137 App. Div. 311 , 122 N. Y. Supp. 25 ; People ex rel. Meeks v. Drummond, 141 N. Y. Supp. 315 , April, 1913), it was declared to be the law with respect to the removals of persons in the civil service not entitled to a trial but merely to notice of charges and an opportunity to make an explanation that the official or body in whom the power of removal is vested, may act upon his or their own knowledge, or on any information received from other sources, and if the charge be substantial, the court is without authority to review the determination with respect to the sufficiency of the explanation; but that, if the charge be frivolous and without substance, then the removal may not be "predicated thereon.
In the case at bar it is manifest that, if the charge was sufficient to give the commissioners jurisdiction to remove the petitioner, the exercise of that discretion should not be reviewed. No argument need be advanced to show the importance to the public interests of leaving a wide discretion to the commissioners in a matter of this kind, for not only would the civil service be demoralized, but the integrity of the commissioners would be questioned unless they are permitted to so conduct their offices and govern and control those in their employ that the civil service laws, rules, and regulations will be honestly and impartially administered, and in- a manner to inspire and retain public confidence with respect thereto which would soon be destroyed by the giving out of advance information with respect to ratings or by a prevr alent belief that this was done.
The petitioner was neither charged with making false ratings nor giving out advance information; but he had reason to believe that
I am of opinion, therefore, that the charges were substantial, and, since they were acted upon in good faith, there is no basis upon which the dismissal of the petitioner can be adjudged to have been illegal.
It follows that the order should be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and motion denied, with $10 costs.
INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, J., concur. CLARKE and SCOTT, JJ., dissent.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Hart v. Board of Fire Commissioners 82 N. Y. 358 p. 431
- Abrams v. Horton 18 App. Div. 208 p. 432
- People ex rel. Fonda v. Morton 148 N. Y. 156 p. 432
- People ex rel. O'Keefe v. Hynes 101 App. Div. 453 p. 432
- Griffin v. Thompson 202 N. Y. 104 p. 432
- People ex rel. Baum v. Butler 120 App. Div. 807 p. 432
- People ex rel. Brown v. O'Bbrien 137 App. Div. 311 p. 432