Majority
Headnote
Municipal Corporations (§ 185[1] )—Police Officers—Dismissal—Grounds— Review.The charge which the relator was required to answer, and upon which he was tried and dismissed, was “Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline,” and the specifications thereof were that, knowing that patrolman William Cohen received $100 from one Epstein, a complainant in a criminal investigation which Cohen and relator were conducting, failed “to report same to proper authorities.” The relator pleaded not guilty, and was tried before Third Deputy Commissioner Walsh, before whom Cohen had been tried on a charge based on his having received the money. The testimony taken on Cohen’s trial was stipulated into this case, so far as applicable, without calling the witnesses.
Cohen and the relator had been detailed to the Seventh precinct for detective work and assigned to the investigation of crimes relating to the poisoning of hors.es and to extortion in connection therewith. They had been most successful, and had secured the arrest and convic
It is manifest that Epstein had entire confidence in Cohen, and considered the transaction perfectly legitimate. His understanding was that the money was to be shown, but not delivered, and was to be returned to him in any event; and it was so returned promptly. There is no evidence that would even warrant a suspicion that the relator had any reason to believe that Cohen was not acting in the utmost good faith, and Epstein at no time found fault with the conduct of either of them. The record indicates that the fact that Epstein so delivered the money to Cohen was brought to the attention of Second Deputy Commissioner Dougherty on September 27, 1912, by a letter from one Dr. Magnus, which the trial commissioner excluded, and that the information on which it was based came from Epstein, who, however, did not intend to reflect on the conduct of either Cohen or the relator. Dougherty then summoned Cohen and the relator, and directed them to separate and to prepare separate reports of their entire proceedings under their assignment on the complaint made in June by Epstein, and each of them made a report in writing. The report made by the relat- or appears to be, and Dougherty considered it, a full and frank report. The relator testified that he did not suppose that the receipt of the money by Cohen fell within the prohibition of rule 50, and that if he had, he would have reported the fact when it came to his knowledge. There is no evidence that relator violated any rule of the department, or failed to perform any duty which devolved upon him. The only rule of the department having any bearing on the subject is rule 50, which is not set forth in hsec verba, but its contents are stated in the record as follows:
“This rule provides that, without express permission of the police commissioner, members of the police force are forbidden to make presents, bestow testimonials, collect or receive money, or anything else from citizens or others, circulate subscription papers or books, or, sell tickets for any purpose.”
That rule does not apply to any act performed by the relator, and it did not require that ho obtain permission from the police commissioner for any act performed by him, either separately or in co-operation with Cohen, in investigating the-charge made by Epstein and endeavoring to apprehend those guilty of the crimes of poisoning horses or extortion by threatening to poison unless they received money. We refrain from expressing an opinion with respect to the applicability of the rule to Cohen; but it is perfectly plain that it did not apply to the relator. If that rule forbade the taking of the money by Cohen for the purposes stated without the permission of the police commissioner, it was incumbent upon Cohen, and not upon the relator, to obtain such permission. It now appears that Cohen did not have permission of
If the action of the police commissioner in discharging this relator should be sustained on the evidence in this record, it would be a dangerous precedent, for it would open the door to the removal of members of the force on trivial charges, not only without the violation of any law, but without the infraction of any rule made for their guidance. If the relator is subject to removal for not having reported to his superior officer the fact that Cohen informed him of the receipt of this money, for which Cohen may have had permission from the police commissioner if that was required, then no officer would be secure in his position without reporting everything that he knows about a fellow officer, notwithstanding the fact that no rule requires it. Without any law or rule requiring it, an officer would thus be subjected to liability for dismissal for failure to report any conduct on the part of a fellow officer that might be regarded by his superior officer as prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the force. It is neither required by the Constitution nor by any statutory law that one police officer shall report to his superior with respect to' the conduct of a fellow officer, which would be proper if authorized by the head of the department; and, if it be deemed that the good order and discipline of the force requires such reports, the members of the force should be notified by an appropriate rule so that they may know that it is required. The relator was appointed on the 1st of March, 1907, and this is the first charge ever made against him. The evidence is wholly insufficient to sustain the charge, and ‘utterly fails to show the slightest evidence of conduct on the part of the relator that in any reasonable construction can be held to be prejudicial to good order and discipline.
It follows, therefore, that the writ of certiorari should be sustained and the proceedings annulled, and the relator reinstated, with $50 costs and disbursements. All concur.