p. 551riet Cohen, after such indorsement, to one R. B. Robbins, who gave the said Harriet Cohen the face value of said checks in cash, in good faith, and without any knowledge that Harriet Conen was thereby diverting the proceeds of said checks to her own use. That both the said Ben Goodman and R. B. Robbins, after receiving the checks so indorsed by the said Harriet Cohen, indorsed the said checks in their own name, and deposited them in the regular course of business, with the defendant, the Corn Exchange Bank, with whom they both had at that time separate accounts. The defendant, the Corn Exchange Bank, collected the proceeds of the said checks and applied them to the respective accounts of Ben Goodman and R. B. Robbins, and paid out the proceeds so collected in the regular course of its business upon the order of said depositors. The proceeds of all of the above checks mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs No. 2 amounting to $329.79 were appropriated by the said Harriet Cohen and converted to her own use, the plaintiff never having received such proceeds or any portion thereof either from the said Harriet Cohen or from any other source.“Sixth. Before presenting the said checks for payment to the respective banks on which they were drawn, the defendant, the Com Exchange Bank, stamped on the said checks one or the other of the following indorsements:
“ ‘Through the New York Clearing House“ ‘Indorsements Guaranteed“ ‘The Corn Exchange Bank of New York“ ‘Frederick T. Martin, Cashier“ ‘Pay any Bank, Banker or Trust Company“ ‘The Corn Exchange Bank, N. Y.“ ‘Frederick T. Martin, Cashier,“Seventh. That the defendant at the time it received said checks from Ben Goodman and R. B. Robbins, and at the time of collecting the proceeds thereof and paying out the same upon the order of said depositors, had no notice, knowledge, or suspicion tending to impeach the validity of said checks, and took them without notice of any limitation, defect, or infirmity in the title thereof, or any limitation or infirmity in the title of Harriet Cohen thereto, or any limitation upon her right to indorse or transfer the same, and that the defendant received said checks in the regular course of its business and in good faith and has parted with value therefor.“Eighth. That the plaintiff has demanded the payment of the amount of said checks set forth in paragraph 2 from the defendant, and the defendant has failed and refused to pay the same. The aforesaid demand on the part of the plaintiff was made after the proceeds of all of the said checks had'been collected by the defendant and paid out upon the order of its depositors as hereinabove stated.”. Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McUAUGHLIN, SCOTT, DOWLING, and HOTCHKISS, JJ.John J. Halpin, of New York City, for appellant.
Henry M. Stevenson, of New York City, for respondent.
Upon the foregoing facts we are unable to distinguish this case in principle from Salen v. Bank of State of New York, 110 App. Div. 636 , 97 N. Y. Supp. 361 , in which Mr. Justice Clarke carefully examined all the authorities on the subject and clearly demonstrated the distinction between the case in which he was writing, and
p. 552. those upon which tjáe plaintiff in the principal case relies. Schmidt v. Garfield Natl. Bank, 64 Hun, 298 , 19 N. Y. Supp. 252 , affirmed
138 N. Y. 631 , 33 N. E. 1084 ; Robinson v. Chemical Natl. Bank,
86 N. Y. 404 . We can add nothing to what was said in the Salen Case, and it would serve no useful purpose to reiterate what was written there.
The circumstances that plaintiff’s employé was furnished with a rubber stamp does not in our opinion differentiate the cases. That was a mere matter of convenience. The point is that she was authorized to indorse the checks in plaintiff’s name. Whether the legend attached above the signature was written or stamped was immaterial.
The determination of the Appellate Term must be reversed, arid the judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed, with costs to the appellant in all courts. All concur.