(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.Headnote
1. Construction of Wills—Life-Estate—Power of Sale.Testator directed payment of his debts to be made, and then devised to his wife “during her widowhood, the use of all my real and personal estate, authorizing her to sell and dispose of any of my real estate as to her shall seem just. ” The remainder was devised to testator’s daughters. Held, that the meaning and intent of the will was that the widow might sell such lands only for the purposes of the . will, and that she was not entitled to such proceeds.
2. Same—Consistent Devise.
In such case, the devise of the life-estate with power of sale was entirely consistent with the remainder over to testator’s children after the life-estate.
3. Executors and Administrators—Sale of Land—Accountino.
When such sale was made, the proceeds became personal property, and a surrogate had jurisdiction to compel an accounting therefor.
Appeal from surrogate’s court, Rockland county.
Proceedings for the settlement of the accounts of Catherine Blauvelt and Julia F. Mansfield, executrices of the will-of Isaac L. Blauvelt, deceased. Testator’s widow sold certain of his real estate, and claimed the proceeds as her own. The will provided as follows: “First. I order all my debts and funeral expenses to be paid as soon as possible. Secondly. I give unto my wife, Catherine, during her widowhood, the use of all my real and personal estate, authorizing her to sell and dispose of any of my real estate as to her shall seem just, giving and executing all deeds and writings necessary to secure the purchasers in all rights of ownership, in the same manner as I could have done if living. After the death of my wife, Catherine, I order that my property be equally divided among my children,” etc. There was no further provision in the will as to the wife’s right to dispose of any of testator’s property. From a decree holding that the widow, Catherine Blauvelt, was-only entitled to a life-estate in the property devised, she appeals.
Argued before Barnard, P. J., and Dykman and Pratt, JJ.A. & A. X. Fallon, (Thaddeus D. Kenneson, of counsel,) for appellants. Abram A. Demarest, for respondents.
Isaac L. Blauvelt died in Rockland county in 1861, leaving a last will. The deceased left a widow and two daughters. By the will the widow was entitled to “the use of all my real and personal estate,” with full power of sale of the real estate “as tp her shall seem just.” After the widow’s death a life-estate in one-half of the estate was given to each of the daughters, with remainder to their children. The widow was one of the executors. She had no power to use any portion of the principal for her own purpose, but the entire estate was disposed of after her life-estate ceased. The widow has sold certain of the testator’s lands, and claims to be entitled to hold the proceeds as her own. The surrogate properly disallowed this. The meaning arid intent of the will is that the widow may sell the lands for the purposes of the will. She is to have the entire use of thó proceeds, but the same must go to the daughters and their children, as provided for in the will. The construction claimed by the widow is inconsistent with the scope and intent of the will, and a gift of a life-estate with power of sale and remainder'over after the life-estate of all the testator’s property is entirely con