Grace v. Town of North Hempstead

This is a proceeding to determine the title to the land beneath the waters of Manhasset Bay, formerly called Cow Bay, a narrow harbor on the north shore of Long Island. It lies between Great Neck and Manhasset Neck (formerly Cow Neck), and is entered, between Hewlett Point, on Great Neck, and Barker Point, on Manhasset Neck. It is a mile wide at the entrance, and runs in

On the easterly side, Plum Point, extending out to the south, forms a sheltered tidal harbor, sometimes called Plum Harbor, often resorted to by small vessels from the Sound. The bay is also a natural ground for the growth of shellfish. Plaintiff’s lands are along the westerly side of Manhasset Bay, about a mile and a half from the Sound. This action involves the title to about seven acres fronting on plaintiff’s upland, and out in the bay beyond the mean low-water line.

Plaintiff relies on a state grant by the commissioners of the land office, made June 24, 1912. Defendant, as successor to the original town of Hempstead, from which North Hempstead was set off by Laws 1784, c. 21 (North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 112 ), claims to own the waters and bed of this bay by colonial grants, first from the Dutch Governor, William Kieft, in 1644, and later from Col. Dongan, the English colonial governor, in 1685.

Both sides having moved for direction of a verdict, the court granted defendant’s motion, and directed a verdict in its favor.

“Whereas there is a certain town in Queens County called and known by the name of Hempstead upon Long Island, situate, lying and being on the South side of the Great Plains having a certain tract of land thereunto belonging, the bounds whereof begin at a marked tree standing at the head of Mathew Garret's bay and so running from thence upon a direct South line due South to the main sea, and from the said tree a direct North line to the sound or east river and so round the points of the necks till it comes toHempstead Harbour, and so up the harbour to a certain barren sandy beach, and from thence up a direct line till it comes to a marked tree on the east side of Gasstiagge Point, and from thence a southerly line to the middle of the plains, and- from thence a due east line to the utmost extent of the great plains, and from thence upon a straight line to a certain tree marked on a neck called Maskacheung, and from thence upon a due south line to the South sea and the said South sea is to be the south bounds from the east line to the West line, and the Sound or East River to be the northerly bounds as according to several deeds or purchases from the Indian owners and the Patent from the Dutch Governor, William Kieft Relation thereto being had doth more fully and at large appear.”

The patent also granted and confirmed unto the patentees—

“all the before recited tract and tracts, parcel and parcels of Land and Islands within the said bounds and Limits, together with all and singular the woods, underwoods, plains, meadows, pastures, quarries, marshes, waters, lakes, causeways, rivers, beaches, fishing, hawking, hunting and fowling, with all liberties, privileges, hereditaments, and appurtenances to the said tract of land and premises belonging or in any wise appertaining.”

From this grant was also specially excepted one entire piece of land containing 700 acres, lying and being on Cow Neck.

As both the' boundary meridian lines run from the Sound or East River to the Atlantic Ocean, and this bay lies between such meridians, the remaining question is: What is the north boundary of this patent? Here again the import is not doubtful. The Sound or East River means the Long Island Sound, and the course “round the points of the necks till it comes to Hempstead Harbour,” plainly means a boundary run around the outer points or headlands of Great Neck and Cow Neck, by which this bay is plainly comprised. All doubt is removed by the final words, “and the Sound or East River to be the northerly bounds.” Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 209 N. Y. 1 , 7, 102 N. E. 585 . And clearly the patent carried title to the land under water within the bounds of the patent. Roe v. Strong, 107 N. Y. 350 , 358, 14 N. E. 294 .

[2] Appellant, however, contends that this patent was only to ratify and confirm the patent granted on November 16, 1644, by Governor Kieft, and that this earlier grant did not include, or should not have included, these waters. The learned counsel suggests that this English exhibit, purporting to be a certified copy of the Kieft patent, must be regarded as a mistranslation of an original Latin text, now lost, since other contemporary patents were in Latin. This Kieft patent is certified as recorded from an original, although the New York state records have a volume which professes to record transía

This generalization of the public right to the sea and its shores, and especially general rights to fish, was one of the broadest doctrines of the Roman law. The subject falls under two heads—the right to fish, and whether rivers, harbors, and portions of the sea were then regarded as alienable, and subject to exclusive occupancy.

As to the right to fish, the practice before Justinian of treating it as a jus publicum did not long continue. In the “Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence,” published in 1631, a work which had eight editions before 1644, Grotius says the United States of Holland and West Friesland are proprietors of the rivers, such as the Rhine, the Waal, the Maas, the Ijsel, and the Lek, in so far as they flow within the limits of Holland, also of the lakes and other navigable waters, and of the beds of all such streams and waters, together with the shores or banks of the same covered with water. Here follows an admission that the state, however, did then grant exclusive proprietary rights in its rivers to private individuals:

“The right o£ fishing in such streams has since times of old belonged to the state, and has been granted to the counts for their maintenance, by whom it has been granted to many vassals and others.” Book II, 27 (Eng. Trans, p. 44).

Vinnius, in the Commentary on the Institutes, written from Leyden in 1642, strikingly traces this change from public to private ownership. “The jus piscandi,” he says, “in the beginning belonged to the people. Thence it passed to the princes, and now no one may have the right, except by their leave, and within certain laws and limitations.” Com. Inst. Imp. lib. II, title 1, § 2 (Ed. 1709, p. 127).

The Flemish and Dutch municipalities or “communes” gradually recovered for 'their inhabitants some of the oppressive rights and revenues before appropriated by the nobles. Among such sources of municipal income wrested from the perquisites of the lords was the privilege to fish in the canals—a right made common in certain of the stronger towns more than a century before the Dutch West India Company had been formed. Blok. Hist. of the People of the Netherlands, vol. 1, p. 226 (N. Y. 1898). This right to fish was specially secured in the early charters of Amsterdam. Van Leeuwen, vol. 1, p. 164, note.

Proprietary ownership of waters by Dutch law is also plain. Dutch law did not deny that local waters could be occupied, and hence were alienable. Rivers and their beds were thus subject to proprietary rights. So Vinnius shows that the ownership of newly formed islands

Grotius, writing in 1625, qualifies such ownership of river beds, limiting it to rivers relatively small, as compared with the extent of the bordering lands. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. II, cap. III, § 7. But he passes on from rivers to bays and estuaries, which he shows were included in private estates. From these illustrations he reasons that larger portions of the sea may be so owned, saying:

“Since a portion of the sea may become part of a private estate, namely if it be included in the estate and is so small as to seem part of it, and since that is not repugnant to natural law, why should not a portion of the sea included within the territory of a people or of several peoples, be the property of those whose the shores are, provided that the size of that portion of the sea compared with the territory be not larger than the inlet of the sea, as compared with the estate.” Lib. II, cap. Ill, § X, 2.

Therefore, under the Roman-Dutch law as recognized and practiced in the Netherlands at 1644, we find nothing against the grant.of ports and havens in this charter to the newly formed town of Hemp-stead.

[4] Furthermore, an attraction possessed by Long Island for settlers, and one that drew colonists from New England, was the shellfish abounding in its bays and inlets. Naturally such settlers would seek to have the grants to them include the waters containing such a source of food supply. Such a grant to found a body politic or town, as we have seen, would involve no violation of Dutch law and custom, and would be the only effectual way to protect the natural shellfish beds from alien depredations. Therefore, on the internal evidence from the wording and form of these patents, and from the extrinsic facts as to the situation of the colon)', we would not be justified in deleting from the scope of this charter this received and settled formula for the cession of ports, harbors, and inland waters.

The conclusion that these patents embraced the waters of Manhasset Bay was also the ground upon which the commissioners of the land office were advised by Attorney General Tabor in 1890, acting with the state engineer and surveyor, to deny an application for these lands under water, by this same appellant, since the Attorney General there held that the town had made sufficient proof of its title through these colonial grants. Such an opinion, though administrative, binds the departments, and is entitled to weight as proceeding from the law officer of the state. People ex rel. Snyder v. Hylan, 212 N. Y. 236 , 240, 106 N. E. 89 .

Appellant cites Town of North Hempstead v. Eldridge, 111 App. Div. 789 , 796, 98 N. Y. Supp. 157 , 161; but this dealt with lands under Little Neck Bay, which the learned referee found were outside of, and to the westward of, these boundaries. He did not pass on the northern bounds of these patents, as he stated:

“As to these northern limits no controversy had arisen or seemed likely to arise.”

In 1669, before the Dongan patent, Hempstead at a general town meeting voted that the north boundary of their patent was the Sound. Since 1686, the town had taken control over the waters and the shores

I advise, therefore, that the judgment and order be affirmed, with costs. All concur.