Majority
Headnote
1. Pleading <§=>142 — Counterclaim — Condition Precedent — Failure to Allege.This action was brought in Erie county to recover the sum of $401.80 for goods sold and delivered to the plaintiff, who conducts a retail store in the village of Ontario, Wayne county, this state. The plaintiff is a domestic corporation, having its principal place of business in the city of Buffalo; and no question is raised that the goods were sold and delivered to the defendant, though there is a question as to where the delivery was made. Neither is there any
The defendant has moved this court for an order changing the venue from Erie to Wayne county, on the ground that it is necessary for the convenience of witnesses, and the moving papers áppear to have been drawn to bring the case within the established rules of practice in this state. Deutsch v. Upton Cold Storage Co., 146 App. Div. 588 , 131 N. Y. Supp. 273 ; Brosky v. Hallock, 165 App. Div. 970 , 150 N. Y. Supp. 755 , and authorities there cited.
[1,2] It is urged, however, that the damages claimed are upon a breach of warranty of quality, and that the case is governed by thé provisions of section 130 of the Personal Property Law, as aided by Laws 1911, c. 571, and that as the pleadings do not allege that the defendant, after accepting the goods involved in the counterclaim, gave notice to the seller within a reasonable time of the alleged breach of warranty, there is a failure to allege a condition precedent, which would be fatal to the cause of action. Upon the theory, therefore, that the counterclaim fails to allege a cause of action, it is urged that we should disregard the convenience of witnesses who could not be used in proving a defective counterclaim. There can be no doubt that a cause of action which fails to allege a condition precedent is fatally defective, under the rule laid down in Wood & Selick v. Ball, 190 N. Y. 219 , 225, 83 N. E. 21 ; but section 157 of the Personal Property Law provides that:
“None of the provisions of this article shall apply to any sale, or to any contract to sell, made prior to the taking effect of this article.”
And this provision took effect on the 1st day of September, 1911, while the sale of the goods upon which the counterclaim is predicated took place in 1909 or 1910, and-the plaintiff’s own affidavit says the, goods were paid for by the defendant on or about the 28th day of November, 1910.
It thus clearly appears that the provisions of section 130 of the Personal Property Law are not controlling in this action, and the same observations apply to section 150 of the Personal Property Law, which undertake to determine the measure of damages in cases of this character. But it is a statutory rule to take effect on the 1st of September, 1911, and by the provisions of the act itself it does not govern in the event that the contract under which the alleged warranty was made came into existence before that time.
[3] It seems to me highly probable that the defendant will find
The motion is granted, without costs.