People ex rel. Woodbury v. Hendrick

In the month of January, 1908, the respondent Thaw was duly -tried at a term of the Supreme Court in the county of New York, on an indictment for murder in the first degree and was acquitted on the ground of insanity, and thereupon the justice presiding at the trial duly made an order pursuant to the provisions of section 454 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, requiring that Thaw be detained in safe custody and sent to the Matteawan State Hospital, there to be kept until discharged by due course of law. He escaped from the hospital on the 17th day of August, 1913, and was duly extradited from the state of New Hampshire under an indictment for conspiracy with respect to effecting his escape, and was tried on the indictment at a term of the Supreme Court in the county of New York, and acquitted on the 13th day of March, 1915. Thereupon counsel for Thaw moved for an order directing the sheriff to return him to the state of New Hampshire. On the 16th day of March, 1915, that motion was denied, and the court made an order directing the sheriff to deliver Thaw to the proper authorities of the Matteawan State Hospital, or to hold him subject to any order of the Supreme Court, or of a justice thereof, that may have been issued or served upon the sheriff. In the meantime the sheriff had been served with a writ of habeas corpus,

[1] The return of the justice shows that it is not his intention to surrender to a jury the jurisdiction devolving on the court to determine the questions of fact, but merely in the first instance to submit a framed issue with respect to Thaw’s sanity to a jury, with a view to obtaining their advice and assistance on that question, which he as the justice presiding over the court contemplates ultimately determining without being concluded or bound by the affirmative or negative answer of the jury thereon. Section 93 of the Insanity Law (Cons. Laws, c. 27) provides as follows:

“Habeas Corpus.—Any one in custody as an insane person is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, upon a proper application made by him or some friend in his behalf. Upon the return of such writ, the fact of his insanity shall be inquired into and determined. The medical history of the patient, as it appears in the casebook, shall be given in evidence, and the superintendent or medical officer in charge of the institution wherein_ such person is held in custody, and any proper person, shall be sworn touching the mental condition

of such person. Where a second or subsequent application is made for the discharge from custody of the same patient, any party to the proceeding may introduce in evidence any testimony, in relation to the mental condition of such patient, received upon any former hearing or trial, together with all the exhibits introduced in evidence upon such hearing or trial in connection with such testimony without calling the witnesses who gave such testimony, such evidence to have the same force and effect as if such witnesses had been called.”

[2-4] The provisions of the Insanity Law quoted,- in so far as they confer upon one in custody as an insane person a right to a writ of habeas corpus to determine his sanity at the time of granting the writ, are merely declaratory of a right theretofore existing with respect to such persons, whose detention was only authorized during their insanity. People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159 , 117 N. Y. Supp. 322 , affirmed 196 N. Y. 525 , 89 N. E. 1109 , 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 946 . The Legislature, however, did not in the Insanity Law prescribe the procedure on the writ of habeas corpus in such cases, and manifestly that is regulated and governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, among other things, vest the Supreme Court at Special Term with full and complete authority to entertain and finally determine such proceedings. Code of Civil Procedure, § 2017. The Special Term of the Supreme Court, therefore, over which the respondent Hendrick is presiding, has jurisdiction to determine the question of Thaw’s sanity. That is conceded, but it is contended by the relator that the court is threatening to proceed in excess of its jurisdiction in calling a jury to its aid. The general rule is that a writ of prohibition will lie to enjoin a court or other tribunal from proceeding without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction. People ex rel. Jerome v. Court of General Sessions, 112 App. Div. 424 , 98 N. Y. Supp. 557 , affirmed 185 N. Y. 504 , 78 N. E. 149 ; People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 113 App. Div. 111 , 99 N. Y. Supp. 114 , affirmed 186 N. Y. 383 , 79 N. E. 330 , 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 159 , 9 Ann. Cas. 972; People ex rel. Jones v. Sherman, 66 App. Div. 231 , 72 N. Y. Supp. 718 , affirmed 171 N. Y. 684 , 64 N. E. 1124 ; People ex rel. Patrick v. Fitzgerald, 73 App. Div. 339 , 76 N. Y. Supp. 865 ; Appo v. People, 20 N. Y. 531 . We are of opinion, however, that the excess of jurisdiction, as distinguished from want of jurisdiction, for which a writ of prohibition will lie does not relate to the prevention of errors of law or of procedure in an action or proceeding over which the court has jurisdiction, but to a threatened exercise of jurisdiction to make a determination or decision which the court has not acquired, or cannot acquire, jurisdiction to make, although it has general jurisdiction of the action or proceeding, and that the writ only lies where the relator has no other remedy, either by appeal, by writ of certiorari, by suit in equity, or otherwise. People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, supra; People ex rel. Mayor v. Nichols, 79 N. Y. 582 ; Thomson v. Tracy, 60 N. Y. 31 ; People ex rel. Patrick v. Fitzgerald, supra. Here the court has jurisdiction and contemplates exercising it, but preliminary thereto it is intended to take the verdict of a jury on a single question of fact which is ordinarily determined by a jury, but which in this case must be determined by the court. If the Special Term calls a jury to its aid,

It follows, therefore, that the writ of prohibition will not lie to regulate the procedure of the Special Term in determining the question of Thaw’s sanity, and that the respondents are entitled to a final order dismissing the proceeding and authorizing them to proceed in the habeas corpus proceeding as if the alternative writ of prohibition had not been issued. Settle order on notice. All concur.