Majority
Headnote
1. Discovery @=61—Examination Before Trial—Corporation—Incriminating Officer.On the 19th day of February, 1915, an order was duly made and entered directing the examination of'the defendant Match Supply Company, by its president and treasurer, before trial. Subsequently the defendant company moved this court for an order setting aside the order for examination, and appeal comes to this court from the order denying such motion. The action rests in an alleged fraudulent conspiracy, and the defendant Kellogg has been permitted to serve an unverified answer. 165 App. Div. 885 , 151 N. Y. Supp. 361 .
[1] The grounds of the motion to vacate the order above mentioned are that the “moving papers fail to comply with the requirements of rule 82 of the General Rules of Practice, in that the affi
Just how this can be expected to relieve the defendant corporation from examination of its officers, where the moving papers comply with the provisions of the statute, does not suggest itself to us. Whatever may have been held in the earlier cases, upon which Matter of Attorney General, 21 Misc. Rep. 101 , 47 N. Y, Supp. 20 , relied, it is very clear that the modern rule does not sustain the position of the defendant corporation. In the case cited the court does not suggest that the fact that the examination will tend to show a crime on the part of the witness gives a third party any rights. It declares that it has frequently been held that, “where it clearly appears that the only material evidence sought by the examination will tend to show that the witness is guilty of a crime, the order to,examine should be vacated upon the motion of the witness without waiting for him to plead,his privilege”; but the witness is not here complaining of the proposed examination. It is the corporation. So far as' the moving papers show, Mr. Kellogg is not asking to be relieved of the order. He is not before this court on appeal. It is the defendant corporation which is seeking to be relieved from the examination, and as the privilege which is suggested is purely personal to Mr. Kellogg, and he may not desire to avail himself of it, there is no reason why this court should disturb the order appealed from on this ground. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 81 Misc. Rep. 362 , 142 N. Y. Supp. 1 ; Ryan v. Reagan, 46 App. Div. 590 , 62 N. Y. Supp. 39 ; Matter of Sayre, 70 App. Div. 329 , 75 N. Y. Supp. 286 ; Bioren v. Canadian Mines Co., 140 App. Div. 523 , 125 N. Y. Supp. 392 ; Peterson v. Fowler, 143 App. Div. 282 , 128 N. Y. Supp. 505 .
[2] The pleadings in this case, upon which the motion is made, in connection with the affidavits, allege a fraudulent conspiracy to sell stock in the defendant corporation at a fictitious value, and the proceedings so far tend strongly to indicate that there is no desire on the part of the defendant to meet the issues. Mr. Kellogg, the treasurer, must have been in a position to know some of the material facts, and if he should, upon the proposed examination, avail himself of his privilege, there would be no one to disclose the necessary information, unless it might be the president of the corporation. It is said that the
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs, and the examination of the defendant corporation, by its officers, should proceed forthwith.
Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur.
Cases cited
- In re Attorney General 21 Misc. Rep. 101 p. 360
- Ryan v. Reagan 46 App. Div. 590 p. 360
- In re Porter Screen Mfg. Co. 70 App. Div. 329 p. 360
- Peterson v. Fowler 143 App. Div. 282 p. 360