Majority
Headnote
1. Licenses <$=>1—Construction—Property Rights—“Property.”In consideration of $1, the city of Rochester, on the 3d day of March, 1915, granted to the defendant a license permitting him “to carry on the business of public vehicle” within the city until December 31, 1915. While he was operating his motor jitney bus under that license, chapter 667 of the Laws of 1915 became effective, May 22d. He continued to operate his bus, claiming that the statute did not apply to him, as he had a license from the city, and this action results.
[1] Licenses from the state or a municipality are ordinarily to be considered, not as contracts, but as temporary permits to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and are not property in any legal or constitutional sense. Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657 ; People ex rel. Lodes v. Dept. of Health, 189 N. Y. 187 , 82 N. E. 187 , 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 89 -4.
[2,3] By the charter and ordinances of the city of Rochester a hackman or vehicle for transporting people from place to place for hire cannot operate in the city without a license, and the common council had power to grant such a license by section 86 of the charter of said city. Chapter 755, Laws of 1907. The only effect of the license was to make legal that which without it would be illegal. The Legislature of the state, therefore, under the police power, in providing for the safety and welfare of the public, may make laws defining what vehicles may be operated in the cities as public conveyances, and the terms of operation. The Legislature cannot bargain away the police power of the state.
[5] There is no difficulty in determining that the Legislature, within the police power, had the right to make this law. If the enactment of the statute was necessary, it was also necessary that it should have force at once, and as to all busses of this class. The mere fact that a bus had received a license from the city before the enactment of the statute made it no less dangerous to the public than one which had no such license. There is no good reason why the statute should apply to the unlicensed bus any more than to one having a license.
[8] A law enacted for the safety and protection of the public should be so construed that the public may have the benefit of its full enforcement wherever its interests are threatened. The language of the statute seems to leave no doubt that it applies to all busses of the kind, no matter whether they were under a previous license or not. The expression in the twenty-fifth section of the Transportation Corporations Law, “Any person or any corporation who owns or operates a stage route, bus line or motor vehicle line or route * * * shall be deemed to be included within the meaning of the term ‘common carrier,’ ” etc., evidently refers to every stage route or line, and the expression in the twenty-sixth section that no bus line shall operate, except upon the conditions mentioned therein, clearly applies to every bus. We see that not only the language of the law, but the very purpose for which it was enacted, compels the construction that it is intended to apply to all such busses operated in cities, without regard to whether they had or had not received a prior city license.
[7] It is further urged that this statute, relating only to busses which charge 15 cents or less, discriminates between them and busses charg
Many circumstances exist which place the jitney in a different class from the motor vehicle which carries passengers by the hour, or from one fixed place to another. The jitney, by reason of its low fare and the manner of its operation, comes in direct competition with the street cars which are common carriers and require a certificate of convenience and necessity. The jitney, by moving rapidly from place to place upon eiilier side of the street, in picking up passengers in competition with the street cars or other jitneys, presents a menace to its passengers and the people upon the street which is greater than that from the ordinary cab or vehicle; and other reasons may have seemed to the Legislature to require that these busses be put in a class by themselves. We cannot say that the classification is unreasonable; upon the contrary, it seems reasonable.
We conclude, therefore, that the statute in question is valid, and prevents the operation of the appellant’s bus until he complies with its terms. The injunction was therefore properly granted, and the order is affirmed, with costs.
Cases cited
- Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie 34 N. Y. 657 p. 141
- People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health 189 N. Y. 187 p. 141