Majority
Headnote
1. Banks and Banking <@=>154—Check—To Whom Payable—Evidence.The plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant $1,-200 as the balance of the deposit due. Defendant contends that $200 only is due of said deposit, and for that amount the plaintiff has judgment. Two checks o-f $500 each, signed by the plaintiff and made payable, according to the testimony of plaintiff’s vice president, to Rounds, Hatch, Dillingham & Debevoise, were paid by the defendant bank without indorsement of tire payees therein named. It seems that one Bergasse, who was in the plaintiff’s employ, procured the money upon said checks, and when the checks were returned at the end of the month presumably abstracted them, as they were not to be found and were not produced upon the trial.
[1] The contention of the defendant is that these checks were payable to bearer, that the checks were lawfully paid, and that the evidence that they were payable to Rounds, Hatch, Dillingham & Debevoise having been sworn to by the vice president of plaintiff’s bank, it became a question of fact as to whether they were so payable, or payable to bearer. If payable to the Rounds, Hatch, Dillingham & Debevoise firm it is evident that they were not indorsed by the payees, and that the indorsements upon which they were paid were forgeries. There is no evidence that these checks were payable to bearer. The only suggestion in the case was introduced by the cross-examination of Vogelstein, plaintiff’s vice president, in which it was asked if Vogelstein did not .know that Bergasse claimed they were payable to bearer, to which Vogelstein responded that he so understood! It further appears that upon July 1st the defendant rendered plaintiff an account, showing that the plaintiff had a balance of $200, and that this account was acknowledged to be correct by the defendant. But this was an account stated, which could be shown to have been made through mistake, and is of little significance, because the check book of the
[2] Upon this state of facts the court charged the jury:
“That the plaintiff was bound to use due diligence to examine the passbook, and to report any errors which they might be able to discover, and that if the bank was misled to its prejudice by the failure of the plaintiff so to do that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount due.”
This charge was, we think, erroneous as applied to this case, because the only error in the account lay in the forged indorsement of the payees of the check, and it has been held that there is no duty on the depositor to look for forged indorsements. Critten v. Chemical National Bank, 171 N. Y. 219 , 63 N. E. 969 , 57 L. R. A. 529 .
[3] Again: The question was practically left to the jury to determine whether the plaintiff had notified the bank within a reasonable time after its discovery of the irregularities' of Bergasse. There is no evidence, however, that the discovery of this forgery was made any length of time before the bank was notified thereof, and there was not sufficient evidence of negligence by the plaintiff in this respect to raise a question of fact for the jury. Furthermore, the law is well settled that a party cannot be charged with a failure to notify a bank of errors in an account unless the bank had been actually damaged by such failure. Kearny v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 110 App. Div. 236 , 97 N. Y. Supp. 274 , affirmed 186 N. Y. 611 , 79 N. E. 1108 ; Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N. Y. 219 , 63 N. E. 969 , 57 L. R. A. 529 ; Morgan v. U. S. Mortgage & Trust Co., 208 N. Y. 218 , 101 N. E. 871 , L. R. A. 1915D, 741, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 462. There is no evidence in the case at bar of any damage resulting to the defendant by the failure of the plaintiff to give notice of any irregularities on the part of Bergasse.
[4.] If this case must be retried, there is one other error in the charge to which attention should be called. It was claimed on the part of the defendant that the failure of the plaintiff to call Bergasse gave the jury the right to infer that, if called, his testimony would have been adverse to the plaintiff’s interest. We are of opinion that the facts in the case do not justify the charge as made. In the first place, the evidence shows that Bergasse was at this time in the insane asylum. Furthermore, Bergasse had been forging the plaintiff’s name, and had committed irregularities in the plaintiff’s business. Under these circumstances, there was no such relationship between plaintiff and Bergasse as would authorize any inference to be drawn against the plaintiff from failure to call Bergasse.
The judgment and order must therefore be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- Critten v. Chemical National Bank 171 N. Y. 219 p. 323
- Kearny v. Metropolitan Trust Co. 110 App. Div. 236 p. 323
- Morgan v. United States Mortgage & Trust Co. 208 N. Y. 218 p. 323