Majority
Headnote
1. Wiles <@=>684—Trusts—Construction—“Wife.”Sarah Akin made her last will and testament on April 13, 1908, and thereby, among other legacies, by the ninth clause thereof gave and bequeathed to her trustees the sum of $25,000, in trust to invest the same, “to collect the rents, income and profits thereof, and to pay the net income arising therefrom to- my nephew Oscar Clark Miller during the term of his life,” with directions as to the disposition of the principal after his death. Oscar Clark Miller was then married to Julia Miller. The answer of the trustees to the petition herein sets up that Miller abandoned his wife and minor son in the month of October, 1908, at Atlantic City, in the state of New Jersey, and for that reason decedent executed a codicil to her will on May 12, 1909; the sole change made in the original will being as to the ninth clause thereof, containing the bequest of the life estate to Miller. As to this the codicil provided :
‘‘Second. I revoke the ninth clause oí my said will, and in place thereof I provide as follows: I give and bequeath to my trustees the sum of twenty-live thousand ($25,000), to have and to hold the same for the following uses and purposes: To invest the same in such securities as are directed in my said will in respect to such sums as are given in said will to my trustees in trust; to collect the rents, income and profits thereof, and in their discretion, and from time to time, to pay the whole o£ the net income arising therefrom either to my nephew, Oscar Clark Miller, or to his wife, Julia Miller, or a portion of such net income to one, and the remaining portion to the other, during the term of the life of the said Oscar Clark Miller.”
Then followed the provision as to the disposition to be made of the principal of said trust fund upon the death of Miller, in the happening of certain contingencies. Sarah Akin died on April 29, 1910, and her will and codicil were duly admitted to probate, and letters testamentary issued to the executors and trustees named therein, who duly qualified and have continued to act as such. Pursuant to the authority given them by the will and codicil, and exercising their discretion as thereby allowed, the executors and trustees divided the in
“the said Julia A. Miller is no longer the lawful wife of said Oscar Clark Miller. You are therefore hereby required and notified to pay no further sums of money or instalments to said Julia A. Miller, for or by reason or on account of any legacy or bequest given by or under the provisions of said above mentioned will to said Oscar Clark Miller, or to said Julia A. Miller, as his wife named therein, or to any other person or persons whatever acting on behalf of said Julia A. Miller.”
The reply of the executors and trustees was:
“That in the exercise of the discretion thereby [i. e., by the will] granted them they will on the 7th day of January, 1914, pay the entire net income of said trust fund accrued to January 1, 1914, to Julia Miller, and that no part of the same will be paid to Oscar Clark Miller.”
The answer of the executors and trustees sets forth:
“They allege that their determination to pay no part of said net income to Oscar Clark Miller, but to pay the whole of the same to said Julia Miller is within the limits of the discretion conferred upon them by the terms of said will, and that said Oscar Clark Miller has no legal or equitable right to the payment to him of any part of said net income.”
They also set up the invalidity of the Nevada decree. Petitioner has brought this proceeding to obtain a decree for the payment and delivery to him by the executors and trustees of tire whole of the net income from the trust fund in question. His claim is that, as the Nevada judgment dissolved the marriage between himself and his wife, the latter thereby ceased to be entitled as his wife to any portion of the trust income. The learned surrogate has denied the petition, upon
[1] We do not consider it necessary to discuss the validity of the Nevada decree, for we do not believe that the right of Julia Miller to receive such share of the income from the trust fund as the executors and trustees might allot to her in any way depends upon her status as Miller’s wife. The words “his wife,” used in the codicil preceding the words “Julia Miller,” were words of description only, and there was no condition, express or implied, that she should remain his wife in order to be entitled to take such sum as the executors and trustees might decide to pay to her. Schult v. Moll, 132 N. Y. 122 , 30 N. E. 377 ; Wait v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 107 ; Salvin v. Salvin, 165 App. Div. 363 , 151 N. Y. Supp. 60 ; Durian v. Central Verein, 7 Daly, 168 ; Overhiser v. Overhiser, 63 Ohio St. 77 , 57 N. E. 965 , 50 L. R. A. 552 , 81 Am. St. Rep. 612 ; Bachmann v. Supreme Lodge, 44 111. App. 188.
[2] By the terms of the codicil, the executors and trustees were explicitly empowered, in their discretion, to pay the whole of the net income to Julia Miller, and, having determined to exercise that discretion in her favor, their decision cannot be disturbed.
The decree appealed from will therefore be affirmed, with costs. Order filed. All concur.
Cases cited
- Schult v. Moll 132 N. Y. 122 p. 363