Lee v. Erie R.

The defendant has been held liable for converting a carload of lath belonging to the plaintiff. The controversy grows out of the application of certain car service rules for demurrage, duly promulgated and rendered effective according to law. The carload in question originated in the state of New Hampshire, and was consigned to William G. Barker, but was intended for the plaintiff, and its destination was Elmira, N. Y. It reached the defendant’s yard in Elmira on the morning of August 27, 1906. Plaintiff had a private track, as lessee thereof, connecting with the defendant’s tracks at Elmira. The plaintiff not being the consignee, the defendant could not place the car on his private track until it had satisfied itself that the car was in fact intended for him and that he was willing to accept the same. Immediately on its arrival, and in the forenoon of said August 27th, the. defendant mailed to the plaintiff a postal card, informing him of the arrival of the car, and stating the freight charges to be $64.60, and bearing on its face the following printed matter:

“Car service in accordance with rules of the Car Service Association will be applied."

The plaintiff received said postal card in the afternoon of the same day, but did nothing in reference thereto until the afternoon of August 30th, when he called at the freight office of the defendant, paid the freight, and took a receipt therefor. He then directed the cashier, to whom he made the payment, to have the car placed on his track, and the cashier thereupon immediately gave instructions to have it so placed. At that time the car stood opposite the passenger station, but in a position not accessible for unloading. The defendant did not then, nor at any time thereafter, place the car on the plaintiff’s track.

[1,2] It was claimed by the defendant at the trial, and is now claimed, that at the time of the payment of the freight there was,

The failure to place the car on the plaintiff’s track on August 30th, when the freight was paid, was not the fault of the latter. When, therefore, on August 31st, the defendant demanded $3 for demurrage, there was only in fact $1 due, and the defendant was making an unlawful and excessive demand. Its refusal to deliver the car on the track of the plaintiff, except on compliance with its unlawful and excessive demand for demurrage charges, constituted a conversion of the plaintiff’s property. It was a part of the implied contract duty of the defendant to place this car on the plaintiff’s private track, and until it did so it had not performed its contract, and no- freight or demurrage charges, although previously earned, were collectable. The contract of transportation by a common carrier includes placing the cars conveniently for loading and unloading. The incidental consignee can require the car to be placed at a convenient point for unloading and a reasonable opportunity therefor. When the consignee, as in this case, has his own track, and requires the car to be placed thereon for unloading, it is the duty of the transportation company to comply with his requirement. This was not done in the present case, nor was the car ever in a position where it could be conveniently unloaded. In New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company v. General Electric Company, 167 App. Div. 726 , at page 732, 153 N. Y. Supp. 478 , at page 482, it was said by this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Woodward:

“We believe it may be laid down broadly that transportation by railroad of carload lots, under present day conditions, requires the convenient placing of the car for loading, and an equally convenient placing of the car for unloading, and that the mere question of whether the tracks are upon the property of the shipper or upon the right of way of the transportation company is of no consequence upon this point. Primarily it is the duty of the transportation company to afford sidings, and a convenient place of loading or unloading, and a proper placing of the cars. If the shipper furnishes the sidings, it does not relieve the transportation corporation of the duty of conveniently-placing the cars.”

[3] The defendant now urges that the plaintiff did not at the time place his refusal to pay the demurrage on the ground that the car had not been placed on his track, but that his real attitude was that he would not under any circumstances pay any demurrage charges, because the defendant was not entitled to make the same. The version of the transaction as given by the plaintiff, and which has been accepted by the trial justice, does not justify this contention of the defendant. On August 30th, when the plaintiff paid the freight, he gave instructions that the car should be placed on his track, which the defendant agreed to do. Nothing was then said about demurrage, nor until the following day, when the defendant informed the plaintiff that, unless he paid more than the defendant had a right to demand, the car would not be placed on his track. The plaintiff then seems to have placed his refusal to pay on the specific ground that the charge for demurrage as made, by the defendant could not be made “on a car that had not been placed.” According to his testimony, that was substantially all that was said between the parties. Whatever may have been in his mind, or whatever his views may have been on the subject, he said nothing to mislead the defendant into believing that, even if it placed the car on his track, he would not pay the lawful charge thereon. The trial justice has not found, nor do we think it could fairly be found from the evidence, that the plaintiff waived the placing of the car on his track and the complete performance by the defendant of its contract obligations before it could demand payment of a proper charge for demurrage. The mistake originated with the defendant, and seems never to have been corrected by it.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except KELLOGG, P. J., who dissents, and LYON, J., not voting.