Majority
Headnote
1. Sams <@=>77(2)—Construction of Contract—Freight.Defendants in February, 1913, through a broker, made two written contracts with plaintiff’s assignors, Dinesmann & Fresser, of Konigsberg, Prussia, for the purchase of certain cannellini beans. The contracts were alike in form; but the first one, dated February
[1] The purchase price of the beans is referred to in the contract as follows:
“Price at sh.' 19/6 [nineteen shillings and six pence] per cwt. o£ 112 lbs. cost and freight at New York.”
The defendants claimed on the trial that by the terms of this contract plaintiff’s assignors were required to pay the freight, and, as there was no evidence of what the charge was for freight, moved to dismiss the complaint; but tire trial judge construed the contract as requiring defendants to pay the freight, to which ruling defendants excepted. This was error. In the absence of proof by experts in the business showing a contrary meaning, the construction of the contract must be that the price includes the freight.
In Mee v. McNider, 109 N. Y. 500 , 17 N. E. 424 , the sale was “at 59 s. per cwt., C. F. & I., by steamer to N. Y.”; the answer admitted that “C. F. & I.” meant “to include cost, freight and insurance”; and the court said ( 109 N. Y. 503 , 17 N. E. 424 ):
“The price is fixed at 59 shillings per cwt., and this is made up of the cost, the freight, and the premium of insurance. Thus the purchaser deals with the matter in gross, and not in detail, transacts the various branches of the business with one person, instead of three, fixes his liability at a lump sum, and in case of loss will recover the amount of his Interest under the policy.”
It is expressly stated in the contract in suit that the insurance is to be paid by the buyers, and it is evident that, if the buyers were also to pay the freight, a statement to that effect would also be explicitly Anade in the agreement.
[2] Upon plaintiff’s objection the court excluded evidence offered by defendants in support of their counterclaim as to the condition of the beans purchased under the first contract when they arrived in New York; the objection and ruling being based on the ground that the proof should be limited to the condition of the beans at the time of their delivery to the steamer at Konigsberg, and that the allegations of the complaint as amplified by the bill of particulars did not warrant such proof: A careful reading of the complaint and the bill of particulars leads to the conclusion that the construction put upon them was too narrow and that the exclusion of the testimony was erroneous. Of course the shipment was at the risk of the defendants; but
It follows that the judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- Mee v. McNider 109 N. Y. 500 p. 42
- Littlejohn v. Shaw 159 N. Y. 188 p. 43