and operated under legal authority, the' owner of adjacent premises, having no title whatever to the land in the street, could recover no compensation for the incidental injury occasioned to his premises by that use of the street. That was considered to be the eff ect of the decision of the court of appeals in the
Case of Story, (
90 N. Y. 122 ,) and of the other decisions made by that and other tribunals concerning the maintenance and operation of steam railways upon the surface of public streets. In
Lahr v.
Railway Co., 104 N. Y. 268 , 10 N. E. Rep. 528 , the rights and liabilities of the parties were considered under the decision in the
Story Case, so far as the items of damages proper to be allowed had been compensated for by the recovery, leaving, however, this other question entirely open for further consideration. And the same is true of the decision made in
Drucker v.
Railroad Co., 106 N. Y. 157 , 12 N. E. Rep. 568 , and
Abendroth v.
Railroad Co., 122 N. Y. 1 , 25 N. E. Rep. 496 , proceeded upon the adjustment of the same subject of damages. And so, also, did the case of
Kane v.
Railroad Co., 125 N. Y. 164 , 26 N. E. Rep. 278 . But in the decision of this last case it was said, in the course of the opinion of Andrews, J., that “the court allowed the jury to consider the noise created by the trains of the defendant as an element of damage. If the defendant had the lawful right to operate its trains in the street, such inconvenience as might result to the plaintiff in the enjoyment of his property from the ordinary and usual operation of the defendant’s road would not, in the absence of negligence on its part, furnish a ground of action,” ( 125 N. Y. 186 , 26 N. E. Rep. 282 ,) which seems to confirm the view that, in acquiring the right to maintain the structure in the street, the railway companies will not be bound to make compensation for the incidental injuries produced by the mere running of the trains upon the elevated railway structure; and that compensation for the future discharge of smoke, cinders, and noxious gases cannot be included as items for compensation to be made for the obstruction of light and air, in the acquisition of the right to maintain the elevated structure, and the operation of railway trains upon it; and that the referee, therefore, erred in including these subjects as objects of compensation, to be paid for in the acquirement of the title to the obstruction of these easements of light and air. Another difficulty, not apparently reconcilable with the conclusions of the referee, arises under his twenty-fifth finding of fact, by which he found that “no damages have been caused to the fee value of the premises in question from October 22,1884, to the present time by the existence and operation of said railroad, but all of such damages were incurred prior to the plaintiff’s purchase.” And that indicates that the plaintiff himself sustained no depreciation whateverin the valueof the premises themselves after he had acquired his title; and, if he did not, then there seems to have been no ground upon which he could claim compensation for even this obstruction of the light and air from his premises; for by the deed which was made to and accepted by him there was a clause “saving and reserving from the hereby granted premises all rights, claims, action, causes of actions, and choses in action for any and all injury done to said property up to the time of delivery of these presents, and for any and all damages therefor suffered by their owner,” which, as there had been no other cause of injury or damage to these premises made to appear, must have been intended to include those resulting from the erection and operation of this elevated railway. And if, as the referee has found by this finding, that no damages have been caused to the fee value of the premises after the execution and delivery of this deed to the plaintiff, the right to claim compensation for the reduction of their value by means of the railway, and the trains passing over it, appear to have been reserved to the grantor in the deed. For these reasons the judgment seems to have been erroneously rendered, and it should be reversed, and a new trial ordered before another referee, with costs to the defendants to abide the result.