Knox v. Hall Steam-power Co. — 23 N.Y.S. 490

Majority

p. 490

(69 Hun, 231.)

KNOX v. HALL STEAM-POWER CO.

(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.

May 12, 1893.)

Headnote

Contributory Negligence—Evidence.

In an action for injuries caused by falling down an elevator shaft, It appeared that the elevator was maintained only for carrying freight, and there was a notice in it that it was not for passengers, though the elevator boy sometimes permitted persons to ride on it Each entrance to the shaft was guarded by a chain across it, hooked at one end, and by gates which could be unlatched on either side. The method of calling the elevator was by rattling a chain on the side of the shaft. At the time of the accident, plaintiff, who was a bright boy, 11 years old, and knew all the facts, having been sent by his employer on an errand, went to the shaft, and, finding the gates open, leaned over the chain to look down the shaft in order to see if the elevator was coming up, when the chain broke, and he fell. The gates were closed just before the

p. 491

accident, and there was no evidence as to who opened them. Held, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and the complaint should have been dismissed, or a verdict directed for defendant, on that ground.

Appeal from circuit court, New York county.

Action by William Knox, an infant, against the Hall Steam-Power Company. From judgment entered on verdict for plaintiff, and from order denying motion for a new trial, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and O’BRIEN and FOLLETT, JJ.

James Dunne, for appellant.

George W. Wilson, (James M. Smith, of counsel,) for respondent.

This action was brought by plaintiff, a boy about 12 years old, to recover damages for injuries sustained in falling down an elevator shaft on premises leased by defendant. In the building was a freight elevator, the care and management of which devolved on defendant, and which was used by the several tenants who occupied portions of the premises. In front of the opening to the shaft was a chain fastened by a hook, and, in addition, two iron gates, about six feet high, which could be opened when needed for placing freight on the elevator, and, when not so needed, could be closed. These gates, when closed, were fastened with a piece of iron, hook shaped, which could be removed from either the inside or the outside of each landing, and, when removed, would permit of the opening of the gates. The building was also provided,, from top to bottom, with a staircase, connected with each floor, and affording the means to tenants and their employes of reaching their several floors. The manner in which the elevator was constructed, and the uses to which it was put, as shown by all the witnesses, demonstrates that it was a freight, and not a passenger, elevator; and while it is true that frequently tenants, or their employes, rode upon such elevator, their presence there was usually in connection with freight which they were engaged in taking up to, or down from, the various floors in the building. Occasionally, too, the elevator bojr would permit other boys, or even tenants, to ride on the elevator, in which, however, there was a cardboard sign bearing the following printed notice: “This is not a passenger elevator. All persons riding on it do so at their own risk.” The elevator boy testified that this sign had been called to the attention of the plaintiff; but without attaching any weight to this • testimony, which was denied by plaintiff, we have the plaintiff’s own statement to the effect that the elevator boy sometimes prevented him from riding on the elevator, and compelled bim to walk up the stairs, and that when he did ride it was only after obtaining the elevator boy’s consent. Plaintiff was asked if he had ever been told by his employer to ride on the elevator, to which he made answer: “Yes, if I had any freight with me, he told me.” Plaintiff’s employers occupied a portion of the fourth floor of the building, and were engaged in the manufacture of looking-glasses, and

p. 492

plaintiff’s occupation consisted of sweeping about the premises, and running errands. With these facts showing the character of the-building,—occupied, as it was, by persons engaged in manufacturing, or similar business, and the construction of the elevator,, the guards placed about it on each floor, and the use to which it was applied in moving freight for tenants,—we are brought to a consideration of the question of defendant’s responsibility for the-injuries suffered by plaintiff, under the circumstances narrated by him.

The plaintiff testified that at 10 o’clock in the morning he was going out for beer; that he did not go on the stairs, and “rattle the chain,”—which was the means resorted to by those who desired to attract the attention of the boy in the elevator for the purpose of having it either hoisted or lowered,—but that, finding the gates which protected the elevator shaft open, he went towards the shaft, and looked over the chain to see if the elevator was coming up;, that he leaned on this chain, and as he did so it broke; that he held on to it until “it slapped me against the wall, and I let go of it, and it knocked me down four stories.” He further testified that he went for beer three times a day; that he rode on the elevator, but that sometimes the elevator boy would refuse to let him ride; and that then he walked. The chain upon which the plaintiff leaned was fastened by a hook which was so placed that it could be removed' and let down when necessary for the purpose of permitting freight to be taken on or off the elevator. He further testified that on-occasions when he either got on or off the elevator the gates were shut by the elevator boy, who also put the chain up. By plaintiff’s witness, one of his employers, it was shown that on the evening before the accident the gates on that floor were closed and fastened, and that next morning prior to the accident they were in the same condition. Ho testimony was given to show that these gates were left open by defendant’s employes, nor was there any testimony in the case showing just how the gates, which were closed prior to the accident, happened to be open at the time the plaintiff was proceeding on his errand. He testified that when he went out the doors were open, but, as stated, Ms employer testified that when he saw the gate that morning it was locked, and that one standing on the landing could open the door by lifting the latch from the inside and the outside. “This was a regular steel wire. It may" have been iron.” This testimony, therefore, did not furnish proof of negligence on the part of defendant in leaving such gates open, and this ground may be disregarded.

Apart, however, from the gates being open, it was shown that the proximate cause of the injuries was the imperfect and defective condition of the hook to which the chain was attached upon which the plaintiff leaned. The only notice of such defect, brought home to defendant, was the fact that the day before the elevator boy called the attention of the engineer of the building to the insecurity of such hook. That defendant had actual notice of the defective hook is not claimed, and it is doubtful if this evidence is

p. 493

•sufficient to prove constructive notice of such, defect, or to present the question of defendant’s negligence. But, assuming such to be the case, there is the remaining question as to whether or not the burden placed upon the plaintiff, of showing freedom from con-, tributary negligence, was sustained. The plaintiff was over 11 years old, and, according to the testimony, had gone to different schools seven years, and was regarded as a bright boy,—“pretty smart when he went to work in that building.” One of the witnesses testified, respecting plaintiff, that he found him an exceedingly intelligent boy. And, as shown by the plaintiff’s own examination, he was familiar with the methods employed to summon the elevator, and knew the uses to which it was applied. Notwithstanding such knowledge, he purposely refrained from either walking down the stairs, or, if he was desirous of soliciting a ride, •summoning the elevator by going up on the steps, and shaking the elevator rope or chain; but, the gates protecting the elevator being open, he saw fit to place his weight upon the chain, and look down the shaft to ascertain if the elevator was coming up. As said in Greany v. Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. 423 , 5 N. E. Rep. 425 :

“It would be error for a trial court to grant a nonsuit if, by any allowable ■deduction from the facts proved, a cause of action might be sustained by the plaintiff; and when such a ruling has been upheld, by reason of the contributory negligence of the person injured, it appears that such negligence was conclusively established by evidence which left nothing, either of inference or of fact, in doubt, or to be settled by a jury.”

Upon appeal, for the purpose of sustaining a judgment, the court will indulge in every fair inference or presumption; and where, as here, the question relates to whether or not there was sufficient evidence as. to plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence, the rule just referred to should be applied. But, applying this rule, which is as strongly in plaintiff’s favor as language could express it, to the facts as shown by the plaintiff’s own testimony, we fail to see how this judgment can be sustained. No inference that can be drawn from the testimony, and no presumption that can be indulged in, is consistent with the exercise of that care and prudence which the law exacts from a boy of the age and intelligence of the plaintiff. At the time of the accident he was not engaged in handling any freight for his employers, but had been sent upon an errand, for beer, which should have been discharged by going down the stairs, instead of waiting to see if he could obtain permission from the elevator boy to ride. This latter desire was seemingly so strong with him that, disregarding the ordinary precautions of prudence and care, he proceeded to the elevator shaft, and leaned' the weight of his body upon a chain, for the purpose of looking down, and ascertaining if the elevator was coming up. Such conduct cannot be regarded as furnishing evidence that he was free from negligence that contributed to his injuries; but, on the contrary, we fail to see why his leaning upon the chain did not constitute negligence on his part, in depending upon the security of an appliance on which, under the circumstances shown, he had ny right to rely. Had this been a passenger elevator, for the use

p. 494

of tenants in the building, and their employes, then there might be some argument based upon the claim that the failure to provide suitable and properly secured chains or other safeguards across the opening was such negligence that one who had a right to use such elevator, and who, relying on the invitation, and the right to enter upon the same, was injured, could recover the damages which he sustained by the failure to perform the obligations thus imposed upon those having the care and management of such elevator. But where, as here, the plaintiff proceeded to the opening in the elevator shaft, which, when the elevator was not at that floor, was secured by iron gates six feet high, closed and fastened with a latch, and thus, deliberately, without having a right, when going on errands, to ride on such elevator, placed himself in a position of danger, and did more by putting the weight of his body upon a chain which was not intended for that purpose, so that he might look over and down the shaft, we fail to find any such case as justified inferences favorable to the burden which the law places upon a plaintiff, of showing freedom from contributory negligence. Upon this ground the defendant moved for a dismissal of the complaint, and subsequently for a direction in its favor, which motions, having been denied, were duly excepted to, and thus the question which we have discussed was directly presented. Having reached the conclusion that the disposition of these motions made by the trial judge was erroneous, we are of opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant, to abide the event. All concur.