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Mercantile Safe-Deposit Co. v. Dimon

25 N.Y.S. 388 Court N.Y. Gen. Term Decision date 1893-10-13 English

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p. 388
MERCANTILE SAFE-DEPOSIT CO. v. DIMON et al.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.
October 13, 1893.)

Headnote

Interpleader—Injunction against Actions by Adverse Claimants.
Where property deposited in a box of plaintiff safe-deposit company is claimed both by the administrator of the depositor, who did not produce the keys of the box, but gave an explanation of their loss, and by another person as a donee, who produced the keys, plaintiff may interplead such claimants, and enjoin them from suing it for the property.
Appeal from special term, ¡New York county.
Action by the Mercantile Safe-Deposit Company against Charles L. Dimon, as administrator of the estate of Stephen C. Dimon, deceased, and Martha Keery, to require defendants to interplead as to certain property in defendants’ possession, and for an injunction. From an order which dissolved the temporary injunction restraining defendants from “commencing or prosecuting any action or proceeding in any court against plaintiff for the recovery of the moneys and property mentioned and described in the complaint,” plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Plaintiff is a safe-deposit company, and defendants are rival claimants to the possession of certain property heretofore deposited in one of plaintiff’s safe-deposit boxes, and now in plaintiff’s custody. The safe-deposit box in question was originally hired, and the property in dispute deposited therein, by one Stephen C. Dimon, now deceased. Defendant Charles L. Dimon claims the right of possession by virtue of letters of administration issued to him on the estate of the decedent Defendant Keery bases her claim upon an alleged gift causa mortis to' her from decedent of the contents of the box, evidenced by the delivery to her of the keys of the box, which are in her possession. Defendant Keery also claims that some of the property contained in the box never belonged to the defendant, but has always belonged to her. The transactions had between the parties which led up to this suit were, briefly, as follows: On or about May 8, 1893, defendant Dimon presented to plaintiff proof of his appointment as administrator of the estate of Stephen G. Dimon, deceased, and asked to be put in possession of the contents of decedent’s safe-deposit box. He did not produce the keys to the box, but gave an explanation of their loss, and plaintiff, having no notice of the adverse claim, began to break open the box, with a view of putting him in possession. At this point defendant Keery appeared with the keys of the box, and asserted her claim to the property by virtue of a gift causa mortis. She notified plaintiff, both orally and in writing, that the property formed no part of the decedent’s estate, and warned plaintiff not to deliver it to the administrator. Plaintiff thereupon refused to give possession to either claimant, but, as the lock of the box had already been broken, the property was removed to another box for safekeeping. This was done without inspection of the property. Subsequently, at the request of the administrator, he was permitted to inspect the property in the presence of officers of the company, and a list was made of the articles found. No other inspection of the property has been made or permitted by plaintiff.
p. 389
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and PARKER, J.
Alexander & Green, (Charles B. Alexander and Charles W. Pier-son, of counsel,) for appellant.
Wm. R. Wilder, for respondents.

It satisfactorily appears to us that the Mercantile Safe-Deposit Company cannot, with safety to itself, deliver the property the subject-matter of this action to either of the claimants. Therefore it has a right to maintain this action of interpleader, and be protected from other claims and litigations in respect to this properly. The order appealed from should be reversed, and the motion for continuing the injunction granted, with $10 costs and disbursements of this appeal, and $10 costs of the motion in the court below, to abide the final event of the action.