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Schieck v. Herzog

27 N.Y.S. 988 Court N.Y.C.P. Decision date 1894-03-07 English

Contents

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p. 988
(7 Misc. Rep. 546.)
SCHIECK v. HERZOG.
(Common Pleas of New York City and County, General Term.
March 7, 1894.)

Headnote

Contracts—Validity—Violation or Statute.
Laws 1892, c. 602, § 5, declares that it shall be unlawful, after March 1, 1893, to engage in the business of plumbing, without first obtaining a certificate of competency, and registering as a licensed plumber. Laws 1893, c. 66, extends the time for obtaining the certificate to September 1, 1893. 'll eld, that a claim for work done between March 1 and September 1, 1893, by a plumber who had not obtained the required certificate, was not affected by the act of 1892.
Appeal from ninth district court.
Action by Augustus Schieck against Hanna Herzog to recover for work and materials. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Argued before DALY, 0. J., and BISCHOFF and PRYOR, JJ.
A. McDonald, for appellant.
C. M. Cohen, for respondent.

The action was by a plumber, for work and materials, for which a balance of $54.86 was claimed. There was a general denial, and a counterclaim of $18.75. The justice dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not complied with the provisions of section 5 of chapter 602 of the Laws of 1892, which prescribes an official examination of all persons about to engage in the plumber’s trade, and the obtaining by them of a certificate of competency from the board created by the act, and declares that after March 1, 1893, it shall not be lawful to engage in the business of plumbing before first obtaining such certificate, and registering as a, licensed plumber. It appears, however, that the statute in question was amended by chapter 66 of the Laws of 1893, by which the limitation of time to obtain the certificate was extended to September 1, 1893. The amendatory act was passed February 28, 1893, and the work sued for was done between the two last-named dates, during which period there was no prohibitory statute. The judgment must be reversed.