Majority
Headnote
1. Mechanics’ Liens—Mistake in Name op Owner.This action is commenced to foreclose a mechanic’s lien filed by the plaintiffs against the property of the defendant Henry for work and materials furnished in building a house upon0 her land. Mrs. Henry, the owner, has not appeared in the action, and judgment passed against her by default, so that the amount which is stipulated to be due from her to the contractor, Male, is undisputed. The facts in the case are briefly told. No evidence was taken on the trial, but the counsel stipulated the principal facts in the case, and they also appear in the pleadings, and in statements of counsel on the trial. It appears that the defendant Elizabeth M. Henry, who is the wife of Frederick J. Henry, owned a lot on the east side of Masten street, near G-lenwood avenue, on which there was a building, bearing the street number 353. That a contract to erect an additional house on the property was entered into by the defendant Male, and it is for work and material fur
“Commencing at a point in the easterly line of Hasten street 120 feet southerly from its' intersection with the southerly line of Glen wood avenue; running thence easterly at right angles with Hasten street 45 feet; thence southerly, parallel with Hasten street, 34 feet; thence at right angles westerly 45 feet, to Hasten street; thence northerly along the said line of Hasten street 34 feet, to the place of beginning.” .
No question is raised but that the description contained in this lien is full, complete, and correct, and that the name of the proper owner is correctly given. It is claimed by the plaintiffs from this state of facts that their lien is prior to the lien of the defendants Knox & Folger, and should be first paid. - This raises the question, did the failure to state the name of the true owner in the lien of the defendants Knox & Folger impair its validity so as to give the plaintiffs’ lien any priority? Is the description contained in the •lien of the defendants Knox & Folger sufficient? By section 4, c. 342, of the Laws of 1885, known as the “General Lien Law of this State,” it is provided that the lien filed shall state the name of the owner of the premises against whose interest the lien is claimed; “but a failure to state the name of the true owner, lessee, general assignee, or person in possession, shall not impair the validity of. the lien.” It would seem from the language of the statute that it was designed to protect the person seeking to establish his lien against any mistake as to the ownership of the property; and if, by inadvertence, or inability to learn the true owner of the premises, he places the ownership in the wrong person, he shall not thereby be deprived of the benefit which the statute was designed to give in protecting material men and laborers against loss. But the courts
The same section 4 of the act requires such lien to contain a “description of the property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for identification, and if in a city or village, the situation of the building, or buildings, by street and number, if the street and number be known.” It is evident that the statute does not necessarily contemplate a full and complete description of the property to be affected if the description is sufficient for identification and location of the property. It is not questioned that the description correctly gives the location of the property, street, and number, and that is all the statute requires. If a more accurate description is necessary to enforce a judgment, it may be made from the description given in the notice of lien. The premises are correctly located by number and street, while the metes and bounds are not correctly given, yet the location of the property is so definite and certain as that it comes within the statutory description “sufficient for identification.” In Donnelly v. Libby, 31 N. Y. Super. Ct. 286 , it was held that, where the lien described premises as on the westerly side of Fourth avenue, known as “Ea. 370,” it was a sufficient description, and the lien could be enforced for labor and material furnished for the premises thus described. It seems to me that the description of the premises is sufficient, especially in view of the provisions of the statute that it need only be sufficient for identification; and, as has been said, the premises can be easily identified. It follows, therefore, that the lien filed by defendants Knox & Folger on the 21st day of August, 1893, is a first and prior lien, and should be-
Cases cited
- Schmalz v. Mead 125 N. Y. 188 p. 999
- Moran v. Chase 52 N. Y. 346 p. 999