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Conabeer v. New York Central & H. R. Railroad

32 N.Y.S. 6 Court N.Y. Gen. Term Decision date 1895-01-18 English

Delivered by FOLLETT, J.

Contents

Majority

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(84 Hun, 34.)
CONABEER v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO. et al.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.
January 18, 1895.)

Headnote

Fee oe Street—Acquisition by City—Reserving Easements.
Defendant railroad company constructed its road in a street after first obtaining legislative and municipal authority, and a grant from the abutting landowner, in whom was also the fee of the street. Afterwards the city, by condemnation proceedings, acquired title to the street, one dollar being awarded to defendant. HeldI, in the absence of evidence that defendant intended to surrender its title to the railroad structure or its easement in the street, that the city took the title subject thereto, and therefore a subsequent conveyance of such abutting property was subject to the grant from the original owner to defendant.
Appeal from special term, New York county.
Action by Hannah Gonabeer against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company and the New York & Harlem Railroad Company. The complaint was dismissed on the merits, with
costs, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
This action was begun in November, 1891, (1) to perpetually enjoin the defendants from operating their railroad in Fourth avenue in front of plaintiff’s premises; (2) to compel defendants to remove their structure in front of the plaintiff’s premises; and (3) to recover damages sustained by reason of the construction and operation of the road. April 25, 1831, the New York & Harlem Railroad Company was incorporated by chapter 263 of the Daws of that year, and authorized to construct a railroad from the north side of Twenty-Third street to any point on the Harlem river between Third and Eighth avenues; and in 1832 it constructed its road in Fourth avenue from Forty-Second street to the Harlem river. The avenue at this time was 1U0 feet in width. The roadbed was on an embankment in the center of the avenue, but the height and width of the embankment, as the road was originally constructed, are not definitely disclosed by the record. On the 18th of January, 1832, Margaret McGown was the owner in fee of a tract of land bounded on the east by Fourth avenue, on the north by One Hundred and Sixth street, on the south by Ninety-Seventh street, and on the west by a line so far west from Fourth avenue that it included the premises now owned by the plaintiff. On the date mentioned, she, by a deed duly executed,
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delivered, and recorded August 18,1835, conveyed to the New York & Harlem Railroad Company certain premises, described in «nífl flood o= follows: “All that certain piece of If velfth ward of the city of New York, ¡ , . \ ut on the map of the city of New Yorl ^ «. ‘Í <• . within a space of twenty-four feet wit * ‘ 1 venue, and between 97th and 106th ereof, for and during the full period < rk and Harlem Railroad Company may on which they are to construct their r 1 the power of sloping their embankmt yond the lines of said premises herein > support their work, not, however, exi le.” Pursuant to chapter 274, Laws 18: T-Fourth street to Harlem river was in feet in width being added to each side ¡out the avenue to the width prescribe* reto for street* purposes, opened it, and lots, an assessment being made on tl lick was paid, and the railroad and ot r compensation for the lands acquired.
By chapter 702, Laws Id regulate the use of the Fourth avenu Tided: “Section 1. The New Y hereby authorized and required to regí Fourth avenue of the city of New York, id road bridges over the same, and sw ae same, with openings for proper ven the same safe and convenient to any railroad trains and passengers traveling imely: * * * From Ninety-Sixth stree esent grade to the centre of One Hund | Ninety-Eighth street to One Hundred tall be carried upon a viaduct, with stc iduct over the cross or intersecting str street, to and include One Hundred an; ____J
Shortly after the passage of tkis act, the New York & Harlem Railroad Company, pursuant to plans agreed on between it and the city, erected in the center of said avenue, crossing One Hundred and Fourth street, and in front of the premises of the plaintiff, a viaduct, about 56 feet wide, and 33 feet high, retained by walls of masonry running parallel with the lines of the avenue, and laid, on the surface of the viaduct, tracks for the use of the railroad. Wherever intersecting streets were crossed, openings were constructed of masonry for the accommodation of persons traveling on said streets. One-half of the expense of such reconstruction was paid by the city, and one-half by said railroad company. The road, as it now exists, was constructed by the joint act of the city and the railroad corporation. April 1, 1873, the New York & Harlem Railroad Company was leased to the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, a corporation of this state, for 401 years, since which time the lessee has been in possession and has operated the road. Prior to 1887, Thomas Foy, by mesne conveyances from Margaret McGown, became the owner of part of the land owned by her when she conveyed the strip to the New York & Harlem Railroad; and on June 29, 1887, by a deed duly executed, delivered, and recorded on that date, he conveyed to the plaintiff a piece of land described as follows: “All that certain lot, piece, or parcel of land, with the improvements thereon, situate, lying, and being in the city of New York, and bounded and described as follows: Beginning at the southwest corner of One Hundred and Fourth street and Fourth avenue, and running thence southerly, along the westerly side of Fourth avenue, one hundred feet and eleven inches, to the center line of the block; thence westerly, along said center line, and parallel with One Hundred and Fourth street, sixteen feet; thence running northerly, parallel with Fourth avenue, and part of the way through a certain party
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wall, one hundred feet and eleven Inches, to the southerly side of One Hundred and Fourth street; and thence running easterly, along the southerly side of One Hundred and Fourth street, sixteen feet, to the point or place of beginning.” At that date there was, and now is, standing on the lot, a three-story brick dwelling. The plaintiff, on the date of the deed, entered into possession of said premises, and has ever since occupied them as a dwelling. From that time the defendants, during every day and night, have run a large number of trains over said viaduct, drawn by locomotives propelled by steam, which emit smoke, steam, soot, ashes, and sparks, which, from time to time, have entered the windows of the plaintiff’s dwelling, and have fallen upon her premises, to the injury thereof. The operation of said road produces loud and disagreeable noises, and its construction and operation interrupt the natural passage of light and air to and from the plaintiff’s dwelling.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and FOLLETT and PARKER, JJ.
Joseph Ullman, for appellant.
Henry H. Anderson, for appellees.

The plaintiff’s lot is bounded on the north by the south line of One Hundred and Fourth street, and on the east by the west line of Fourth avenue, she having no title or estate in the bed or soil of either street, and she claims no private rights or interests in either street, except such as are incidental to lots abutting on streets. The title to these streets is in the city of New York, in trust. By the deed of January IS, 1832, Mrs. McGown, the former owner of the fee of the plaintiff’s lot, conveyed to the New York & Harlem Railroad Company a strip of land 24 feet wide, in the center of the avenue, and extending from Ninety-Seventh street to One Hundred and Sixth street. By the terms of this deed, the grantee was authorized to construct a railroad on the land conveyed, with the right of extending the embankment on which the rails were to be laid to the exterior lines of the avenue. At the date of this conveyance, the avenue was 100 feet wide; and on each side of the land conveyed, and within the avenue, there was a strip of land 38 feet wide, the title to which was not conveyed, but the right to cover these strips with an embankment was expressly granted. The embankment as now constructed is 56 feet wide, covering the land conveyed by Mrs. McGown, and a strip 16 feet wide on each side of the strip granted by her, which is 22 feet less on each side of the strip conveyed than the defendants by the grant were authorized to use. By the conveyance the grantee was authorized to construct a railroad on the subject of the grant, and, if necessary, to occupy the whole width of the avenue adjacent to the grantor’s remaining land. The grant of the right to construct a railroad carried with it the right to operate it when constructed, and the defendants could not have been held liable to Mrs. McGown for incidental damages caused to her remaining property by operating the road, without showing that the road was improperly constructed or negligently operated. The plaintiff stands in- the shoes of her predecessor in title, and has no greater rights than she had. There is no assertion that the road was improperly constructed. On the contrary, the proof is that it was built in accordance with the statute of 1872 and the requirements of the city authorities; and it is

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not alleged or proved that the defendants have been negligent in the operation of the road.

But the plaintiff insists that when the city, in 1853, increased the width of the avenue from 100 feet to 140 feet, and acquired the title to all lands within its exterior lines, including the strip granted to the railroad, Mrs. McGown’s grant was annulled, and the successors to her title were from that date vested with all the rights in the avenue that they would have had in case no such conveyance had been made by her. In support of this contention, it is urged that, this avenue having been laid out pursuant to chapter 86 of the Revised Laws'of 1813, section 176 of which provides (2 Rev. Laws 1813, p. 414) that the city shall become seised in fee of lands taken for streets, subject to the trust that lands so acquired shall be kept open and used as streets, the title of the railroad to the strip of land in this street was not only acquired, but from that time its right to use the street for railroad purposes became subject to the right of the abutting owners to recover damages for injuries to their street easements, occasioned by the subsequent use of the street by the railroad. In support of this position it is asserted that the city could not acquire the fee of the street, subject to the right of the railroad to use a portion of it for its purposes. Incumbrances and easements burden many estates, the title to which is held in fee, and such burdens are not necessarily inconsistent with a title in fee. When the city acquired the title to this avenue, the New York & Harlem Railroad Company was, and for more than 20 years had been, occupying the central part of the street, under legislative and municipal authority, for railroad purposes, and had erected therein, pursuant to such authority, an expensive and valuable structure; and it cannot be assumed, in the absence of proof, that, for an award of one dollar, the city intended to acquire, or the corporation to surrender, its title to the structure, or that the railroad intended to surrender its long-enjoyed right to operate its road in the avenue. The practical construction by the city and by the railroad of the effect of the acquisition of the title to this street is opposed to such a contention. The city never claimed to be the owner of the structure, and the corporation was not compelled to remove it, nor was its right to use it abridged, and it has been held that the structure is not the property of the city but of the railroad. People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 101 N. Y. 322 , 4 N. E. 127 . By chapter 702, Laws 1872, the title of the railroad to its structure in the avenue, and the right to continue to operate its road therein, are expressly recognized. We are referred to Hill v. Railroad Co., 5 Denio, 206 , affirmed 7 N. Y. 152 , as an authority for the position that, when land is acquired for public use by condemnation, an easement therein cannot be reserved in favor of the person from whom acquired. This case is not an authority for this position, as it simply holds that an easement in lieu of or in diminution of the owner’s damages cannot be reserved without the consent of the owner of the property taken. With the consent of the owner an easement may be reserved and considered upon the question of damages. Mills, Em. Dom. 112, and cases cited.

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In the case at bar it is apparent that the railroad assented to an award of one dollar as compensation for its land taken, in consideration that its easement in the street was not to be disturbed, but was to be continued. We think the judgment is right, and that it should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.

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