play would run until June 1st, that was the contract, and she is not limited to six weeks, but is entitled to recover for the full period.” To this the defendant excepted. The defendant contends that the evidence shows that the plaintiff was engaged only for the run of the play, and that the statement by Brooks, the defendant’s agent, who engaged her, that the play would run to June 1st, was mere opinion, and not a warranty that it would so continue. The testimony of plaintiff, on her direct examination, was: That Brooks said: “This means a permanent thing for you in New York from the opening until the balance of the season. I will give you $60 a week from the time we open until the balance of the season.” That she said, “Suppose the play is a failure?” He said, “Crane does not produce failures.” She said, “How long is the season?” He said, “We will open in three or four weeks, at the very latest, from January 30th, and it will extend to about June 1st.” On cross-examination she was asked: “Q. I call your attention particularly to the conversation you had with Brooks the first time you met him, and I ask you the question whether or not it was not a fact that Brooks said to you, you were engaged for the run of the play? A. Yes. Q. That is it? A. Yes; and I asked him how long the run would be, and he told me about three weeks from January 30th, until about June 1st. Q. And that, he told you, would be the run of the play? A. Yes.” And again: “A. My first conversation with him, I was engaged from the time I say until on or about June 1st. Q. For the run of the play? A. Yes; that is, the length of the,run of the play. Q. And he told you, in his opinion, it would run to June 1st, about? A. Yes.” From this testimony, if the jury believed it, there was no doubt that Brooks not only expressed an opinion that the play would run until June 1st, but had so much confidence in Mr. Crane’s judgment of plays, and ability to run them as long as he pleased, that he was willing to and did contract with plaintiff that her engagement in this piece would last to that date. So that, while he engaged the plaintiff for the run of the play, he distinctly specified that run as extending to June 1st, and there was no error in the instruction of the court on that point. But, if there were a doubt as to the sense in which Brooks’ statement as to the run of the piece and plaintiff’s engagement are to be understood, defendant is not entitled to the benefit of that doubt; for it is manifest that from Brooks’ declaration to plaintiff that “this means a permanent thing for you in New York from the opening until the balance of the season,” and “I will give you $60 a week from the time we open until the balance of the season,” together with his other statements, "he must have supposed that the plaintiff understood he was contracting for the season, and this understanding constitutes the contract. “Where the language of a promisor may be understood in more senses than one, it is to be interpreted in the sense in which he had reason to suppose it was understood by the promisee.” Hoffman v. Insurance Co.,
32 N. Y. 405 , citing Potter v. Insurance Co., 5 Hill, 149 ;
Barlow v. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40 . It is to be observed that defendant did not ask that any question with regard to plaintiff’s understanding, or what defendant supposed