Majority
Headnote
1. Limitation of Actions—Set-Off of Legacy against Debts to TestatorSpecial Surrogate. The note above mentioned was made July 15, 1882, payable one day after date, with interest. On the 19th day of July, 1889, the testatrix made her will, whereby she bequeathed to her son Albertus A. Foster the sum of $200. At this time more than six years had elapsed since the malting of this note, and no interest, or any part of the principal of said note, had been paid. Under Schedule B of the account filed, the executor credits himself with the following item: “Promissory note of Albertus A. Foster, by limitation of law not collectible, $150.” Under Schedule G- of said account, the executor also credits himself with the following item: “Paid legacy to Albertus A. Foster, $200.” The executor contends (1) that, the statute of limitations having run against the note, the executor could not apply the legacy of $200, or so much thereof as might be necessary to pay said note; (2) that by the provisions of said will the legacy of $200 was intended to be in addition to any indebtedness her son Albertus A. Foster might owe her.
The statute of limitations only affects the legal remedy, and in no case operates as a discharge or satisfaction of a debt. It does not even raise a presumption of payment, but is merely a b^r to the remedy by action. That an executor has an equitable lien upon and a right to retain out of a legacy an amount due from the legatee to the testator, and that this right is unaffected by the fact that such debt is barred by the statute of limitations, is well established. Rogers v. Murdock, 45 Hun, 30 , and cases cited.
The testatrix, by her will, disposes of the greater part of her household furniture, beds, bedding, etc., by specific legacies, and the eighth clause of her will is as follows:
“Eighth. I order, direct, and empower my executor hereinafter named to sell, as soon after my death as he shall deem it advantageous to my estate, all the rest and remainder of my personal property and estate, and all the real estate of which I may die seised, at public or private sale, at his discretion, and convert the same into money; and I give, devise, and bequeath the proceeds of the sale of said real and personal property as follows: To my son John S. Foster, the sum of one hundred dollars ($100). To my son Albertus A. Foster, the sum of two hundred dollars ($200). To my husband, George A. Foster, all the rest, residue, and remainder of the proceeds of the said sale of real and personal property and estate, for and during his natural life; and from and after his death I give, devise, and bequeath the same to my own children, share and share alike. I order and direct my said executor, after making the said sale, and paying the legacies to John S. and Albertus A. Foster, to safely invest the balance of the proceeds of said sale, and keep the same safely invested for and during the natural life of my husband, George A. Foster, and pay the interest and income arising therefrom, after deducting legal expenses, to my said husband, George A. Foster, as soon as received.”
“Nobody would contend that the mere gift of a legacy is of itself, and necessarily, a manifestation of an intent on the part of the testator to remit a debt due him from the legatee.” Smith v. Kearney, 2 Barb. Oh. 533, 547-549; Wright v. Austin, 56 Barb. 17 ; Close v. Van Husen, 19 Barb. 509 ; Rickets v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Cas. 100 .
I am therefore of the opinion that this executor should have applied this legacy of $200 to Albertus A. Foster, or so much thereof as may be necessary, towards the payment of his note for $150, and interest from July 15, 1882, to the date of the death of testatrix, and that the account should be amended and settlement made in accordance with the foregoing, and so order. Decreed accordingly.
Cases cited
- Smith v. Murray 1 Dem. Sur. 34 p. 38
- In re the Estate of Colwell 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 742 p. 38