Majority
Headnote
1. Assumpsit—Money Loaned—Evidence.This action was brought to recover the sum of $1,500 alleged to have been loaned by the plaintiff to the defendant John Curran. The defendant answered denying each and every allegation of the complaint. Before the trial, the defendant Curran having died, his administrators were substituted as defendants. i
Upon the trial it was endeavored to prove the loan of the moneys by the plaintiff to the defendant Curran, by establishing the fact •that the plaintiff had given to the defendant Curran checks for a certain amount; and a witness by the name of Dahlman was called, who testified that he had had transactions with Curran by selling horses to him, for which Curran made payments during the year 1888; and a check for $400 was presented to the witness, and he stated that the indorsement thereon w7as made by Curran, and that
It is difficult to see how, in connection with the testimony of the witness, any of the entries in these books could possibly be evidence. No witness had been sworn or examined who had any personal knowledge of these transactions, or who made the entries in the books and could testify as to their accuracy. The motion was directed entirely to the testimony of Dahlman, and as to what he learned from the books in respect to transactions about which he had no recollection; his testimony being based upon entries in the books, as to the correctness of which he had no knowledge. The books were not offered in evidence, but the testimony of Dahlman was given, and that was stricken out. There seems to have been no error whatever in striking out all of Dahlman’s testimony, except that which related to the possession of the check and its indorsement by Curran. And it is to be observed that, even if the testimony of Dahlman were allowed to remain, it could not have affected the case at bar. The fact that the plaintiff gave Curran the check, and that Curran gave the check to Dahlman, proved nothing. The case of Nay v. Curley, 113 N. Y. 575 , 21 N. E. 698 , expressly holds that the giving of a check is presumptively the payment of a debt, and, to raise the presumption that it was a loan, additional proof is required to be given. This rule was recognized by the counsel for the plaintiff when he attempted to introduce in evidence the stub in the plaintiff’s check book upon which stub was the following memorandum: “Dated May 22, 1888, order of John Curran, for loan.” This was sought to be introduced as part of the res gestae, as is claimed. But it is difficult to see upon what theory the entries in the'plaintiff’s own book, in his own interest, could possibly be evidence against John Curran. It might just as well be claimed that, if somebody had been standing by at the time the plaintiff drew his check, Curran being absent, and the plaintiff had told the bystander that he drew the check for a loan to Curran, such declaration could be used as evidence against the latter. It is clear that no such declaration of the plaintiff could be offered in evidence under such circumstances, and the entry in his check book is of precisely similar character. In considering this question, we
The above views dispose of the objection to the ruling in regard to the stubs relating to the other checks. It is conceded by the counsel that, in respect to the admissibility of these stubs, they stand upon the same footing as that of the check first above mentioned. None of the authorities cited by the appellant seem to sustain any such proposition as is contended for here.
The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
Cases cited
- Nay v. Curley 113 N. Y. 575 p. 706