a limitation upon the power of a testator to give, and upon the right of an heir or next of kin to receive. Remove the disqualification of alienage, and what is it the heir is entitled to sell? Clearly, the property or interest therein which would pass to a citizen heir,—in the case at bar, 95 per cent, of such interest. While the provisions of the treaty must be liberally construed, it must be manifest that the court will not strain towards such a construction as will give greater advantages or privileges in the acquisition of property to foreigners than is accorded to our own citizens. I suppose it is fair to assume that the contracting parties intended that a consistent treaty should result from their negotiations. Then why, if the appellants' contention is correct, should there be a discrimination between personalty, passing as such, and the proceeds of real estate? If we adopt the appraiser’s construction of the treaty, the instrument is harmonious, and results in what I conceive is the end sought in such affairs, viz. the granting and receiving by the citizens of each of the contracting states of reciprocal rights, and forbidding the exercise of any right of forfeiture because of alienage except as reserved thereby. By the terms, “droit d’aubaine,” “droit de retraite,” “droit de detraction,” and “duties of detraction,” were not intended taxes upon succession to, or transfers of, property. Frederickson v. State of Louisiana,
23 How. 445 . In that case, Fink, a naturalized citizen of the United States, residing in Louisiana, bequeathed certain legacies to citizens of Württemberg. By a statute of Louisiana, it is provided that “each and every person now being domiciliated in this state, and not being a resident of any other state or territory in the Union, who shall he entitled, whether as heir, legatee or donee, to the whole or any part of the' succession of a person deceased, whether such person shall have died in this state or elsewhere, shall pay a tax of ten per cent, on all sums or on the value of all property which he may have actually received from said succession, or so much thereof as is situated in this state, after deducting ail debts due by the succession.” The court held that article 3 of the treaty, which was relied upon as prohibiting the levy of such a tax upon the legacies, did not apply to the case of a citizen or subject of either country residing at home, and disposing of property there in favor of a citizen or subject of the other, which construction is directly opposed to the contention of the appellants here.