house in Cohoes of the assessed value of $8,000, in which she had resided for several years prior to May SO, 1886. Kespecting her said dwelling-house and furniture her affidavit returned by the assessors recited: “My household furniture at Cohoes, H. Y., has been since June 1, 1886, rented by me to Mr. Vredenburgh, with my house, to October 1, 1886, and used by him, except a small portion, which is stored in four rooms, because he did not want them. A portion of my furniture is in a house rented and occupied by me since May 30, 1886, at said town of White Creek, Washington county, which I had hired and occupied since May 30, 1886, continuously. ” She also submitted to the assessors the affidavit of Thomas C. Gifford, to the effect that she was assessed for the year 1886 in the town of White Creek, as a resident and taxpayer therein. The assessors refused to strike off the assessment, holding, in substance, that the relator was still a resident of Cohoes, and her residence in White Creek was evasive and temporary. The certiorari and return coming on to be heard at the special term, an order was there made against the objection and protest of relator, but without prejudice to the same, sending the matter to a referee. Before the referee, the relator was sworn in behalf of the assessors, and testified that she resided in the town of White Creek, but refused, under the advice of counsel, to testify further, alleging that the testimony was closed before the assessors, and the only question was one of law whether upon that testimony the assessment should be stricken off the roll. One of the assessors was then sworn, and testified that during the whole of the month of July, 1886, the relator resided in a house assessed to her in the city of Cohoes. The referee certified to the testimony and proceedings before him, and thereupon the relator moved at special term that the assessment be vacated. The court ordered that the matter be sent back to the referee, “to take the testimony of the relator if the respondents still desire to take the same, and such other pertinent.testimony as either party desire to introduce, ” and the relator was directed to appear before the referee, and submit to an examination by the assessors. The assessors then served notice upon the relator’s attorney that they disputed the power of the court to send the case back, and did not desire to examine the relator further, or introduce other testimony. The relator offered to submit to their examination. Thereupon the relator brought on the motion and hearing before the special term upon the whole proceedings, and the order was made from which this appeal is taken, the assessors giving notice that they intend to bring up for review the order sending the case back to the referee for further hearing.
Argued before Learned, F. J., and Landón and Ingalls, JJ.Doyle & Fitts, for relator. T. D. FFiver, for respondent.
Section 4, c. 269, Laws 1880, authorized the special term, upon the return to the certiorari, to appoint a referee “to take such evidence as the court may direct, and report the same to the court. ” The reference being duly made, it was the duty of the relator to answer the questions addressed to her by the assessors, touching her place of residence. Her refusal was primafacie a contempt, and the special term, upon the second motion, had the discretion to give her opportunity to purge herself of the contempt, or to take proceedings for her summary punishment, as by striking out her testimony before the assessors, or denying her application upon the certiorari. He gave her further opportunity to testify, if the assessors requested it. They did not request it. The result is that both parties have rested their ease upon the testimony, and the question is whether upon that testimony the relator was a resident of the city of Cohoes on the 1st day of July, 1886. We think not. She had actually hired a house, and taken up her residence in it, in White Greek, on the 1st of June preceding, and continued to reside in it. She had left her residence in Cohoes, and had leased part of her house and furniture there to a tenant. She was liable to taxation in White Creek. Bell v.