ele sired him to keep the lot, and try to sell it, but the market was dull, and they could sell nothing in those days, and that Robert then requested him' (defendant), to execute a mortgage of $2,000, and he would see if Mr. Platt would accept such mortgage in payment for his lot; that he (defendant) "was importuned to buy the lot, many times, and for a long time, and to make this mortgage; that Robert finally said the Platt lot would cost about $1,500, that he required about $1,500, anckjinally induced him (defendant) to execute the mortgage for $1,475.
This was substantially all the evidence given upon the trial. The defendant offered other evidence by himself and a witness, Judge Addison Brown. Judge Brown testified that he was in the active practice of the law in 1888, and acted as counsel for defendant, and that he remembered a transaction relating to the purchase of property on 106th and 107th streets, in New York City,—12 lots. The witness was asked if he received any money for the purchase of a piece of property from Mr. Hull. Witness produced a receipt, written and signed by himself, dated January 5, 1869, stating that he received from defendant $910 as a special deposit account, Hull; and defendant offered the receipt in evidence. Witness also produced a warranty deed from defendant to plaintiff of the 106th street lot, dated January 11, 1870, signed and acknowledged by defendant, expressing no consideration, and not recorded; and defendant offered this in evidence. Witness stated that he made entries in his books at the time of the transaction when the purchase of the 106th street property was made, and he produced the book; and defendant offered it in evidence. Witness was then asked if he' received money from Hull with reference to the purchase of the 106th street lot. All these offers of evidence were objected to, and the evidence was excluded by the court. The defendant himself was asked by his own counsel if he had any beneficial interest in the 106th street lot; whether he held the lot as trustee or not; whether, at the time he received the deed, he paid any money to anybody; whether he or anybody else paid the consideration for the lot; whether plaintiff’s husband paid the consideration. All these questions were objected to, and the evidence was excluded by the court. Defendant testified that, after the bond and mortgage were given, he paid the interest ¿hereon until 1876, and that such payment was demanded, but he was not permitted by the court to state how he came to pay the interest, or how the demand was made. At the close of all the evidence, the court directed a verdict for plaintiff for the amount unpaid on the bond and mortgage. The defendant exceptpd, and requested to be allowed to go to the jury as to the question of consideration for the bond and mortgage, which was refused, with exception. From the judgment entered upon this verdict, this appeal is taken.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and WILLIAMS, PATTERSON, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.Robert L. Harrison, for appellant.
Charles B. Alexander, for respondent.
It seems to us that the learned trial court erred in the disposition made of this case. There seems to be no doubt from the evidence given on the part of plaintiff herself that the consideration for this bond and mortgage, if any, was an indebtedness by defendant to the plaintiff’s husband. The defendant, by his answer, denied that any such indebtedness ever existed; alleging that the title to the 106th street lot was taken and held by him merely as an accommodation for the plaintiff’s husband; that the money paid for the lot was not borrowed by defendant from plaintiff’s husband, but was paid by the latter directly to the owner, as the purchase price of the property. This defense he attempted to prove on the trial by himself and the witness Brown. Some of the evidence offered for this purpose was competent, and should have