tiff assents to the adjournment and waives his right to a jury trial, and defendant’s attorney states that he does not demand a jury, but that he wants the case tried according to law.
The plaintiff commenced his action against the defendant, and issue was joined, and the case was adjourned by mutual consent to August 4, 1892, after drawing a jury called at the request of the plaintiff. On the 4th day of August, 1892, the jury was drawn from the persons summoned, and the parties proceeded to trial. The jury disagreed, and they were thereupon discharged, all parties being present. The record of the justice shows that the parties then consented to an adjournment until August 10, 1892. The plaintiff then stated to the court “that he waived a trial by jury, and did not call a new jury. The attorney for the defendant then stated that did not demand a jury, but stated that he wanted the case tried according to law. I did not issue a new venire. On the adjourned day, August 10, 1892, the parties appeared as before, and the attorney for the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the justice had no jurisdiction to try the said cause, for the reason shown in the written motion, made by said attorney, which is hereto attached. The motion was granted, and judgment was therefore entered against the plaintiff for $11.75.” The written motion which is referred to in the minutes of the justice was filed on the last adjourned day, and in it the defendant demurred to the jurisdiction of the court to further hear and determine the case, upon the grounds, to state them briefly, that, after the jury had failed to agree, “the court failed to immediately call and draw k new jury, as required by law; second, that the court has failed to draw any jury, since such disagreement, to try the cause; and, third, that, when the jury had disagreed, and was discharged, the plaintiff’s attorney said to the court that he waived a jury, and did not want a jury drawn on his account,” etc. It was insisted, on the part of the defendant, “that the plaintiff could not waive a jury; that, the plaintiff having called a jury, and such jury having failed to agree, it was the duty of the justice to immediately draw a new jury to try the cause; that the law must take its own course; that he would not agree to dispense with a jury.”
Appeal from Ulster county court.
Action by George Suitor against Charles Kent, as administrator, substituted in place of Oliver'P. Kent, deceased, for the recovery of a sum of money. From a judgment in favor of defendant, on a verdict dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Argued before PARKER, P. J., and LANDON, HERRICK, MER-WIN, and PUTNAM, JJ.E. Dayton, for appellant.
C. M. Woolsey, for respondent.
The judgment of the county court and of the justice’s court should both be reversed. The justice’s record states the justice’s version of what took place at the time of the disagreement and discharge of the jury and of the agreement to adjourn to the subsequent day. The filing of the written motion, which contains a statement of facts as to what took place before the court at such time, and which is at variance with the justice’s record, cannot be taken, and considered by the court upon appeal, as a correct statement of the facts upon which the appeal is to be heard and decided. Such appeal must be heard upon the record of the justice. If that is not correct, either party has his remedy by moving for a further return. The record, if incorrect, cannot be changed by filing,' upon a motion, a statement containing facts different from those set forth by the justice.