ranted, taking all the allegations of the moving affidavits most strongly in favor of the respondent, and we can have no hesitation in holding that it was. Meyers v. Cohn,
4 Misc. Rep. 185 , 23 N. Y. Supp. 996 ;
Paige v. Chedsey, 4 Misc. Rep. 183 , 23 N. Y. Supp. 879 . The defendant, during the interval of time material to this litigation, resided without the jurisdiction of the court, and the order of arrest obtained July 8,1896, could not be executed. A seafaring man by occupation, he intended to commence' a voyage on the 12th day of September, 1896, and was prepared to come into the jurisdiction, furnish bail, and present his defense to the plaintiff’s action, should the trial proceed at a time sufficiently early for him to join his ship; and, with a view to thus disposing of the matter, his counsel, together with counsel for the plaintiff, appeared before one of the justices of the court below, at trial term, on September 8, 1896, and it was then agreed that the trial should be had on the 10th of the same month, without a jury, since none was obtainable, the defendant to appear voluntarily at that time. That there was actually such an agreement upon the plaintiff’s part is not seriously disputed, and is amply supported by the record. Accordingly the defendant was notified by his counsel to come to this city, which he did, arriving on the morning of September 9th, and proceeding to procure his bail; but it appears that at half past 6 o’clock in the evening of the day before the plaintiff’s attorneys had notified the clerk of the defendant’s attorneys that it would be inconvenient for them to try the cause as arranged, suggesting a later date, which was not acceded to. Upon hearing of this the morning of September 9th, defendant’s " counsel served a notice that the defendant would be produced in court as agreed, and that an immediate trial would be demanded. Defendant accordingly was produced, his bail was accepted, and the cause moved for trial, but the motion was met by the plaintiff’s counsel demanding a trial by jury, and upon this demand the cause was set down for trial at the October term of the court,—a result which, if suffered to remain unaffected, worked an unmitigated injustice to the defendant, under the circumstances of the case. The appellant’s contention is that there had been, in effect, a mutual rescission of the agreement before the defendant submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court; but, while the affidavits presented for the plaintiff upon the motion tend to show some such fact, this was not the fact accepted by the justice, who credited the express denial of the matter contained in the affidavits submitted in support of the motion, and for this appeal his finding of the fact must also be ours. Higgins v. Dewey (Com. Pl.) 14 N. Y. Supp. 894 . It is further claimed that there was a voluntary appearance by the defendant, with a waiver of the plaintiff’s agreement, because, after notice that the plaintiff’s attorneys were unwilling to try the cause as stipulated (referring to the conversation between counsel and the defendant’s attorneys’ clerk on the evening of September 8th), the defendant nevertheless appeared. If, from the conversation referred to, a distinct repudiation of the agreement by the plaintiff’s representatives was to be gathered,—which is by no means clearly the fact,—still the defend