McCloskey v. Willis

Gavin, the commissioner swore, in an affidavit verified February 11, 1897, that he “is not now employed as foreman of street repairs in said city of Brooklyn, and has not been so employed since the 11th day of November, 1896, when his duties ceased as foreman of a gang of street repairers, and he entered upon the duties of foreman of a connection gang, to which he was transferred by deponent in good faith, and because he had shown ability and reliableness, on the 18th day of September, 1896, said transfer to take effect when his said duties as foreman of street repairing were finished.” This allegation indicates what is the principal question of fact as to which the parties to this proceeding are at variance. In the service of the department of city works the laborers who do work upon the streets are classified into gangs known, respectively, as “repair gangs” and “connection gangs.” The appellant, in his moving papers, alleges that the duties of both these classes of gangs are identical; whereas the opposing affidavits, without expressly denying this allegation, contain statements of fact, the fair import of which, I think, amounts to an averment that the duties of the repair gangs and the connection gangs are different, and that the work done by the repair gangs is only practicable during the warm seáson. Hence it is contended in behalf of the respondent that the employment of the appellant was only temporary in its nature, and ended with the termination of warm weather. This appears to have been the view adopted by the learned judge at special term. That view would be correct, I think, if it were not for the question in the case as to the identity of the work done by the repair gangs and the connection gangs. If it be true, as alleged by the appellant, that their duties were substantially the same, he certainly was deprived of the preference intended to be bestowed by the statute, when he was discharged from the service of the department, while Gavin, who was not a veteran, ivas retained. The propriety of the action of the commissioner, therefore, in dismissing the appellant, depends upon the character of the employment of these two foremen. Both men being actually in the service of the city, he could not lawfully, except upon charges, and after a hearing, dismiss the veteran, and retain the foreman who was not a-veteran, to do substantially the same kind of work. In re Sullivan, 55 Hun, 285 , 8 N. Y. Supp. 401 , is precisely in point. There the relator was an honorably discharged soldier, employed as a laborer in the department of public works, and engaged in repairing and repaving streets in the city of New York. He was discharged from employment, while the same kind of work remained to be done, and others, who were not veterans, had been retained to do it. It was held that the relator was entitled to be reinstated by mandamus. If the appellant is right in his contention that the work of repair gangs and connection gangs is identical in character, his employment cannot be deemed temporary, and terminable upon the arrival of cold weather, inasmuch as Gavin nevertheless continued to be employed, discharging the same duties, after the winter began. In this respect the present case differs from People v. Gilroy, 60 Hun, 507 , 15 N. Y. Supp. 242 , where the employment

of the relator as an inspector was limited to a particular purpose, and in connection with a special work; and even there the'court expressly said that if he had been a general employé as inspector, he would have come within the preference of the act of 1887. The statutory preference to which veterans are entitled would amount to very little, so far as laborers are concerned, if veterans could lawfully be discharged from the public employment at the approach of winter, while men who are not veterans could be retained in the service of the municipality, doing substantially' the same work. It is quite true, as stated in the opinion at special term, that the duty of the commissioner of city works was to discharge all men whose services were no longer needed; but this duty must be exercised with reference to the command of the statute in regard to the preference to which veterans are entitled, and, where-ever there are two men employed in a public department, one being a veteran and the other not, and the services of only one man are required for the future, the statute makes it the duty of the superior officer who has the power of discharge or dismissal to retain the veteran, rather than the man who has never been in the military or naval service of the nation. This case turns upon the question whether Gavin was, in fact, retained to perform the saíne sort of service which McCloskey also had been rendering; and an alternative mandamus should be awarded in order that this question may be tried and determined.

The order appealed from must be reversed, and the application granted so far as to award an alternative writ; costs to abide the event. All concur.