arine Walsh, who Is, as these plaintiffs are informed and believe, a sister-in-law •of the defendant William Drought. Eighth. On information and belief, that the said instrument in writing purporting to convey said premises to the defendant Catharine Walsh was made without consideration, and solely for the purpose of defrauding these plaintiffs of the commissions honestly earned and rightfully belonging to them. Ninth. That, notwithstanding such pretended conveyance, the defendant William Drought is still the owner of said premises. Tenth. That these plaintiffs demanded of the defendant William Drought that he make a bona fide sale of the said premises, and pay these plaintiffs the commissions due them out of the proceeds; but the said defendant William Drought refused and neglected, and still refuses and neglects, to carry out his agreement with these plaintiffs. Eleventh. These plaintiffs allege they are advised by counsel, and verily believe, that they are remediless at law, and cannot bring any action to recover their commissions in a court of law, but are compelled to sue in a court of equity to enforce the agreement above set forth. Twelfth. That unless the deed above set forth made by the defendant William Drought to the defendant Catharine Walsh be declared null and void and set aside, and these plaintiffs be decreed to have an equitable lien upon said premises, they will suffer great and irreparable damages by reason of the premises. Wherefore these plaintiffs demand judgment: (1) That the deed made by the defendant William Drought to the defendant Catharine Walsh, purporting to convey the premises above set forth, and which was recorded in the office of the register of the city and county of New York on the 19th day of September, 1896, be declared null and void. (2) That these plaintiffs be decreed to have an equitable lien upon the said premises, and that the said premises be sold, and out of the proceeds thereof these plaintiffs be paid the commissions due them with their costs, and that the balance of such proceeds be paid into this court. (3) That the plaintiffs may have such other and further relief in the premises as may be just and proper.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and RUMSEY, WILLIAMS, PATTERSON, and PARKER, JJ.James P. Campbell, for appellant.
M. Siehel and Paul N. Turner, for respondents.
It is obvious on the face of the complaint in this action that the plaintiffs are not entitled to equitable relief. They have no lien and no right to a lien on the real estate, and cannot reach it to enforce against it a mere claim for brokers’ fees. The only real question now before the court is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon a legal cause of action under the averments of the complaint. Manifestly they are not as against the defendant Walsh, with whom they never stood in contract relations. It is urged; however, that enough appears to charge the defendant Drought with liability for damages for the breach of the contract to sell the real estate, and thereby have a sum ascertained and fixed upon which the plaintiffs would be entitled to a commission for services rendered by them to Drought in the transaction mentioned in the complaint. That a complaint may properly present the facts of a case in a double aspect, so that the plaintiff would be entitled either to legal or equitable relief, is well settled (Bradley v. Aldrich, 40 N. Y. 512 ; Hale v. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626 ; Sternberger v. McGovern, 56 N. Y. 12 ; Margraf v. Muir, 57 N. Y. 159 ; Wheelock v. Lee, 74 N. Y. 500 ); but, looldng at the averments of this complaint, it conclusively appears that it was framed for equitable relief alone. Its object was to have Drought’s conveyance to Walsh declared null and void, to have a lien fastened upon