Majority
Headnote
1. Accident at Railroad Crossing—Contributory Negligence.This action was begun January 25,1895, to recover damages under section 1902 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the alleged negligent killing of the plaintiff’s intestate. The decedent was 26 years old, and a resident of the state of Texas, having a wife and one child. He left his family October 9,1892, and was not heard of afterwards by them until after he was killed. It appears that he went almost immediately to the La Concha, an apartment and Turkish bath house in the city of Syracuse, where he stayed under the assumed name of Louis W. Lee. After 9 o’clock of the night of the accident —February 3,1895—he left this house in an open cutter, drawn by one horse, with two young women, who were, employés .or inmates of the establishment. He drove westerly on the Baldwinsville highway,
It is alleged in the complaint that the defendant was guilty of negligence in the following respects: (1) That the train was running “over forty miles per hour”; (2) that decedent’s view of defendant’s tracks west of the highway was interrupted by cars; (3) that the gates erected at the crossing were not closed; (4) that the flagman "was not on duty at the crossing at the time of the accident; (5) that no signal by bell or by whistle was given of the approach of the Cincinnati Express. The rate of speed of this express passenger train was not unusual or excessive, and it was not negligent to run at that
‘■‘The headlight was lighted. I can’t say whether the bell was rung or not. or whether the whistle was blown. All I can say is I did not hear them; did not hear either; that is all I can say with reference to them. I don’t remember looking to the westward or to the right before we were struck. I did not see Easley look that way while we stood there or before we were struck. I was so anxious to get home that I did not think of anything except getting across.”
The examination and cross-examination of this witness, read in connection with this statement, is to the effect that she could not tell whether the bell was rung or the whistle sounded. The engineer and fireman on the 'Cincinnati Express testified that the whistle was sounded about 2,000 feet west of the crossing, and that the bell was rung when the train approached and crossed the highway. A brakeman employed on the freight train testified that he heard the whistle and bell on the Cincinnati Express, and that he notified the decedent . and his companion that the express was coming. The woman denied thát they were notified of the approach of that train. The woman testified that the headlight on the locomotive was burning. It seems to me that the plaintiff failed to show that the decedent was free from negligence which contributed to the accident, and more, that the evidence shows that he did not exercise ordinary care in attempting to cross the tracks. Again, the learned trial judge, in submitting the ■ case to the jury, instructed them, as bearing upon the contributory negligence of the decedent, that they might take into consideration the fact that during the daytime this crossing was protected by a watchman, whose duty it was to operate the gates, but during the nighttime it was not so protected. In this connection it was charged:
“In this regard, gentlemen, as to whether the decedent exercised reasonable • care and prudence for his own safety while approaching and. passing over this crossing, you have a right to consider the fact that gates were operated there fluring the day, and- a flagman stationed there during the day, and at night both of these methods of warning were taken away; and you are to consider what effect, if any, those facts—the fact of the stationing of a flagman there during the day, and the fact of the gates being operated during the day—had upon the mind of this decedent in inducing him to rely upon the idea that they W.ere there upon the night in question. Was he thereby, by the act of the defendant, deceived into reliance upon their being present on the night in ques
tion? And was he thereby Induced to lessen the vigilance which he otherwise would have exercised in looking up and down the track for the purpose of discovering any approaching train? Was he, under the circumstances, induced by the nonappearance of the flagman, and by the gates being raised, to believe that there was no danger to be apprehended, and that the track was clear?’’
To this instruction the defendant excepted. The evidence did not justify the submission of this question to the jury. It was shown, and not disputed, that it had been the custom for some time to keep a flagman at this crossing, and operate the gates during the daytime, but never during the nighttime. It is also an undisputed fact that the decedent and his companions drove over this crossing on the night in question during .their outward trip from the city, and that when they crossed the gates were not operated, and that no flagman was there. The evidence given in behalf of the plaintiff is that for at least a half hour preceding the accident the decedent and one of his companions had been detained at this crossing, and he had ample opportunity for knowing that a flagman was not there, and that the gates were not operated. He could not have been lulled into security by the fact that gates were there, which were then fastened in an upright position. It was error to submit this question to the jury as bearing upon the issue of the contributory negligence of the decedent.
The judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. All concur.
I concur upon the question that it was error in the trial court to allow the jury to consider the omission of the defendant to maintain the gates with a watchman at the crossing at night the same as in the daytime upon the question of contributory negligence.