Majority
Headnote
1. Partnership—Evidence—Competency.The action was brought to recover for certain advertising done by the plaintiff for W. C. Loftus & Co., and the plaintiff sued Thomas J. Loftus, this appellant, together with W. C. Loftus, as co-partners, composing the firm of W. C. Loftus & Co. 'The appellant, by separate answer, denied the co-partnership, and that was the issue upon which the jury found in favor of the plaintiff. Evidence was given by the plaintiff of statements made by the •appellant which were claimed to constitute an admission that the latter was a co-partner, and that the plaintiff relied upon these statements, as furnishing the ground of the recovery against the appellant by estoppel; but the plaintiff also claimed, upon the evidence, that the actual fact of the co-partnership was established by the defend
The plaintiff proved certain acts and admissions of Thomas J. to support the inference that he was interested in this business. These admissions were denied, but it was unquestioned that Thomas J. exercised authority and control over the finances and the employés of the shops conducted in the name of W. C. Loftus & Co. W. C. Loftus was not offered as a witness, but Thomas J., who alone defended the action, went upon the stand, and explained that in his transactions with regard to the business of W. C. Loftus he acted under the instructions and at the request and for the benefit solely of his brother; that his actual relations with the latter were that of creditor and seller of goods; that it was only to secure himself for the indebtedness which was thus created that he took possession of all the money receipts and remittances coming to W. C. Loftus in the several shops, and made disbursements therefrom needed in the "business; and that he had no interest, and shared in no profits, in the said business. To corroborate his denial of the co-partnership he offered certain witnesses to show that they were familiar with the business, or had dealt with him and his brother, and had no knowledge of the existence of the alleged co-partnership. This evidence was excluded, and the question is, was it competent? The acts of Thomas J., tending to support the inference of the joint interest, having been proved (principally by his own testimony), how would it affect the inference to be drawn from his acts to listen to witnesses, no matter how closely connected with the parties, who
We may dismiss, without argument, the defendant’s attempt to prove his own or his brother’s declaration to the commercial agency and to other parties as to the co-partnership, for such declarations of parties in their own interests were never admissible upon such an issue. The exclusion of testimony of an accountant as to the result of his examination of books kept by Thomas J. Loftus, showing, as he said, his business relations with his brother, was certainly proper, for he was concededly carrying on an independent wholesale business, and his books would only show, it may be assumed, what he swore to in his testimony, viz. that his relations with W. C. Loftus were merely those of seller and creditor. How would it strengthen his testimony to produce the entries which he had made to that effect, and when are entries made by a party, or under his direction, admissible to corroborate his oral testimony of his transactions, except to show, in a disputed case, to whom a credit was given? But it may be urged that when the legal adviser of W. C. Loftus and the appellant was placed on the stand his testimony as to whether W. C. Loftus had a partner, and who that partner was, differed in character from the other excluded testimony. This suggestion can only be based upon the assumption that the actual truth of the relation of the parties would be disclosed by the defendants to their counsel, and that, if they did not confide such an arrangement as a co-partnership to him, it might be inferred by the jury that none existed. But is this, after all, anything more than an attempt to prove the declarations of the parties in their own interests? If the object was to show that the witness had heard no statements, and had seen no documents, and witnessed no transactions from which a co-partnership could be inferred, then the case is not much better than that of the offender who proposed to rebut the proofs of his guilt, furnished by witnesses of the act, by calling a much greater number of witnesses to testify that they had not seen it. The rulings of the court excluding his testimony were made upon objections, in some instances, that it was incompetent, and in others that it was merely immaterial and irrelevant. As this evidence could not be made competent, the exclusion upon the objections mentioned may be sustained. Tooley v. Bacon, 70 N. Y. 34 .
A great number of exceptions were taken by appellant to the rulings of the court upon requests of both parties for instructions, and to modifications by the court of certain of such requests. It appears from the case that the jury were fully and fairly and correctly instructed as to the law upon the issues before them, and none of the exceptions disclose error. The exceptions to rulings upon
The judgment should be affirmed. All concur.
Cases cited
- Tooley v. Bacon 70 N. Y. 34 p. 140