Majority
Headnote
1. Municipal Corporations—Torts—Public Duty—Police.The city of Rochester, on the 1st day of July, 1887, entered into a contract in writing with the Rochester Electric Light Company of that city, a domestic corporation (which will be referred to as the “Company”), whereby the company agreed to furnish, from time to time, poles suitable for supporting its electric lamps for street lighting in the city, and poles or underground conduits for its wires for transmitting electricity for such lamps at such place or places and in such numbers as the city, by its common council, should from time to time, during the continuance of the contract, direct; to keep the poles properly painted; and to set, and from time to time, as might be required, to change, the same, at its own expense, under the direction of the common council, and in such place or places as the common council should direct, and keep in first-class condition said lamps and all appurtenances thereto or connected with the same. And the contract further provided as follows:
“The party of the first part [the company] shall also place and at all times maintain in good condition a suitable cross-arm on each pole erected and placed by it as aforesaid at the top thereof, or such other location as may be agreed upon by the party of the first part and the said common council; or, in case of an underground conduit or conduits, there shall be at all times kept in good condition a suitable space therein. And the party of the first part shall grant to the party of the second part [the city] and its agents the exclusive use of said cross-arm or space aforesaid, free of charge, at any time during the period thereof [the existence of the contract], for any and all municipal purposes, and placing of any and all telegraph or other electric wires owned and used by it other than for lighting and power. The party of the first part shall also, upon the requirement of the common council, immediately remove any and all of its poles after its or their use have been discontinued for three consecutive months.”
The contract further provided that the common council should at all times freely inspect the works, plants, dynamos, lamps, wire, and all apparatus connected therewith of the company, and the quality and condition of the wire and lamps used in and about the furnishing of such lights. The city further agreed to take and use, during the continuance of the contract, at least 100 electric lights, and pay for the same at a rate fixed; the contract to terminate on the 1st day of July, 1892.
The plaintiff’s intestate was a son of the plaintiff; was 19 years, old, a healthy, bright, industrious young man, living with his father, and earning wages, which he gave to his father. His only difficulty seems to have been a slight or partial deafness. He had been 15 months in the employ of a meat-market concern. On the night of the accident, he had a package of meat to deliver at the Church; Home. He entered the avenue by way of Clarissa street, which was; north of Sandford street, and passed along the east side, until he crossed over to the Church Home, on the west side, a few minutes before he was killed, where he delivered his package, and shortly returned. The time was from half past 8 to 9 o’clock in the evening, and it was quite dark, so that an object as large as a man could be seen but at a little distance. As he reached the trolley track between Sandford and Cypress streets, his neck encountered a patrol wire that had been disconnected from the pole, and had descended to within about four feet of the ground, when he received a charge of electricity which caused his immediate death. This electricity was communicated to the wire from the trolley wire. Shortly before this accident, a repair wagon in charge of two employés of the Rochester Railway Company came along, and discovered the wire running from what- was called the “Church Home Pole.” It came down from a
At the expiration of the contract with the electric light company, a new contract was made between it and the city, extending for several years. It continued in effect the relations between the parties as specified in the first contract; and, in the specifications which were made a part of the contract, it was provided that the poles and cross-arms were to be of a kind and size, and be subject to be changed or removed whenever, in the judgment of the common council, public safety or convenience demanded the same. A storm of wind and rain preceded the accident. The defendant contended that this was a very violent storm of wind and rain, one of the worst that had ever occurred, which caused the wire to become detached from the pole; and it was not within the contemplation of the contract of the parties that the patrol line was to stand any such storm, but only the ordinary storms in that locality. The plaintiff’s proof tended to show that it was not an extraordinary storm for that time of the year (July). The weather observer testified that the velocity of the wind did not exceed 28 miles per hour. It appeared in the case that the feeder line was substantially free from trees, and was not subjected to the danger that was apparent as to the line among the trees in the avenue. The trial court fairly submitted the issues in the case to the jury, which found for the plaintiff, and we cannot disturb their verdict as being against the weight of evidence.
The appellant presses the point that it was not responsible for the defective construction of the patrol line, because it was used by the police department of the city, and as that department is created by law for the discharge of a public duty, and not for the immediate benefit of the city, the city is not liable for the negligence of the police commissioner in the construction and maintenance of the patrol wire; citing Woodhull v. City of New York, 150 N. Y. 450 , 44 N. E. 1038 , and kindred cases. The difficulty with this contention is that the preponderance of the evidence does not show that the line was constructed by the police department or its servants, but was done by virtue of a contract with the city, and by city officers who were empowered to and did represent the city. The powers of the police department of Rochester are enumerated in the charter of the city, and the authority to create and operate telegraph lines as an independent body is not among its enumerated powers. That power rests, under the charter, with the city alone, to be performed through the agency of departments and officers that represent the city. If it be the fact that the city permitted the police to construct this line or to use it after it had been created, that does not bring the case within the principle claimed by the appellant. In Woodhull v. City of New
There was evidence of the defendant’s negligence sufficient to be presented to the jury in this case. Some of the facts tending to prove such negligence may be enumerated. The patrol wires were put up without sufficient guards to protect them, among the trees of the avenues, where they were liable, by the swaying of the limbs, to be detached from the poles, and connect with the deadly currents below'.
But it is claimed that the city of Rochester was not liable under the city charter (section 218), which provides that:
“The city of Rochester shall not be liable for any road-way being out of repair or unlawfully obstructed unless actual notice of the unsafe or dangerous condition has been given to the city officers having charge of the highways a reasonable time before the happening of such injury,”—citing Smith v. City of Rochester, 79 Hun, 174 , 29 N. Y. Supp. 539 , affirmed 150 N. Y. 581 , 44 N. 15. 1128.
In so far as the city is liable for the negligent construction of the patrol line, or the other negligent acts and neglect of duty to which we have referred, the city needs no actual notice, because it is presumed to know its own acts, and therefore has actual notice. As to its notice of the falling of the wire prior to the accident, Mr. Barnes, the superintendent, representing the city, and who had charge of the lines, and whose duty it was to see that it was kept in good condition, had actual notice. He testified that he remembered three occasions where the line had been broken down by one means or another within two years preceding the accident. Stedman v. City of Rome, 88 Hun, 279 , 34 N. Y. Supp. 737 ; Riddle v. Village of Westfield, 65 Hun, 433 , 20 N. Y. Supp. 359 ; Wilson v. City of Troy, 135 N. Y. 102 , 32 N. E. 44 ; Turner v. City of Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301 , 16 N. E. 344 .
The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contends that there should have been no recovery, because the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. This objection is best answered by the charge of the learned trial judge upon that subject. After stating that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to satisfy the jury by a fair preponderance of evidence that Edward Twist was not himself careless, and did not contribute to his death, and that if he went upon the street knowing that this wire was there, and walked into it carelessly, and met his death, no recovery could be had, then the court proceeds:
“The case shows that, at an earlier part of the evening than the time when the accident occurred, Edward Twist was near the comer of' Clarissa street, and there saw boys playing with a. broken wire, and that he knew that there was a broken wire at that point. There is no evidence that he knew there was a loose or broken wire above [north] the Sandford street pole. It seems that later this wire was down between the Sandford street pole and the Church Home pole, which was the wire with which Edward Twist came in contact, and which caused his death. It appears that he was engaged in an occupation which required him to be in the street. He had a package of meat
to be delivered, and the inference is fair that it was to be delivered at the Church Home; that he went there, and on his return he came in contact with this wire, and fell to the ground, and he was taken up dead. There is evidence tending to show that a warning was given. Some of the witnesses say that he was almost upon the wire when the cry came, and that he seemed to be bewildered, and turning his head towards the west side of the avenue, from which side, some of the evidence tends to show, the alarm came, he came in contact with the wire. There is evidence from other witnesses that he was further from the wire when the warning was given. There is also evidence that his hearing was impaired. If he did not hear the warning, or if he was confused, and in that way ran into the wire unconsciously, not knowing it was there, he would not be guilty of contributory negligence. .Upon all this evidence, you will determine whether he was prudent and cautious in crossing the street, and what knowledge he had of the danger he was going into. If he was not aware of this danger, and was using proper care, you will find upon that branch of the case in favor of the plaintiff.”
The judge might well have added that the night was so dark that he could not see this little wire until he was close upon it; that at the time he was advised that the wire was down, in the early part of the evening, at another place, when the boys were playing with it, he expressed a wish that no one would get killed with it. The question of contributory negligence was plainly for the jury.
It is also contended by the appellant that the negligence of the city was not the proximate cause of the injury; that the wire, when it broke, only fell across the trolley wire, and did not reach down to the street, and it would not have come in contact with the deceased had not the railway company and employés pulled the wire down. There is no doubt but that the act of the employés was a concurring cause of the accident, but had not the line fallen from the trolley wire, having been disconnected from the pole for want of proper construction or want of due care on the part of the city, the accident would not have occurred, coming within the principle that, where an injury is the combined result of the negligence of the defendant and an accident for which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is responsible, the defendant must pay damages, unless the injury would have happened had he not been negligent. Thomp. Neg. p. 1085, § 3; Quill v. Telegraph Co., 92 Hun, 546 , 34 N. Y. Supp. 470 , and 37 N. Y. Supp. 1149 ; Laible v. Railroad Co., 13 App. Div. 574 , 43 N. Y. Supp. 1003 . In the Quill Case the plaintiff was injured by the fall of an insulator from the defendant’s telephone pole. The insulator, although not properly secured, would not have fallen had it not been knocked off by a third person, for whose acts the defendant was not responsible; nor would the acts of such third person have knocked it off had it been securely attached. Held, that both the defective attachment of the insumtor and the act of the third person were the proximate causes of the accident, and it might therefore be attributed to either or both of them.
The appellant complains of the charge of the court as follows:
“It was error to charge that the city of Rochester was bound to-remove its wires to another place, and that it should have originally constructed it in a different place,” evidently referring to the feeder bank line.
The counsel has misapprehended the charge of the court in that regard. The court said;
“Now, if you find that this was a dangerous place by reason of the proximity of the trees, or if for any other reason, in which to construct this patrol line, and that it could have been avoided without difficulty,—if the city could have constructed the line originally in another place, or if, after the trolley line had been constructed, it could have changed the line to another place without difficulty, it was bound to do so, if the place where it was constructed was dangerous to human life, and it could have been avoided without difficulty; and, if a line constructed on the feeder bank was practicable, the city was bound to use that, and avoid this danger. It is for you to say whether the falling of this wire upon the trolley wires was a danger that was to be apprehended, and if it was, and this danger could have been avoided, that should have been done.”
At the close of the charge, the counsel for the defendant asked the court to charge that:
“The city had the right to construct this line on Mount Hope avenue, and was only chargeable for negligence in the construction or maintenance of the same.”
The court so charged, and, taking the two charges together, there was no error.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court dismissed the complaint as to the Rochester Railway Company and the Rochester Gas & Electric Company, that were joined as defendants with the city of Rochester, and refused to dismiss as to the city. The counsel for the city, however, asked the court to let the case go to the jury as to the negligence of the other defendants, which was refused, and the exception to such refusal is urged here as a ground of reversal. This point is without merit.
Finally, the appellant claims that the damages were excessive. The verdict was $>5,000. The statute permitted the jury to render a verdict up to that amount. The appellate court should only interfere with it where the amount is so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury, or greatly beyond any possible loss that could have come to the next of kin. It is unnecessary to review the cases upon this subject. We are of opinion that this point is not well taken. Rb exceptions are presented taken upon the trial upon the reception or rejection of evidence.
We find no reversible error in the points presented by the appellant, and the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concur.
The court adopted this opinion a.t January term, 1899.
Cases cited
- Woodhull v. Mayor of New York 150 N. Y. 450 p. 854
- Turner v. City of Newburgh 109 N. Y. 301 p. 855, p. 856
- Laible v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 13 App. Div. 574 p. 857