Majority
Headnote
1. Municipal Corporations—Proceedings to Open Street—Notice.In respect to the first objection, it is stated in an affidavit, verified October 20, 1897, that the affiant has examined the records in the office of the clerk of the county of Onondaga, and that it appears from those records that October 18, 1856, the Syracuse & Southern Railroad Company mortgaged its road, extending from Syracuse to Binghamton, to trustees, to secure the payment of §1,400,000, and that there appears to be due on that mortgage $2,750; also that it appears by said records that May 29, 1867, the Syracuse, Binghamton &New York Railroad Company mortgaged its said road to secure the payment of $600,000, upon which mortgage there appears to be due $5,000. It is further stated that Percy R. Pyne has been substituted as trustee under both mortgages in the place of the original trustees, and the contention is that these proceedings are invalid, because no notice of the application was mailed to or served on him.
Without considering whether Percy R. Pyne is an “owner,” within section 167 of the charter, I think this objection is disposed of by the maxim, “De minimis non curat lex.” Assuming that there is a liability of $7,750 existing under the two mortgages, the sum is so insignificant in proportion to the value of the railroad, consisting of 81 miles of single track, extending from Syracuse to Binghamton, that it may well be disregarded in this proceeding; as it is apparent that the security, if a lien exists, will not be impaired in the slightest degree by the extension of the street. ■ Courts are not bound to a
The second objection is not sustained by the record, for it appears that a map of the proposed extension was made by the city engineer, and duly filed July 12/1897, in the offices of the clerk of the city and of the clerk of the county of Onondaga.
The third objection is untenable, for it appears, by the undisputed evidence contained in the record, that, when the proposed extension was surveyed, monuments were placed on the ground showing the location of the extension.
In respect to the fourth objection, it appears that the resolution of July 6, 1897, was adopted by a two-thirds vote of the common council, but that the ayes and nays were not called; and it also appears that the resolutions of July 12,1897, were adopted by the affirmative votes of 16 of the 19 members of the common, council upon a call of the ayes and nays. Section 29 of the charter provides: “The ayes and nays shall be called and recorded on all motions and resolutions authorizing the expenditure or collection of money or the making of local improvements or repairs.” The resolution of July 6, 1897, neither authorized the expenditure or collection of money, nor the making of a local improvement, but simply authorized the engineer of the city to make a survey and map of the proposed extension of the street, and the question whether it should be extended was left until the coming in of his survey and map; and afterwards, July 12, 1897, the resolutions directing the extension of the street were adopted upon a call of the ayes and nays. Is section 167 of the charter unconstitutional, in so far as it relates to these proceedings? The section provides for notice of the application for the appointment of commissioners to ascertain and report the just compensation to be paid to persons owning or having an interest in the property proposed to be taken and shown to be benefited by the map adopted and filed; but the section does not, in express terms, provide that notice shall be given to the owners of property taken, but not benefited. If the provision of the section which relates to the opening of streets upon lands taken, but not benefited, be unconstitutional, it does not render the portion of the section unconstitutional which relates to a proceeding for the opening of a street through lands all of which are deemed by the common council to be benefited, and which are described as benefited on the map adopted and filed and in the resolutions; for it is well settled that, in case two provisions are contained in a statute, one of which is unconstitutional, such unconstitutional provision will not vitiate the other provision, provided it can be carried into effect without the aid of the unconstitutional provision. People v. Kenney, 96 N. Y. 294 ; Bridge Co. v. Smith, 148 N. Y. 540 , 42 N.
The order should be reversed, with costs. All concur.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Angerstein v. Kenney 96 N. Y. 294 p. 961
- New York & Long Island Bridge Co. v. Smith 148 N. Y. 540 p. 961