Majority
Headnote
1. Costs—Extra Allowance.This action was brought to recover $17,425.79, alleged to be the balance due for constructing the Ft. Edward water works, and for extra services performed and materials furnished in
The defendant contends that neither party should have costs, and that no costs or allowances can be awarded herein. His contention is that section 3245, Code Civ. Proc., stands in the way. It reads:
“Costs cannot be awarded to the plaintiff, in an action against a municipal corporation, in which the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only; unless the claim, upon which the action is founded, was, before the commencement of the action, presented for payment to the chief fiscal officer of the corporation.”
It appears that one Fred A. Davis was the treasurer of the village of Ft. Edward before and at the time of the commencement of this action, in November, 1894, and that the claim upon which this action is founded was not presented to him for payment. He further claims that he was the chief fiscal officer of the defendant, and that he received and paid out, and was the custodian of, all the funds of said village. The trustees of the village of Ft. Edward and the board of water commissioners in 1894 were the same persons. E. L. Potter was the chief fiscal officer of the defendant, as to all matters relating to the water works. He was the treasurer elected by the board in pursuance of the statute in effect at that time. Laws 1889, c. 455. He was the only person who had authority, as treasurer, over the water-works fund, and was the chief fiscal officer of the defendant for that purpose. All payments made by the defendant on the contract for the construction of the water works were made by the treasurer of the board from the fund under its control; and it has been found by the referee,' “that said claims, and each of them, when
“No costs, fees, disbursements or allowance shall be recovered or inserted in any judgment against municipal corporations unless the claim upon which such judgment is founded, shall have been presented for payment to the chief fiscal officer of said corporation, before the commencement of an action thereon.”
This act was never embodied in the Code of Procedure, but, when the Code of Civil Procedure was passed, it was embraced therein, as section 3245. In the Code of Procedure, as to municipal corporations, there was no difference, as to the rule of costs, than with any other prevailing plaintiff; and it was only through the special act referred to that any condition or bar to the recovery of costs against such corporations was imposed. The reported cases under the act of 1859 will not aid very much in determining the question before us, and we will confine ourselves to the consideration of the cases under the present Code, and the special statutes relating to the award of costs. There are in many of the charters of municipal corporations special provisions made with reference to the presentation of claims, and conditions imposed as to recovery and as to costs. It has been held that' the treasurer of a city and of a village, and the supervisor of a town, is the chief fiscal officer thereof. Gage v. Village of Hornellsville, 106 N. Y. 667 , 12 N. E. 817 ; Stanton v. Town of Taylor (Sup.) 19 N. Y. Supp. 43 ; Laws 1897, c. 414, § 81. The object of section 3245 was to insure notice to a municipal corporation of claims against it, before it should be subjected to costs of suit, and notice to the chief fiscal officer was prescribed as a means of giving such notice to the corporation; and hence notice to the board of trustees of the defendant alone is not a sufficient compliance with the section of the Code. The chief fiscal officer of such a corporation is the officer who receives, keeps, and disburses the moneys of the corporation. It is no answer to this requirement of the Code, that the treasurer of the corporation is not authorized to adjust or pay the
“The object of [meaning section 3245 of the Code] was to secure notice, and the chief fiscal officer was named as the person on whom the notice should he served.”
In the case cited it did not appear that the claim was acted upon by the board of trustees. In the case at bar the water commissioners and the trustees were the same, and the claim was presented to them and to its treasurer, and examined and passed upon and disallowed, and a reasonable time allowed the defendant to settle and adjust before the commencement of the action. The board of water commissioners and its treasurer were the agents as to the water works, and all power was vested in them. Fleming v. Village of Suspension Bridge, 92 N. Y. 368 .
In order to find out the intention of the legislature as to the award of costs, in cases of this kind, we should examine the Code of Procedure, and all the statutes bearing on the subject during the existence of the Code, together with the Code of Civil Procedure, and all of the special statutes passed from time to time. Laws 1859, c. 262, § 2, was repealed by Laws 1880, c. 245. The Code of Civil Procedure was passed in June, 1876, and from that time till 1880 contained no provisions making any distinction in favor of municipal corporations, relieving them from costs in any case. By the Code of Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure, such corporations were liable for costs. Section 2, c. 262, Laws 1859, governed and regulated the right to costs against such corporations until its repeal, in 1880. It will thus be seen that this statute controlled during 17 years of. the existence of the Code of Procedure, and for 4 years after the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was embodied in our Code in 1880 for the first time, and forms and makes section 3245. Section 3250 is new, and reads:
“This title does not affect any provisions contained elsewhere in this act or in any other statute, remaining unrepealed after this chapter takes effect, whereby the award of costs is specially regulated in a particular case, otherwise than as prescribed in this title.”
Statutes should be construed so as to carry out the intent of the legislature, though it seems contrary to the letter. A thing that is within the intention of the makers is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing that is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute, unless it is within the intent of the makers. When this intent is manifest, the letter of the statute must yield to the spirit. In the case before us, the plaintiffs presented their claim to the defendant, and waited a reasonable time for adjustment. It is not even claimed on the part of the defendant that it was not fully apprised of the demands of the plaintiffs. The Code provides that the claim must be presented to the “chief fiscal officer,” and the courts have held that the treasurer is such officer, because he receives, keeps, and disburses the moneys of the corporation; but there is no case to be found which holds, or even intimates, that the treasurer of the corporation is the chief fiscal officer of the moneys and funds of the corporation, raised, pursuant to the
“The board o£ water commissioners of any village may sue, complain or defend in any court, in the name of said village, in any action to enforce any contract with said board, or to enforce any claim for damages, water rents, labor, or supplies connected with the building or carrying on of the waterworks by said board.”
The complaint or answer of said village in such actions shall be verified by the oath of some member of the board. The complaint in actions against said village in such cases shall be served on the board of water commissioners, whose duty it shall be to defend in the name of the village. The damages and costs recovered by the village in such actions shall be paid to the treasurer of the board of water commissioners for their use. The damages and costs against the village in such actions may be paid by the treasurer of said board from any funds in his hands not otherwise appropriated.
The motion for an extra allowance is granted.
Motion granted.
Cases cited
- Gage v. Village of Hornellsville 106 N. Y. 667 p. 164
- Fleming v. Village of Suspension Bridge 92 N. Y. 368 p. 165