Majority
Headnote
1. Pleading—Demurrers.This is an action for libel. The defendant has demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The plaintiff alleges that he is the proprietor of an hotel known as the “Columbia Hotel,” in Albany, and the defendant is the publisher of the Albany Morning Express, printed in the city of Albany. The complaint sets forth verbatim the alleged libelous publication, which, appeared in "the defendant’s paper on the 20th day of June, 1898. The article in question
The complaint further alleges the meaning of said article as understood and meant to be understood by the friends, acquaintances, and patrons of plaintiff and the readers of the paper, and also “that said article held up and subjected this plaintiff to public ridicule, hatred, and contempt, and to deprive him of public confidence and social inter: course, and to injure and destroy his business”; also that by the publication of the article “the plaintiff has suffered greatly, and has been, and still is, greatly injured in his good name, fame, and credit; the plaintiff has been brought into public ridicule, scorn, scandal, and disgrace, and held up to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule;, besides has suffered great mortification, besides damage to plaintiff and his business of $20,000.” It is the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant, by demurring, has admitted all the allegations in the complaint, including those contained in the innuendo. I think this propo-' sition is untenable. A demurrer admits such facts only as are properly pleaded, and not conclusions of fact or of law. The pleader’s inferences or deductions from the facts pleaded, or the construction he puts upon the facts pleaded, are not admitted. The office of an innuendo is to apply what has been already expressed, and not to enlarge or change its meaning. It cannot extend the meaning beyond what the words and the facts with which they are connected justify, and, on a demurrer, must be rejected when not justified by the antecedent facts. Fleischmann v. Bennett, 87 N. Y. 231 ; Brown v. Moore, 90 Hun, 169 , 35 N. Y. Supp. 736 . It is only when the language is ambiguous, and permits of different constructions, any one of which makes it defamatory, that a question is presented for the jury to decide in what sense it was intended. When the words are unambiguous, and admit of but one sense, the court must determine whether or not they
Demurrer sustained, with costs.
Cases cited
- Fleischmann v. Bennett 87 N. Y. 231 p. 906
- Woodruff v. Bradstreet Co. 116 N. Y. 217 p. 907