aforesaid; and, further, that the members of said association shall respectively submit to said Good monthly sworn statements of the quantity of such fibers-so worked, sold, and delivered by them during the preceding month.” Good, then, “for the more effectually securing the contract on his part,” empowers Daland, as such trustee, or his successor in the trust, to bring suit in his name and at his expense for the prosecution of infringements upon his patent, and appoints Daland his attorney in fact for this purpose. Daland, as trustee, agrees, “for the more effectually securing the contract on his part as such trustee, ” that if said association, or any member thereof, make default in submitting a monthly sworn statement of the quantity of fibers worked, sold, and delivered, as above provided, or in payment of the sum above agreed, the said trustee shall promptly bring suit against such defaulting member, and use all diligence in prosecuting an action for the collection thereof; and, on failure on his part so to do, the said Good may, at his election, bring such suit in the name of said trustee, at said trustee’s expense.” The complaint, after allegations of full performance by plaintiff of the agreement on his part, then sets forth that in the months of March, April, May, June, and July, 1887, the Tucker & Carter Cordage Company, having worked large amounts of fibers into cord, twine, and rope, and sold the same in the United States, though requested, have failed and neglected to furnish plaintiff with any statement thereof, and that the amount thereof is unknown to him, and that no sum or percentage in respect of such fibers has been paid to him; that defendant Daland, in compliance with the suggestion of the Tucker & Carter Cordage Company, has refused to bring suit for the collection of such percentage from that company in accordance with his agreement in that behalf, though requested by the plaintiff so to do, but claims that no cause exists for any such action. The plaintiff then demands judgment (1) that the rights of the plaintiff and liabilities of defendant under the agreement maybe established and declared; (2) that an accounting may be had of the fibers worked and sold in the United States by the Tucker & Carter Cordage Company during the months of March, April, May, June, and July, 1887; (3) that judgment be rendered against defendant Daland for the agreed percentage on the amount thereof, or for such portion as with due diligence he could have collected; (4) tliat judgment be rendered against the Tucker & Carter Cordage Company for said amount. Defendants demurred to the complaint, on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, which demurrers were overruled, and defendants appeal.
Argued before Barnard, P. J., and Dykman and Pratt, JJ.Charles L. Atterbury, (Calvin Frost, of counsel,) for appellants. Albert <?. McDonald, for respondent.
There is but one cause of action stated in the complaint. Daland agreed with Good that the Tucker & Carter Cordage Company should pay one-eight of one cent per pound on all cord, rope, and twine offered for sale and used by this company during the time it had the use of the plaintiff’s patent-rights for machinery and manufacturing the same. The defendant Daland further agreed that the defendant company would make monthly statements of the quantity of fiber worked, sold, and delivered during the preceding month. The agreement was made by Daland with Good as trustee of the defending company. The complaint avers a default in each respect, although the defendant had worked up “many hundred thousand pounds” into cords, and sold and delivered the same. For the purpose of determining the sufficiency of the complaint, the other parts of the argument are immaterial. In legal effect, the defendant company agreed to pay Good, and Daland agreed that the defendant company would pay, and that he could sue the other defendants for the collection of what was due. The plaintiff seeks only to enforce this contract against those who made it. Even if the parties are not equally entitled or in the same legal right, they are proper parties. There is but one transaction,—