which he transferred by will, there" was thus constituted a transfer of property taxable under the provisions of chapter 399, Laws 1892. To this the executors reply that the relation between a company and its policy holder is simply that of debtor and creditor (Uhlman v. Insurance Co.,
109 N. Y. 421 , 17 N. E. 363 ; Bogardus v. Insurance Co.,
101 N. Y. 328 , 4 N. E. 522 ;
People v. Security Life Insurance & Annuity Co., 78 N. Y. 114 ; Cohen v. Insurance Co., 50 N. Y. 624 ; Grobe v. Insurance Co.,
24 Misc. Rep. 462 , 53 N. Y. Supp. 628 ); that the decedent was a nonresident of this state, and that it is the well-settled law of Yew York that, where a resident of this state owes money to a nonresident decedent, the situs of the property follows the domicile of the creditor (In re Phipps, 77 Hun, 325 , 28 N. Y. Supp. 330 ; Hayes v. Gas Co.,
143 N. Y. 641 , 37 N. E. 648 ; In re Bronson’s Estate,
150 N. Y. 1 -7, 44 N. E. 707 ); and that hence the proceeds of the insurance policies in question was property located in the state of Yew Jersey, over which the state of Yew York had no jurisdiction for the purposes of taxation. It will be seen that the contention of the comptroller in this case amounts to a claim that, if a man in any remote state or territory of the Union takes out a policy of life insurance in a Yew York company, it is the intention of the legislature of this state, as expressed through the transfer tax law, that the proceeds of such policy cannot be collected by his personal representative or paid by the company without being subject to the inheritance tax. Buch contention, if sustained, would affect seriously vast pecuniary interests, and discriminate against, and possibly seriously embarrass, the insurance corporations organized under the laws of this state. It might also result in double taxation in every case where the policy holder resides in a state where there is a similar transfer tax law. The questions raised on this appeal are not only important, but novel and intricate, and can only be settled definitely and finally by the court of highest resort in the state. I find it physically impossible, in the short time before the expiration of my term of office, and under the heavy pressure of current court business, to prepare such an elaborate and carefully considered opinion and decision as the importance of the case would demand, and deem it better that this should be so, rather than that the judge of a court of first instance should, on á question of such vital and far-reaching importance, render a decision which would never be accepted as conclusive until passed upon by the court of appeals, but which would surely tend, no matter what it might be, to unsettle, pending the appeal, great financial and business interests. It is far better, in my judgment, that the case should reach the supreme appellate tribunal as speedily as possible. Hence, pro forma, the decision of the appraiser is affirmed, and the appeal dismissed.
Decision affirmed, and appeal dismissed.