People ex rel. Sutphen v. Feitner

The relator obtained a writ of certiorari to review the action of the commissioners of taxes and assessments of the city of New York in fixing the value, for the purposes of taxation for the year 1898, of certain real estate owned by him situate on Riverside drive, between Seventy-Second and Seventy-Third streets, in the borough of Manhattan. In the petition for the writ the relator claimed error in the assessment for overvaluation and for inequality. In their return the commissioners presented a statement of their acts and proceedings, setting forth the method pursued in fixing the value of lands, including the relator’s, namely-, that the appraisement thereof was made by a deputy tax.commissioner, who stated, under oath, that he had examined every house, building, lot, etc., within his district, and what in his judgment such property, “under ordinary circumstances, would sell for The return also refers to the making of the annual books, and the assessment rolls prepared therefrom, the entry of the relator’s lots on such books by block and lot numbers, and the sums fixed upon as the value of such lots, respectively. It then sets forth that the relator, on or about April 28, 1895, made to the commissioners an application in writing expressive of his dissatisfaction with the amount of the assessment of his property, and asking that it be reduced, and that writing is annexed to, and forms part of, the return. It states, after referring to the property as vacant lots, as follows: “He [the relator] finds that the same has been assessed on the assessment roll of 1898 at a valuation of $145,-009, whereas the same should not have been, in his judgment, valued at more than $69,000, to be in proportion to the assessed value of adjacent property and in accordance with the marketable value thereof.” It further states that “the market value of the property has not increased since 1895, and the ability to sell the property has in fact decreased. The property was assessed for the year 1895 at $57,000, being increased to $69,000 for the year 1896. It is vacant property, irregular in shape, and produces no income. Is rock at the curb line, covering all. He therefore asks that the same may be reduced to the amount stated.” The commissioners then set forth in their return that, in order that no injustice should be done the relator, they directed the deputy tax commissioner to reexamine the property, and to report whether or not the alleged" grievance had any substance; that, in accordance with such direction, a re-examination was made by such deputy tax commissioner. On May 9,1898, he made a written report to them, in the following words: “I have re-examined the property referred to in the within application, and report as follows: That the increases made in

That the relator was not entitled to judgment upon the papers as presented to the court at special term is obvious. There was no evidence upon which a judgment could be founded. Nor was he entitled to a reference of the issues. He claims, in substance, that under section 253 of chapter 908 of the Laws of 1896, known as the “Tax Law,” it became the duty of the court to order a reference because the taking of testimony was necessary for a proper disposition of the matter. He treats the proceeding as if it were an original and independent one, in which for the first time evidence in support of the relator’s claims might be offered or produced by Mm. Support for his contention is sought in the recent decision ®f this court in People ex rel. Bronx Gas Co. v. Feitner, 43 App. Div. 198 , 59 N. Y. Supp. 327 ; in which it was held, in general effect, that in all cases of this character, where an issue of fact is raised, the statute contemplates that testimony shall be taken, and that it was never intended by the legislature that issues raised by the petition and the return thereto should be tried in any other way; that the petition is in the nature of a pleading; and that, where it contains allegations of the grounds upon which the objections to the assessment are based, the terms of the statute requiring a reference, while permissive in form, are nevertheless mandatory. What was held in the Bronx Gas Co. Case we adhere to, but that was a case in which, as the record before the court disclosed, the relator had, in the preliminary proceedings before the commissioners of taxes, complied with the provisions of the law wMch required him to put before the commissioners the full grounds of his objection to the value of his property as fixed by them. It was also assumed in that case that everything had been done before the commissioners which the relator was bound to do.

By section 89'5 of the charter of the city of New York, it is provided that a person claiming to be aggrieved by the assessed valuation of real and personal estate may make application to the

The order appealed from must be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except BARRETT, J., who dissents.

(dissenting). The only reason given for denying to-the relator a writ of certiorari is the insufficiency of his application for a reduction of the assessment. It is held, in substance, that this application must set forth the facts showing the assessment to-be illegal, and that the court will interfere only in case the" commissioners have refused to give proper force and effect to the facts thus stated. Section 895 of the charter, however, merely requires that the application shall be made in writing, and shall state “the ground of objection” to the assessment. The “ground of objection” is one thing, and the facts in support of that ground quite-another. The act even employs the singular “ground,” instead of the plural. How that word can reasonably be interpreted to mean the underlying facts showing the illegality I am quite unable to-see. It cannot have'been meant that the relator should, in his written statement specifying the “ground of objection,” go into every fact and circumstance upon which he bases his claim to revision, or which would be relevant upon the trial of an issue of overvaluation or inequality. That would be quite impracticable. It is intended merely that he shall set forth, in general terms, the reason why—the point in which—lie thinks the action of the commissioners erroneous. With their attention thus called to the matter, it is their duty to re-examine the question. But the application was merely meant to give them a subject for further consideration, not the detailed facts upon that head. This view is emphasized by section 895 of the charter. That section provides that the board of' taxes and assessments shall appoint one or more deputy tax commissioners, who shall “receive applications for revision and cancellation of any assessments, take testimony on such applications,, and reduce the same to writing, and, when so reduced to writing, transmit such applications and testimony, together with his recommendation, to the board,” etc. The section further provides that the board may prescribe the time and place for hearing such applications in the city record and at least one newspaper in each borough. The testimony taken upon such hearings is to form part of the record of the assessment. The application is thus plainly treated as a mere complaint, not as a presentation of the relator’s-case. The relator is to have a hearing upon this complaint, with an opportunity to produce his- evidence. In the present case the commissioners did not give the relator this hearing. They chose to dispense with it. Whether they could legally do so need not be considered. If, as I think, the relator’s application was sufficient, he has done all that he is required to do in order to entitle him to

I therefore think that the order should be reversed, and the proceeding remitted to the special term for a hearing upon the merits.