Majority
Headnote
Costs—Action tor Penalties.The action was for a penalty of $100. The plaintiff had a verdict for $25. Upon that the clerk taxed the plaintiff’s costs at $25. Thereupon the defendants moved for a retaxation, claiming that, as the action was for a penalty less than $200, and consequently within the jurisdiction conferred upon a justice of the peace by section 2863, subd. 7, Code Civ. Proc., the plaintiff was not entitled to costs, but that they were. The motion was denied, and the clerk’s ruling sustained, upon the amendment to subdivision 3 of section 3228 of the Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1898 (chapter 110). This amendment consists of the words italicized in the following extract from the section:
“The plaintiff is entitled to costs of course upon the rendering of final judgment in his favor, in either of the following actions: * * * (3) An action specified in subdivision first, third, fourth or fifth of section twenty-eight hundred and sixty-three of this act. But if, in an action to recover damages for an assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, criminal conversation, seduction or malicious prosecution; or a fine or penalty in which the people of the state are a party, the plaintiff recovers less than fifty dollars damages, the amount of his cost cannot exceed the damages.”
Without passing upon these respective contentions, we think the case is covered by the amendment of 1898, and that the clerk and the special term were right in their construction and in the effect which they gave to it. This amendment clearly places an action for a fine or penalty, in which the people of the state are a party, in the same category, with respect to costs, as an action to recover damages for an assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, criminal conversation, seduction, or malicious prosecution. It was thus the legislative understanding and construction that, but for the amendment, the people, in an action for a fine or penalty, would be entitled to full costs, regardless of the sum sued for. The intention was to limit the costs of any such action (whether for less or more than $200), brought by the people, to the sum awarded by the jury, when the verdict is for less than $50. E the intention had been to limit the amendment to a recovery of less than $50 in an action brought for one or more fines or penalties, amounting to or exceeding $200, the limitation would not have been left to debatable implication or doubtful construction, but would have been expressed in distinct terms. Instead of that, we have here language broad enough to include any action to recover damages for “a fine or penalty in which the people of the state are a party.’* This view is in harmony with the legislation which the present action was brought to enforce, namely, the “Agricultural Law” (Laws 1893, c. 338), and also with similar legislation upon kindred subjects. ¡None of the penalties imposed by the “Agricultural Act” exceed $100, yet provision is made for an injunction pendente lite and also to accompany the final judgment. Section 10. These injunctions are to restrain further violations of the provisions of the act. They contemplate effective procedure in the supreme court, even when the penalty sued for is less than $200, Upon the defendants* construction of the amendment, the people would, in the enforcement of the law, be frequently deprived of the arm of equity; and this would be a serious deprivation, for it might be most important, upon proof of a single violation, to restrain further transgression. Certainly the commissioner of agriculture could not sensibly come into a court of record exercising equity powers, in a case where, E successful, his success would
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur.