Majority
Headnote
1. Municipalities — Common Council — Legislative Powers.The plaintiff is a taxpayer of the city of Rochester, and commenced this action April 21, 1899, pursuant to chapter 301 of the Laws of 1892 and section 1925 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to obtain a judicial determination that the contract set forth in the complaint, and a resolution of the common council authorizing the same, were illegal, and to enjoin the defendants carrying out the same. The complaint, which is very voluminous, sets forth that the common council of the city of Rochester, on. the 11th day of April, 1899, adopted a resolution granting to the defendant telephone company a franchise for its system in said city, and empowering and directing the mayor to execute a contract which had been prepared therefor, and a copy of which is contained in the complaint; that, in compliance with such authority and direction, said contract was duly executed and delivered by said mayor and said telephone company, and that said telephone company has already begun to carry out the same; that while said subject was pending before said common council one Fred Gleason presented to said body his petition, in which he purported to represent others, mainly citizens of Rochester, who were associated together in the enterprise outlined therein, and offered for said franchise which it was then intended to grant to the said Home Telephone Company the
This, in condensed form, is the complaint, and it is apparent it is meager of facts on which to hinge the charge of fraud. The common council of the city is its legislative body, and within its sphere of action its legislative cognizance is supreme, and cannot be fettered or obstructed by judicial interference. Kittinger v. Traction Co., 160 N. Y. 377 , 54 N. E. 1081 ; People v. Fallon, 152 N. Y. 1 -11, 46 N. E. 302 . Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitu
“Restraints on the legislative power of control must be found in the constitution of the state, or they must rest alone in the legislative discretion. If the legislative action in these cases operates injuriously to the municipalities or to individuals, the remedy is not with the courts. The courts have no power tp interfere, and the people must be looked to, to right through the ballot box all these wrongs.”
The charter of the city is the offspring of the legislature. It vests the municipal body with legislative authority, because that delegation is deemed wise and practical on the assumption that the citizens of the municipality and its officers can better legislate for its inhabitants than the state legislature. It is in furtherance of home rule, and is a normal product of the principle of self-government. The transmission of this power vests in the local legislative body, within its restricted range, the same plenary force as if retained and executed by the legislature itself; but it must be borne in mind that the power vests only by explicit warrant. As was said in People v. McIntyre, 154 N. Y. 628 , 49 N. E. 70 , in construing a cognate delegation of authority:
“Within the limits of this delegated power the board of supervisors is clothed with the sovereignty of the state, and is authorized to legislate as to all details precisely as the legislature might have done in the premises.”
People v. Board of Sup’rs, 153 N. Y. 370 , 47 N. E. 790 ; City of Buffalo v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 152 N. Y. 276 , 46 N. E. 496 .
There is a class of cases where the authority exercised by the common council, though delegated by the legislature, is purely administrative in its character, where a different rule prevails. See Weston v. City of Syracuse, 158 N. Y. 274 , 53 N. E. 12 . If courts, even in a case of palpable fraud, possess the power to interfere and restrict a body executing its legislative authority within its prescribed compass, that power will be exercised only in an extraordinary case, and when public policy imperatively requires it. If the courts, on every general charge of fraudulent, collusive conduct against the members of a municipal body with delegated legislative power, should intervene to restrain the execution of its normal duties thus delegated, the clashing between the two co-ordinate branches would be fraught with immeasurable harm. The policy of our constitution is to keep these two branches distinct, each to be supreme in its own domain; and transgression, upon the province of the one would invite a like trespass up^n the other, until the barriers separating the two would be wholly removed. In the present case the only fact upon which the charge of fraud hinges is that the common council declined to accept the proposition of Mr. Gleason, involving, as it is claimed, loss to the city of ¡$15,000. The petition presented did not apprise that body what the occupation, residence, or responsibility of the petitioner was. It was significantly silent as to the names of his associates, and their ability to undertake and perform this contract, of so great importance to the city of Rochester. The defendant telephone company was a body corporate, and that it possessed the financial strength to execute
“Impressive as this allegation is when first read, it will he found on analysis not to allege a single fact which would legally support a conclusion that any member of the common council was bribed, or that he voted in favor of the consent through promise of gain to himself or others.”
The bare allegation that the conduct of the board was fraudulent, or that the contract was illegal, does not state an issuable fact. Tallcott v. City of Buffalo, 125 N. Y. 280 , 26 N. E. 263 . It is a conclusion entirely proper to be stated in summing up an array of facts which support the general charge, but, independent of any fact to uphold it, it is of no weight.
It is contended that the allegation that the request of Mr. Gleason 'was ignored “for the purpose of favoring the defendant the Home Telephone Company of Rochester, N. Y.,” is an averment of a distinct fact upon which the charge of fraud or collusion can be hinged. It is a bald statement without any coincident fact to justify it, and the “favor” may have been from the worthiest of motives. It is inadequate, in any event, to warrant a judicial investigation into the reasons actuating a municipal body in granting a franchise on the charge that it was inspired by corrupt motives, — a field the courts are chary in entering. The averment that the mayor attended the meeting of the lamp committee, and voted thereat, is of no consequence, as the power was vested with and exercised by the common council. Even if the interference of the mayor were unauthorized, there is no suggestion that he continued to exert his in fluence over the council itself, and no fact is alleged in the complaint from which we can spell out any improper, corrupt inter-meddling with the granting of this franchise to the defendant tele
The interlocutory judgment sustaining demurrers affirmed, with costs of this appeal to each respondent, and with leave to amend. All concur; LAUGH LIN, J., in result.
Cases cited
- Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction Co. 160 N. Y. 377 p. 661
- People ex rel. Sturgis v. Fallon 152 N. Y. 1 p. 661
- People ex rel. Wakeley v. McIntyre 154 N. Y. 628 p. 662
- People ex rel. O'Connor v. Board of Supervisors 153 N. Y. 370 p. 662
- City of Buffalo v. New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad 152 N. Y. 276 p. 662
- Weston v. City of Syracuse 158 N. Y. 274 p. 662
- Talcott v. City of Buffalo 125 N. Y. 280 p. 663
- Skaneateles Water Works Co. v. Village of Skaneateles 161 N. Y. 154 at 165, 55 p. 664
- Ghee v. Northern Union Gas Co. 158 N. Y. 510 p. 664