Majority
Headnote
1. Larceny—Evidence.The defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree, and sentenced to be imprisoned in the penitentiary for the term of one year, and, in addition thereto,
“If Dukehart would keep quiet for a few days, it would be all right. I would settle. But * * * I won’t admit having the property, for that would be convicting me.”
The testimony of these witnesses, taken in connection with the explanation given by the defendant, and his conduct prior to and immediately after his arrest, was sufficient to justify the verdict of the jury; and, had they, reached any other conclusion, it would have been clearly against the weight of evidence.
This brings us to the consideration of the other question presented,.
As to the first contention, there is absolutely notMng in the record which justifies even a suspicion that the defendant’s attorney did or -neglected to do anytMng which would have occasioned a different result. It is urged that the value of the jewelry ought not to have been conceded, or the size of the package admitted; but it is not even intimated that upon a new trial either of these facts would be contested, or that they would be changed in any respect. There was no dispute but that the package was delivered, and that it was not subsequently returned, and it is not even suggested that it did not contain jewelry of the value of upward of $25. As to the charge of the court, it is not subject to the criticism placed upon it by the defendant’s counsel; and, if portions of it had been excepted to, the exceptions would have been unavailing, and would not have called for a reversal of the judgment.
As to the second contention, that the newly-discovered evidence would change the result, inasmuch as it would tend to impeach the complaining witnesses (the Dukeharts), there is no force in that; and, indeed, that of itself would not be a ground for a new trial. It has been settled by a long line of decisions that a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence will not be granted in order that the defeated party may impeach the witnesses of his adversary by proving that they are not credible. Corley v. Railroad Co., 12 App. Div. 410 , 42 N. Y. Supp. 941 ; People v. Maguire, 2 Hun, 269 , affirmed in 60 N. Y. 640 ; Schultz v. Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. Super. Ct. Rep. 285. The cases cited, it is true, were not criminal ones; but the same rule is applicable to a criminal case, on a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, that is applicable to a civil case. People v. Baker, 27 App. Div. 597 , 50 N. Y. Supp. 771 . There are no allegations in the moving papers which tend to contradict or vary the testimony of the witnesses of the people as to the commission of the crime by the defendant, and for "which he has been convicted. It is not claimed that the newly-discovered evidence would change in any respect what the people’s witnesses testified to upon the trial as to the receipt by the defendant of the package, its contents, value, and his failure to return it, or as to the admissions made by him prior to or immediately after his arrest. The newly-discovered evidence relates either to the conduct of the defendant’s attorney upon the trial, or an attack upon the character and credibility of the testimony of Dukehart and his wife; and, as already indicated, the record fails to disclose that such attorney either did or failed to do anything to the prejudice of the defendant. The defendant had a fair trial.
We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed. All concur.