Majority
Headnote
Mortgages—Former Judgment por the Debt—Execution—Leave op Court —Appeal—Harmless Error.The assignments of the two bonds and mortgages carried also whatever rights to a deficiency judgment Mrs. Sanford acquired in the foreclosure action which she had prosecuted to judgment. 'So far as the bond and mortgage then foreclosed bore any relation to the two mortgages in suit, they were collateral to them, and the judgment consequently passed with the transfer of the principal debts. Freeman v. Auld, 44 N. Y. 50 -57; Bolen v. Crosby, 49 N. Y. 183 -187; Cobbey, Chat. Mortg. pars. 650, 651. If it did not pass with the assignments, then it was extinguished thereby, for Mrs. Sanford could not retain the collateral judgment as a subsisting demand after she had parted with the considerations themselves. Langdon v. Buell, 9 Wend. 80 -84. The deficiency judgment was a mere incident to the mortgage, and, though based upon the bond, it could not be obtained in the foreclosure action except for the mort
“In an action to foreclose a mortgage a judgment for deficiency is authorized, and may be rendered as incidental to the principal relief demanded, but it cannot be rendered in an action where the plaintiff fails to establish the mortgage."
Mrs. Sanford possesses no rights in this deficiency judgment, and cannot issue an execution thereon. If any one has any such right, it is the plaintiff in this action, who is her successor in title, and we will act on that assumption in the consideration of the questions involved.
It is urged by the appellant that it is necessary for the plaintiff, before commencing this action, to obtain leave of the court so to do, pursuant to section 1628 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and also that an execution should have been issued on the deficiency, and returned unsatisfied, as required by section 1630 of said Code. The philosophy of the requirements of these sections is obviously to prevent an action on the bond and a foreclosure suit to collect the same debt pending at the same time. Dudley v. Congregation, 138 N. Y. 451 -457, 34 N. E. 281 . This is made by section 1630, which is to be construed in connection with the two preceding sections, which reads, “Where final judgment for the plaintiff has been rendered in an action to recover any part of the mortgage debt, an action shall not be commenced or maintained to foreclose the mortgage unless an execution” has been issued and returned unsatisfied. That is, if an action has been brought on the bond, and judgment rendered, execution must issue before the foreclosure suit can be commenced on the mortgage, which is collateral to the bond. Section 1628 is of like import, except then, if the foreclosure action is pending, or final judgment has been rendered therein, an action at law to recover the mortgage debt cannot be commenced without leave of the court. These sections are, therefore, designed to meet a specific purpose. When a bond and mortgage have been given evidencing the same indebtedness, one of which is enforceable in an action at law and the other by a suit in equity, that one remedy must be exhausted before resort can be had to the correlative relief. That is the extent of their application. Section 1629, which, like the other sections, has been long in vogue, and which is a part of the plan intended by them, requires the complaint in -the foreclosure action to state whether any other action has been brought to recover any other part of the mortgage debt, and, if so, what has been collected. That requirement has been complied with in this case, for the complaint sets forth fully the facts pertaining to the preceding suit, brought primarily to foreclose the mortgage of $720; and it further alleges that the surplus remaining after paying this mortgage was applied on the debts represented by the two mortgages in suit. The truth of these.allegations is not assailed, and the defendant has received the benefit of every cent to which he is entitled. These sections are not jurisdictional, but relate to the practice, and the court can even grant the order nunc pro tunc for leave to sue while the action for which leave is necessary is pending. Earle v. David,
So ordered. All concur, except McLENNAN, J., who dissents.
Cases cited
- Freeman v. Auld 44 N. Y. 50 p. 1063
- Bolen v. Crosby 49 N. Y. 183 p. 1063
- Langdon v. Buel 9 Wend. 80 p. 1063
- Dudley v. Congregation of the Third Order of St. Francis 138 N. Y. 451 p. 1064