People ex rel. City of New York v. Woodruff

The contention here made is upon section 86 of the charter of Greater New York. The relator insists that by the provisions of that section the commissioners of the land office have been stripped of their power to grant to a riparian owner in the city of New York adjacent land under water upon the objection of the board of docks of that city that the grant would conflict with the rights of the city under the charter, or be otherwise prejudicial to its interests. This veto power in the board of docks is claimed to be effective without the assignment of any ground for such determination, and howsoever unsubstantial may be ground upon which it actually rests. If this contention be sound, a most material change has been effected by the statute, and the state has devested itself of an important power, which for many years it has exercised, and which has been the source of some revenue to the state. While the power of the state so Lto legislate is unquestioned, the intent to effect so radical a change, involving such vast commercial interests, should be most clearly indicated. In his argument the counsel for the relator asserts three propositions: First. That in the report of the commissioners who framed the New York charter is indicated a purpose to make the city self-governing, and a special purpose to

To the first two propositions are found ready answers.- A general purpose to make the greater city self-governing, and to give to it the control of its water front and the land under water therein, is undoubted. Such a purpose is explicitly expressed in the report of the commissioners. But the control intended to be given was a qualified control. As expressed in the report of the commissioners, it was a control “so far as is necessary to secure and develop the commerce, foreign and domestic, of the city.” That the determination of this question, however, was not given absolutely to the city, is established in the Woodruff Case, 39 App. Div. 123 , 56 N. Y. Supp. 681 . By the charter, upon the demand of the city for this land under water the land commissioners are required to convey. If the absolute power of veto of a grant' to any riparian owner is intended by this provision of the charter, then the city has been given practical dominion over this land. Under the Dongan and Montgomerie charters, land under water adjacent to upland upon the Island of Manhattan had been given in fee to the city of New York. With this legislation in mind, the failure to give to the city this land in fee would seem to indicate an intention on the part of the state to retain the dominion over the same, granting to the city only such interest in or control thereof as might be necessary for the promotion of its commerce, foreign and domestic. The right to determine, as-given by the charter, is not to determine whether the grant shall issue, but to determine whether the issue of the grant will conflict with the rights of the city, or be otherwise prejudicial to its interests; and this right of determination must be construed in connection with' their subsequent duty to report to the commissioners of the land office not their “determination,” not their “conclusion,” but their “conclusions.” This distinction would be hypercritical were it not for the fact that this charter was framed by able lawyers, and in legal procedure “to report their conclusions”- has an accepted significance. A reféree directed to report his conclusions should report his conclusions of fact and law, which would show not only the result reached, but the grounds which led to the result. Such a report is always advisory, and not conclusive. The requirement, then, that the board of docks should report to the commissioners of

To the third proposition submitted by the relator the answer is not so apparent. It is difficult to understand why the statute should thus qualify the grant to which conditions should be annexed. There is found in the statute, however, no express provision making the determination of the board of docks conclusive upon the commissioners of the land office. There is no express provision restraining the commissioners of the land office from issuing any grant not recommended by the board. There is no express provision prohibiting the commissioners from annexing the conditions to a grant not recommended. The absolute power of determination contended for in the board of docks is at the most an inferred power. To determine whether such inference is necessary or legitimate, we must examine not only the words of the statute in which the power is claimed to be implied, but also the nature of the power claimed to be granted, the nature of the powers already held by the body to which it is claimed the grant is made, and any other provisions of the statute, or any other circumstances under which the statute was passed which might give aid to the court in ascertaining what was the real intent of the legislature in 'this enactment. In the first place, this right of determination claimed to be given to the board of docks is in part a right of judicial determination. Their veto may be placed upon the ground that the grant sought will conflict with the rights of the city under the charter. This is a judicial question. The board of docks is presumptively composed of business men. The relator is driven to the position that this judicial question is to be determined by this nonjudicial body, and determined finally. Clearly, the legislature cannot be presumed so to have intended. Again, no provision is made for any hearing before the board of docks. In the case at bar, no hearing was given. Their determination was wholly ex parte. The petition even of the riparian owner was not before them. The law only requires that the board of docks be notified of such an application, upon which notification they are to make their own examination and determination. And yet relator contends that the right of veto of this application is given to a board before which the petitioner has had no opportunity to appear, and which board had not before it even the petition itself. True, the petitioner has no legal right to this grant. The right to petition therefor, however, is given to him, and has been his for many years. In the case at bar the grant sought for is of great value to the petitioner. The court will be slow to deny to the petitioner long-vested rights, if only perchance the right of petition, except by clear mandate of law.

Not only is the nature of the power claimed by the relator one which should be unmistakably given, but it is claimed to be given to a board with interest's antagonistic to the interests of the petitioner. The board is the agent of the city for the purchase of dock property for the city’s ownership. It has the supervision and control of many piers owned by the city itself. These piers are leased

Finally, some aid to the interpretation of this statute may be gleaned from the presumption of law that a grant by the state is of strict construction. The state will not be presumed to have granted to the city a prerogative held in trust not only for the city, but for the whole state, whose commerce enters largely through the port of New York. This relator stands protesting without assigning any ground for its stand, and without a reason suggested, except the possible desire of the city in the future to purchase this land. Their desire is that the land shall remain unimproved, so that,

For these reasons we conclude that the legislature of the state did not intend to renounce to the board of docks of the city the power to determine absolutely whether its own representatives, the commissioners of the land office, should grant its own land. The determination of the commissioners of the land office should, therefore, be confirmed.

Determination of the commissioners of the land office confirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements; order to be settled by SMITH, J. All concur, except MERWIN, J., dissenting.