Majority
Headnote
1. Perjury—Oath—Jurisdiction of Justice—Criminal Prosecution.The charge against the defendant was that on or about the 16th day of March, 1896, he committed the crime of perjury in falsely testifying that he did not indorse a certain promissory note for $150, dated December 9, 1895, made by A. M. Burleson, payable to the order of W. W. Collins, the defendant, three months after date, at the First National Bank of Earlville,' and which purported to be indorsed by W. W. Collins and by C. K. Warren. It appears that such a note was negotiated by Burleson at the bank named, and that when, upon its nonpayment, it was brought to the attention of Collins, he denied ever having indorsed it. Thereupon a criminal proceeding was instituted before George Bergen, a justice of the peace, against Burleson, first for grand larceny, and then for forgery. The justice is dead. From his docket it appears that Burleson was arrested, upon a charge of forgery, and
Upon the trial under review, Mr. Clark, the bank cashier, was called as a witness for the people, and during the course of his direct examination the following occurred:
“Q. Are you familiar with the writing of W. W. Collins? A. I have seen considerable of it. I have seen him write his name. Q. What do you say,— is that signature in his handwriting [referring to the signature in question]? (Objected to as immaterial, incompetent, and improper; the witness not shown competent. The Court: ‘The objection is overruled.’ Exception taken.) A. To the best of my judgment, it is.”
Upon his cross-examination the following occurred:
“Q. On your knowledge of Mr. Collins’ handwriting, as you li&ve seen him write, would you say that [referring to the signature in question] was his genuine handwriting? A. I have not seen him write enough to base any opinion. * * * Q. On what other grounds do you base your opinion aside from the amount you have seen him write? A. I have had signatures supposed to be Mr. Collins’ genuine admitted signatures which I compared. I did not know, they were his signatures. Q. You don’t know they were gen-
nine signatures? A. No, sir. Q. You base your opinion partly on those signatures that you supposed were genuine? A. Yes, sir.”
The counsel for the defendant then moved to strike out the evidence of the witness in regard to Mr. Collins’ handwriting upon the ground that it was inadmissible and improper, and the proper foundation for it had not been laid. The court denied the motion, and the defendant excepted. It is claimed by the defendant—correctly, we think—that the court erred in denying the motion to strike out. The witness did not show himself qualified to testify as to the genuineness of the handwriting, either from his own knowledge or from comparison with signatures known to him to be genuine, or admitted to be so. See People v. Severance, 67 Hun, 182 , 22 N. Y. Supp. 91 ; People v. Dorthy, 50 App. Div. 44 , 63 N. Y. Supp. 592 . The evidence was material, and from the position of the witness it may have had controlling effect with the jury. The error was, we think, of sufficient importance to require a reversal.
When the case was moved for trial, the defendant moved upon affidavits to put the case over the term, upon the ground of the absence of a witness, who was shown to be sick and unable to attend. The defendant claims the motion ought to have been granted. The witness absent was Warren, whose name appeared as indorser on the same note, but whose signature was claimed to have been also forged. The situation of Warren to the case was evidently such that his testimony might be quite material for the defendant. The defendant, in substance, complied with the requisites on such an application as laid down in People v. Jackson, 111 N. Y. 362 , 19 N. E. 54 . The disposition of such an application depends largely on the discretion of the court. Still it seems to us that under the circumstances it might well have been granted.
Judgment and order reversed, and new trial granted. All concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Jackson 111 N. Y. 362 p. 153