Majority
Headnote
1. Costs before Trial.The case was tried in Orange county in June, 1898, and the trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury. It was retried in June, 1899, and a verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff, which verdict the court set aside for misconduct of the jury, ordering “that the action be replaced upon the calendar of this court, and to be tried as though no verdict had been rendered.” In November, 1899, the complaint was dismissed at the circuit because of plaintiff’s default, which was afterwards opened upon payment by plaintiff to defendant of costs of the term and of the motion. In April, 1900, the case was again tried, and the trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. The county clerk, on retaxation of plaintiff’s costs, struck out various items from the bill, and the special term refused to require him to restore any of them. Seven items are in dispute.
1. The sum of $45 was taxed for costs after notice of trial, and clerk rejected $30 of this sum. Under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, $15 only could be taxed for all proceedings after notice and before trial. Seifter v. Railroad Co., 53 App. Div. 443 , 65 N. Y. Supp. 1123 .
2. Each of the three trials occupied more than two days, and the plaintiff had taxed $30 for the extra time. Of this sum the clerk disallowed $20. This was error. Subdivision 3 of section 3251 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows, “for the trial of an issue of fact, thirty dollars; and where the trial necessarily occupies more than two days, ten dollars in addition thereto.” It is settled that this item, so far as the $30 is concerned, may be taxed for every abortive trial, as where the jury disagrees, and, indeed, $90 is taxed for the three trials in this case without objection on the part of the defendant. The same right exists to the $10 as to the $30, and, if the latter item is properly taxed three times, the former should also be so taxed. The trial fee is $30 for each trial conducted within the period of two days, and $40 for each trial which necessarily lasts longer.
3. The plaintiff had taxed $25 for all proceedings after the granting of, and before, the new trial, and this item the clerk disallowed. The plaintiff is entitled to it. The language of subdivision 3, supra, is: “Where a new trial is had, pursuant to an order granting the same, for all proceedings after the granting of, and before the new trial, twenty-five dollars.” When the jury rendered a verdict at the June term, in 1899, the trial, as such, was completed. Nothing then remained to be done but to enter judgment. The action of the court in subsequently setting the verdict aside not only necessarily involved the granting of a new trial, but, by the express terms of the order, a new trial was directed. 'Such new trial was thereafter had pursuant to an order granting the same.
4. The jury fees ($3) paid by the plaintiff to the first jury has been disallowed because of the disagreement. This item, having been actually paid, is a proper disbursement, and should be restored. A juror is entitled to his fees in “each cause in which he is impaneled.” Code Civ. Proc. § 3313.
5. The clerk disallowed the sum of $152 paid by the plaintiff for stenographer’s fees. There are decisions to the effect that the ex
6. By subdivision 4 of section 3307 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the sheriff’s calendar fees are limited to the sum of $1.50, and the clerk was justified in reducing the amount taxed to that sum.
7. The plaintiff, being ultimately ¿warded the right to costs, may tax as a disbursement the witness fees for the November term in 1899, notwithstanding the fact that he was obliged to pay terms to the defendant for opening the default then taken. The terms imposed by the court for the favor granted, and which have been fully complied with, should measure and limit the extent of the plaintiff’s obligation in that regard.
The order appealed from should be so far modified as to require the clerk of Orange county to readjust the plaintiff’s costs in accordance with this opinion, and as so modified the order should be affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. All concur.