to perform in person. Stoner had a right to assign the contract, or in case of his death his executors or administrators would have succeeded to his rights and'liabilities under the contract. The obligations of Stoner under the contract could have been discharged by any one. If the assignment was made without the consent of the plaintiff, the obligations of the contract would still have rested upon Stoner, and resort could have been had to him for the fulfillment of the contract if the same had not been carried out and discharged by his assignee.
Rochester Lantern Co. v. Stiles & Parker Press Co., 135 N. Y. 209 , 31 N. E. 1018 . An assignment of the contract by parol was sufficient to transfer the same to the defendant. Hooker v. Bank,
30 N. Y. 83 ; Doremus v. Williams, 4 Hun, 458 ; Risley v. Bank,
83 N. Y. 318 ; Id.,
111 U. S. 125 , 4 Sup. Ct. 322 ,
28 L. Ed. 374 ; Marcus v. Insurance Co.,
68 N. Y. 625 ; Epstein v. Guaranty Co.,
29 Misc. Rep. 295 , 60 N. Y. Supp. 527 . At the time of the trial an actual written transfer of the contract had been executed and delivered, and plaintiff will not be prejudiced by an adjudication of the rights between the parties to this action under the contract. Sheridan v. Mayor, etc.,
68 N. Y. 30 . The defendant claims, and Stoner testified on the trial, that the contract was assigned by parol, and that the contract itself was actually delivered to the defendant before the' commencement of the action. The decision of the trial court, holding as a matter of law that the contract had not been assigned, was therefore erroneous. The questions as to whether the contract of April 28, 1899, had been released and abandoned by the parties interested therein, whether the plaintiff had assented to an assignment thereof from Stoner to the defendant, as well as the question whether an assignment had in fact been made by parol, and the contract delivered to defendant with intent to pass the title thereto, were questions of fact that should have been submitted to the jury. The contract in regard to making the samples of paper hangings by the plaintiff for the defendant was not in writing. The plaintiff contended that the defendant agreed to pay for the samples, but that it was agreed in connection therewith that in case the defendant gave to the plaintiff a further order for not less than $15,000 of paper hangings, and which order should be for at least 15,000 rolls of blanks and 10,000 rolls of gilts, no payment should be made for the samples. Plaintiff further contended that it had not received an order for paper hangings to the amount of at least $15,000 under such agreement, and that it is entitled to recover for the value of the samples, and evidence was received tending to substantiate its contention. The defendant contended that it never agreed to pay for the samples, but that it did agree to give to the plaintiff an order large enough so that the plaintiff could afford to make the samples for nothing, and that it was stated that such order should be for at least 10,000 rolls of blanks and 5,000 rolls of gilts, and that upon such statement the plaintiff agreed to make the samples for nothing. The defendant further claimed that it gave to the plaintiff an order in compliance with said agreement, and evidence was received tending to substantiate its contention. The defendant also contended that the plaintiff, by entering into the agreement with the Continental Wall-Paper Company, put itself in a