Majority
Headnote
Railroad Mortgage—Bonds—Issue—Trustee’s Authority.Although the more immediate subject of discussion upon this appeal related to the cause of action attempted to be set up in the complaint being on a sealed instrument, and hence not barred by the statute of limitations, 20 years not having-elapsed since the cause of action accrued, as set forth in the reply to the answer, nevertheless, the scope of the inquiry we must make is much broader, and extends to the ascertainment of the sufficiency of the complaint upon the plaintiff’s own theory of the action. It is admitted that the demurrer to the reply searches the whole record, and that judgment must be rendered against the party who committed the first fault in pleading in matter of substance. The plaintiff claims—and, we think, correctly—that it was the intention of the pleader, in drafting the complaint, to declare upon a sealed instrument. There is no express covenant in terms made by the defendant, but it is apparent from the text of the instrument and the conditions indorsed upon the bond that there was an intention of the trust company to bind itself by contract under seal to require something to' be done for the protection of the bondholders before it parted with bonds to the mortgagor. The argument of the plaintiff seems to be that there is a covenant, if not strictly an express one, with the bondholders,—one arising by implication of law enforceable by them, it being for their benefit; that, if there is an implied covenant, an action may be maintained (Booth v. Mill Co., 74 N. Y. 15 ), that made by the trust company with the Oregon Company being regarded necessarily as made for those who should become bondholders. The action, of covenant lies upon contracts under seal either for the nonpayment of money or for not doing or forbearing some other act. Grah. Prac. (2d Ed.) 84. It lies upon a covenant not expressed in words, but which will be implied from the terms of the sealed instrument (Kent v. Welch, 7 Johns. 258 ; Booth v. Mill Co., supra); and, while there is here no direct privity in terms between the plaintiff and other bondholders and the trust company, yet it is argued a covenanted duty manifestly intended for their benefit" may be enforced by them (Van Schaick v. Railroad Co., 49 Barb. 409 ; Coster v. Mayor, etc., 43 N. Y. 399 ). But covenants are not to be inferred in a contract under seal, unless it clearly appears in the contract that the party against whom the implication is sought to be made has plainly intended tó do the act in respect of -which a covenant is sought to be implied. Hornbostel v. Kinney, 110 N. Y. 94 , 17 N. E. 666 . Technically speaking, the action of covenant at common law might not be brought against the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company on this instrument. There is no express covenant in terms made by the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, and an implied covenant can be raised only out of or in connection with some express promise; but, nevertheless, the obligation assumed by the trust company to the bondholders arises out of the sealed instrument. It is not merely the ordinary obligation of a trustee to the persons for whose benefit a trust is created. It is a particular and precise obligation arising out of specific necessary requirements of the sealed instrument; and the practical question upon the record now before us is, what obligations were assumed by the defendant under the terms and conditions upon which it accepted and undertook the trust
Our attention has been called to an opinion of the learned judge of the circuit court of the United States (Frismuth v. Trust Co. [C. C.] 95 Fed. 5 -9) giving a general construction to the very mortgage now before us. We agree in the main With the view taken of the duties of the trustee as stated by that learned judge, but we do not construe particular provisions of the mortgage as he does. According to the condition of the mortgage under which these bonds
Concurrence
RUMSEY, INGRAHAM, and HATCH, JJ., concur.
I concur in the result of the opinion of the* court. The execution of the agreement by the Farmers’ Loan &.
Cases cited
- Booth v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co. 74 N. Y. 15 p. 440
- Kent v. Welch 7 Johns. 258 p. 440
- Van Schaick v. Third Avenue Railroad 49 Barb. 409 p. 440
- Coster v. Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty 43 N. Y. 399 p. 440
- Hornbostel v. Kiinney 110 N. Y. 94 p. 440